Caldwell v. Green

• Citation: 451 F.Supp.2d 811
• Decision Date: 07 September 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:06cv00063.
• Parties: John Joseph CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. Jeff A. GREEN, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Dickenson County, VA, Defendant, and Bobby G. Hammons, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Dickenson County, VA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

451 F.Supp.2d 811

John Joseph CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. Jeff A. GREEN, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Dickenson County, VA, Defendant, and Bobby G. Hammons, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Dickenson County, VA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:06cv00063.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Abingdon Division.

September 7, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Everett Parker Shockley, Dublin, VA, for Plaintiff.

Henry S. Keuling-Stout, Keuling-Stout, P.C., Big Stone Gap, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.

This case was brought before the court by the plaintiff, John Joseph Caldwell, ("Caldwell"), against Deputy Sheriff Jeff A. Green, ("Green"), and Sheriff Bobby G. Hammons, ("Hammons"), of Dickenson County, Virginia, for alleged violations-of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 and 1988. The plaintiff also alleges state law tort claims for battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution. This court has jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Before the court is the motion of Green and Hammons to dismiss this case for the failure of the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), (Docket Item No. 6) ("Motion").

I. Facts

For the purpose of the court's consideration of this motion, the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint will be accepted as true. In 2004, Green was a deputy sheriff in Dickenson County, Virginia and his supervisor was Hammons, the elected sheriff of Dickenson County. In his capacity as a sheriffs deputy, Green used informants in his investigations of drug activity in the county.

Green began using Curtis Hale, ("Hale"), as an informant beginning in 2004. Hammons may have known that Green was using Hale as an informant, but at no time did Hammons take any action to stop this use of Hale. It is also noted that Hale sold drugs and was involved in a drug deal on January 24, 2004, for which he was later indicted.

In 2004, Green received information from Hale that "John Caldwell," a resident of Montgomery County, Virginia, had illegally sold him drugs on January 24 and 25, 2004. Acting on this information, Green obtained a picture of John Joseph Caldwell from the Department of Motor Vehicles and showed it to Hale. At that time John Joseph Caldwell resided in Montgomery County and had no criminal record. Based on the photograph, Hale positively identified John Joseph Caldwell as the man who sold him drugs in January.

On September 13, 2004, Green was called to testify before a grand jury in Dickenson County. He testified truthfully to the information provided to him by Hale. In so doing, he testified that John Joseph Caldwell was identified by Hale as the "John Caldwell" who had sold him drugs illegally in January. As a result of this testimony, the grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against John Joseph Caldwell for distributing controlled substances.

On May 28, 2005, John Joseph Caldwell was arrested by a police officer in Christiansburg, Virginia, and was taken to Dickenson County. He remained in jail until June 11, 2005, when he was released on bail. Caldwell asserted that he was not the correct "John Caldwell." It is unclear to whom this was asserted, but it does not appear that the Sheriffs Department investigated these claims. Green, however, did provide the Commonwealth's Attorney for Dickenson County transcripts of tape recorded drug transactions which he received from Hale. Green believed these transcripts included evidence of "John Caldwell's" alleged January drug transactions. However, these tapes had been fabricated by Hale.

At some point after the grand jury indicted John Joseph Caldwell a large number of the indictments obtained in Dickenson County during 2004 based on information provided by Hale were dismissed.

In February 2006, John Joseph Caldwell, with the aid of a private investigator and his attorney, was able to convince the Commonwealth's Attorney that he was not the "John Caldwell" that had sold drugs to Hale. The Commonwealth's Attorney then dismissed the indictment against John Joseph Caldwell nolle prosequi.

An individual by the name of John Clinton Caldwell is currently being prosecuted for the drug offenses Hale described. John Clinton Caldwell was also a resident of Montgomery County with an extensive criminal record, but Green was unable to discover his existence or locate a picture to show Hale during the investigation or any time subsequent.

II. Analysis of 12(b)(6) Grounds for the Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a compliant. In considering such a motion, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See De Sole v. U.S., 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969)).

In order to grant the motion it must appear certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.1999). When a 12(b)(6) motion deals with a civil rights complaint, the court should not dismiss the claim unless it appears certain that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged. Harrison v. United States Postal Service, 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.1988). However, the court need not accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiffs complaint. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Furthermore, mere legal conclusions couched as factual allegations need not be accepted as true. Assa'Ad-Faltas v. Virginia, 738 F.Supp. 982, 985 (E.D.Va.1989) (citing Papasan v. Allain 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).

A. Civil Rights Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The plaintiffs primary claim is a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983 one must allege that a defendant (1) acted under color of state law and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right, privilege or immunity. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2003). This section should be broadly construed. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991). However, it should be construed to respect proper balance between the states and the federal government in law enforcement. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951) (quoting Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 108, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945)).

Green and Hammons do not challenge that Caldwell's claims are based on actions the defendants performed under color of state law. The dispute over this motion to dismiss centers upon whether the second component of a § 1983 claim, the deprivation of a constitutional right, has been properly pleaded.

As the basis for his § 1983 claim, Caldwell alleges that his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were infringed by Green and Hammons. However, the plaintiff's complaint and the plaintiffs response to the defendant's motion to dismiss provide facts dealing with violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments only. The constitutional violations Caldwell alleges are that he was subject to an unreasonable seizure of his person by a state official and that he was deprived of his liberty by a state official. There was no attempt by the plaintiff to set forth any facts alleging any violation under the Fifth Amendment.

Therefore, the court will examine only the alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court will separately address the alleged constitutional violations and determine if the plaintiff has meet the legal requirements to establish a claim under § 1983. This analysis will begin with the claims against Green. The claims against Sheriff Hammons are all derived from the actions of Green. Therefore, if Green's actions are found not to violate § 1983, Hammons actions as Green's supervisor will not violate § 1983.

1. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Green Based on His Initiation of Caldwell's Prosecution

The Fourth Amendment claim asserted by Caldwell is that he was arrested without probable cause and, thus, subjected to an unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of § 1983. Caldwell is essentially asserting a constitutional tort claim of malicious prosecution based on Fourth Circuit precedent from Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.1989), and Lewis v. McDorman, 820 F.Supp. 1001 (W.D.Va. 1992).

The plaintiff acknowledges that Green did not personally arrest Caldwell or obtain the arrest warrant. Instead, the arrest was pursuant to an indictment returned by a Dickenson County grand jury. However, these facts alone are not grounds for dismissal. The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Goodwin, in the context of a police officer who withheld exculpatory information and induced a prosecutor to bring a case they would not have otherwise brought. See 885 F.2d at 162. The court concluded that a police officer cannot escape liability simply because he had no power to terminate a prosecution once it began, if that officer initiated the prosecution. See Goodwin, 885 F.2d at 162: However, as noted by Judge Crigler in Lewis v. McDorman, 820 F.Supp. at 1005 (discussing the Goodwin case also in the context of a law enforcement officer withholding potentially exculpatory information), "the relevant issue was causation." If the defendant's actions tainted the prosecutor's decision to bring the case or caused the...