Caldwell v. Maloney
| Decision Date | 17 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1511,98-1511 |
| Citation | 159 F.3d 639 |
| Parties | Michael CALDWELL, Petitioner, Appellee, v. Michael T. MALONEY, Respondent, Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Gregory I. Massing, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellant.
Alan Jay Black for appellee.
Before BOUDIN, LYNCH, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
Michael Caldwell, an African-American man, was tried in Massachusetts state court in 1986 for the rape, sexual assault, and kidnapping of two women, who were white. During jury selection, defense counsel timely objected to four of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges, asserting that the prosecutor had purposefully struck all the black 1 jurors on the basis of their race. The trial judge overruled the objection, and Caldwell was ultimately convicted on all charges by a jury that had no black members. These convictions were reversed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court on the ground that several of the challenges were impermissibly race-based; but that ground was rejected and the conviction was reinstated by the unanimous Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
On subsequent habeas review, the federal district court, finding that two of the peremptory challenges at issue were discriminatory under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), thus disagreeing with both the state court which had tried the case and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring Caldwell to be retried or released. Under governing Supreme Court precedent, we now reverse the order issuing the writ of habeas corpus.
At about 3 a.m. on August 18, 1985, two young white women left a hotel in downtown Springfield after a pre-wedding party. As they approached their car, an African-American man came up behind them, held up a knife, and ordered them into the front seat. He then drove them to a park, where he raped one of the women repeatedly and forced both of them to perform various sexual acts. The attack lasted about an hour and a half. When the man was ready to leave, the car would not start, so he walked with the two women for about a mile, then left them.
Both of the women selected Michael Caldwell's photograph from a photo array, and details and descriptions given by the women (such as the attacker's preferred brand of cigarette) corresponded to Caldwell's habits and appearance. When Caldwell was arrested and informed that he was suspected of kidnapping and rape, he responded, "two white girls?" In his statement to the police, Caldwell said that on the night in question he was with his girlfriend until about 3 a.m., arrived at Antonio's Grinders at 4 a.m. and found it closed, and then went to his grandparents' house and went to sleep. Caldwell later changed his statement and said that he was with his girlfriend until about 2:45 a.m., went to Pizza King a few minutes later and ordered a sandwich, and reached his grandparents' house at 3:00 or 3:30 a.m.
Caldwell was charged with rape, kidnapping, and related counts, and jury selection for his trial took place in Hampden County Superior Court on March 27, 28, and 31, 1986. At the selection, the judge first asked the prospective jurors general questions as a group, then brought the jurors in one by one and, in the presence of counsel, asked ten additional questions, elaborating as necessary. 2 Each juror also filled out a questionnaire. 3 3
The state trial judge sought to empanel sixteen jurors. After finding eligible and seating enough prospective jurors to fill the jury, the judge permitted peremptory challenges. The judge then refilled the jury box with eligible jurors after each challenge or group of challenges was exercised. The Commonwealth challenged a group of six jurors, then an additional juror; Caldwell challenged a group of eight, then two jurors, then one more. The Commonwealth then exercised five more peremptory challenges. At this point, Caldwell's counsel objected, stating that the prosecutor had "challenged three or four blacks that were seated on the panel."
At the time of these challenges, the Supreme Court had not yet decided its seminal case prohibiting racially motivated peremptory challenges, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). But the court proceeded to hold a hearing under the authority of Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), which, under article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, provided at least as much protection for defendant as does Batson. 4 See id. at 515-16. At that hearing, the state trial judge reviewed the answers of each of the prospective jurors to voir dire and reviewed the prosecutor's reasons for the challenge. This review occurred immediately after the challenges were made, when the jurors were still present and their responses were fresh in the mind of the trial court. The review also occurred before the court accepted the challenges to these four jurors. The issue was whether the prosecutor purposefully discriminated on the basis of race in challenging prospective jurors 4-1, 4-2, 4-5, and 5-1, all four of whom were part of the prosecutor's last group of five challenges. We describe the proceedings in the state trial court in detail.
Juror 4-1's answers to the questions about police officer credibility were as follows:
After this exchange, the judge proceeded to the questions designed to discern racial bias:
The prosecutor's stated reason for the challenge of this juror was his "perception of her reactions"; the prosecutor said that most of her answers had been clear but that he thought she was "equivocating" and "hesitat[ing]" in her answers to the police-officer-related questions. He also indicated that her statement that police officers "should be more truthful" gave him concern. 5 The court ruled that "from my point of view at this time, based on what I have seen and what I have heard," the challenge was acceptable.
At the conclusion of juror 4-2's individual voir dire, the prosecutor told the court that police officer Michael Sands, who was sitting at counsel table with the prosecutor and who had been named as a witness, thought that he might have had dealings with members of the juror's family in the North End of Springfield (the juror's last name and the fact that she had eight children were apparently listed on her questionnaire). The court asked the juror if she had ever lived in the North End of Springfield, and she said that she had. However, before the questioning proceeded any further, the prosecutor said, "I withdraw any further questions with respect to this juror at this time, your Honor," and the juror was seated.
The prosecutor offered two reasons in support of his later peremptory challenge of this juror: Officer Sands's contact with the juror's family, and the juror's former residence in the North End, where she allegedly lived "within a few streets" of Caldwell's home and might therefore have known or have heard of Caldwell or members of his family. 6 The judge accepted this explanation. 7
The individual voir dire of juror 4-5 began with the judge asking the juror if she understood all of the written questions, to which she replied, "[t]he best I could." He also asked her if he was reading the questions too quickly. After the juror answered all of the judge's questions, this colloquy ensued:
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