Caldwell v. Hammonds

• Decision Date: 31 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 97-2405(GK).,Civ.A. 97-2405(GK).
• Citation: 53 F.Supp.2d 1
• Parties: Lawrence CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. Cedric HAMMONDS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1

53 F.Supp.2d 1

Lawrence CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. Cedric HAMMONDS, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 97-2405(GK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 31, 1999.

Lawrence D. Caldwell, Lorton, VA, plaintiff pro se.

Michael Alan Stern, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Washington, D.C., for the defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KESSLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a D.C. prisoner, filed this Complaint pro se, seeking damages from the District of Columbia and several employees of its Department of Corrections for injuries suffered as a result of allegedly unconstitutional actions in violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The parties have filed supplemental pleadings and have submitted various documents in support of their positions.

Plaintiff's verified Complaint contains essentially four claims: first, that the conditions in Cell Block 3 at the Maximum Security Facility ("Maximum") at Lorton are so outrageous as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment; second, that the procedures under which he was transferred to that cellblock, and his attempts to appeal the transfer, were racially motivated in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and equal protection; third, that the limitations on use of legal materials by prisoners housed in Cell Block 3 violate his right of access to the courts; and fourth, that the Defendants displayed deliberate indifference to his right to medical treatment for skin cancer and other illnesses he suffered as a result of the conditions prevalent in Cell Block 3.

The Defendants' motion is based on three grounds: that the complaint fails to state a claim against the District of Columbia for municipal liability; that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit; and, finally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against the Defendants based on any "known constitutional right". Although the Defendants have moved in the alternative for summary judgment, they have not submitted any affidavits or verified exhibits to controvert the allegations of the Complaint. Consequently, Defendants' motion will be treated as a motion to dismiss, not as a motion for summary judgment. On consideration of all the pleadings, the applicable case law, and the entire record herein, the motion to dismiss Count V will be granted. In all other respects the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment will be denied. Counsel will be appointed to represent Plaintiff.

I. The allegations of the Complaint.

Plaintiff, of Irish-American heritage, is serving a sentence of 20 years to life for a violation of the District of Columbia Code committed in May, 1971. Since 1994, Plaintiff has been incarcerated at the Lorton Reformatory. In addition to the District of Columbia, Plaintiff names as Defendants, in their individual capacities, Cedric Hammonds, Unit Manager of Cell Block 6 at the Maximum at Lorton; Dale Schultz, Staff Psychologist at Maximum; Irma Brady, Chief of Classification and Parole, at Maximum; Belinda Watson Barney, Acting Warden of Maximum, and Adrienne Poteat, Acting Deputy Director for Institutions for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. All individual Defendants except Schultz are African-American. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are responsible for following "clearly established constitutional, statutory, and local law" including the Lorton Act (28 D.C.Mun.Reg. §§ 500-531). Moreover, he alleges, Defendants Barney and Poteat are responsible for directing their subordinates so as to correct "obvious violations of law brought to [their] attention through personal observation or verbal or written notice". (Cpt.¶¶ 2-8).

Plaintiff alleges that the Maximum Security Facility "is among the nation's most wretched, antiquated, dungeon-like prisons of its kind". It is, he contends, "a particularly hostile racial environment for a Caucasian prisoner such as Plaintiff". The inmates at Maximum are the "most violent and aggressive [sic] inmates" and a majority are on lock-down status. The heating and ventilation systems "are in extremely poor condition" and there is no ventilation system in some of the housing units. (Cpt. ¶ 9).

On May 6, 1997, Plaintiff was transferred to Maximum from the Medium Security Facility ("Medium") and placed in a control cell on Cell Block 6. (Cpt. ¶ 10). Two days later, without written notice of a hearing, he was brought before Defendants Hammonds, Schultz, and Brady. He was advised by Hammonds that the hearing was to "classify" him within Cell Block 6. Hammonds told Plaintiff that he did not require counsel and that he should sign a waiver of the right to counsel to expedite his hearing. (Cpt. ¶ 11). However, as soon as Plaintiff signed the waiver, Hammonds announced without consultation with Brady or Schultz that Plaintiff would be placed in Cell Block 3 ("CB 3"), the disciplinary unit. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants "purposely misled [him] so that he would waive his right to representation and to call witnesses pursuant to" the Lorton Act. (Cpt. ¶ 11).

