Caldwell v. Copeland
Decision Date | 07 January 1861 |
Citation | 37 Pa. 427 |
Parties | Caldwell <I>versus</I> Copeland. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
It is apparent, from that part of the charge of the learned judge which is recited in the first error assigned, that he made the title of Caldwell to the coal in dispute to depend altogether on the actual possession which Caldwell had maintained of the surface, and not at all upon his occasional entries to take coal, of which there was evidence. The judge's language was: —
This proposition would be unquestionable, if there had not been a severance of the title to the mine-right from that of the surface by the deed of 27th May 1831, Caldwell to Greer. But it is not true that after such a severance, whether by reservation or grant, the possession of the surface is possession of the underlying mineral. That mines may form a distinct possession, and a different inheritance from the surface-land, has been long settled in England, as may be seen by reference to the cases cited in the two opinions heretofore delivered in this case, and reported in 7th Casey 476 and 482. See also Barnes v. Manson, 1 Maule & Sel. 84.
It is a common occurrence in mining districts there, not only that the ownership of the soil is vested in one person, and that of the mines in another, but there are frequently distinct ownerships of the minerals in the same land. Thus, one person may be entitled to the iron-ore, another to the limestone; a third to one seam or stratum of coal, and a fourth to a distinct stratum. Title to any of these minerals, quite distinct from the title to the surface, may be shown by documentary evidence, — or, in the absence of such evidence, or in opposition to it, title to them may be made out by proof of possession and acts of ownership under the statute of limitations. The acts of ownership, however, which constitute possession and confer title, must be distinct from such as are exercised over the surface: Tymnith v. Wynne, 2 Barn. & Ald. 554; Cullen v. Rich, Bull. N. P. 102. And see the same case under the name Rich v. Johnson, 2 Strange 1142. So entirely is a mineral-right, after severance, a claim to land, and therefore not an incorporeal hereditament, that title to it cannot be acquired...
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Manning v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co.
...claim the coal had not become barred or extinguished by the statute of limitations at the time of the institution of this suit. Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427, was a between the claimant of underlying coal and the owner of the surface, who claimed to own the coal by adverse possession. Th......
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Carminati v. Fenoglio, 15498
...distinguished from possession of the surface. 1 R.C.L., p. 739, sec. 57; Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N.E. 433; Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427, 78 Am.Dec. 436; Gordon v. Park, 202 Mo. 236, 100 S.W. 621; Newman v. Newman, 60 W.Va. 371, 55 S.E. 377, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 370. The adverse......
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Wallace v. Hoyt
...coal had not become barred or extinguished by the statute of limitations at the time of the institution of this suit. Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427, 78 Am. Dec. 436, was a controversy between the claimant of underlying coal and the owner of the surface, who claimed to own the coal by adv......
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Northcut v. Church
... ... St. Rep. 17; Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, supra; Manning v ... Kansas, etc., Coal Co., 181 Mo. 359, 377-379, 81 S.W ... 140; Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427, 78 Am. Dec ... 436; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284; Huss v ... Jacobs, 210 Pa. 145, 59 A. 991; Virginia Coal, etc., ... ...