Plaintiff immediately protested that because the purpose of the hearing had been changed, he should be allowed counsel. He was not allowed to revoke his waiver. Plaintiff had been told the hearing was not related to the situation that had caused his transfer from Medium to Maximum. However, Hammonds told him that he was being placed in the disciplinary unit because he had been found in possession of "major contraband" at Medium. (Cpt. ¶ 11). Schultz confirmed that the suicide/psychiatric unit was in Cell Block 3, but assured Plaintiff that it was only one of four tiers, and that he would not be on that tier. In fact, Plaintiff was placed on the suicide/psychiatric tier. (Cpt. ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges that these actions were based on a discriminatory racial animus, and were purposely designed to deprive him of his rights under the Lorton Act and to place him in a unit where they knew he "would be exposed to the most physically dangerous and psychologically stressful environment available". (Cpt. ¶ 11).

Plaintiff submitted an appeal to Defendant Barney, which was returned as being on the wrong form. He submitted a second appeal, by letter rather than on a form, which was returned ostensibly because it again was on the same wrong form. He submitted the appeal a third time but at the time suit was filed in October, 1997, this Defendant had taken no action on the appeal. (Cpt. ¶ 12).

When Plaintiff was moved to Cell Block 3, in a cell on the lower level, the suicide/psychiatric watch tier, he was received by the other residents with various epithets, which were both racial and derogatory names used for police informants. He was threatened with bodily harm and sexual attack. Staff employed in the unit heard these threats. (Cpt. ¶ 13).

Paragraphs 14,¹ 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, and 30 contain allegations of grossly unsanitary conditions experienced by Plaintiff while he was housed on Cell Block 3. When he arrived, he found two milk cartons in his cell containing human feces, and fecal matter smeared on the walls. Foul smelling water leaked over the sink. He was refused cleaning materials and his request to repair the leak was ignored. (Cpt. ¶ 14(a).)

Many of the mentally ill prisoners on Cell Block 3 do not shower. Others urinate in the shower stalls, which are not cleaned. The unit is infested with flies, cockroaches, and ants in the warmer months. (Cpt. ¶ 15). There is no mechanized ventilation in Cell Block 3. More than 99% of the prisoners at Maximum use smoking materials although D.C. law prohibits smoking in government buildings and Cell Block 3 is posted with "No Smoking" signs. The smoking materials are lit with "wicks" of toilet paper which burn for hours. (Cpt. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that on Cell Block 3 he was subjected to more secondary tobacco smoke and particulate matter than in other cellblocks in Maximum because more of the prisoners in that cell block smoke. He alleges that the failure of staff to implement the no smoking policy "is so widespread, of long duration, pattern, practice, and routine as to constitute a policy which has significantly put [his] health and well being at risk". (Cpt. ¶ 33).

On May 15, 1997, two inmates in the cellblock were "maced" by staff. The staff refused to open windows. Plaintiff's lungs, eyes, and nasal passages "were irritated severely" by the gas, which lingered for at least 20 minutes. (Cpt. ¶ 17). Five days later, a fire was started in an upper level cell, causing smoke and debris which lingered in the air; staff did not attempt to disburse the smoke. (Cpt. ¶ 18.) The next day, another fire was set on the upper level tier. Prisoners on the upper level flooded the lower level by plugging their toilets so they overflowed. The flooding continued for the next three days. Prisoners urinated and threw feces into the water. Between ¼ and ½ inch of waste material accumulated on the floor of Plaintiff's cell. The staff made no effort to clean the water until May 26, and refused to allow the prisoners cleaning materials such as mops and brooms. Plaintiff alleges that the failure to clean this water that the staff "knew was contaminated with human waste show willful, malicious, and deliberate indifference to the health and safety of Plaintiff". (Cpt. ¶ 19). Fires were set in the cellblock on June 2, June 21, and June 27. Each time staff waited before bringing air evacuation fans onto the tiers. As a result, Plaintiff alleges, he suffered from smoke inhalation, his nostrils being "coated with black soot and other particulate matter" causing adverse effects on his eyes, throat, and lungs. On June 27 he requested and was refused medical treatment. (Cpt. ¶¶ 20, 24, 27). On June 27, there was additional flooding from the upper level, which brought more...