Caldwell v. Nocco, Case No: 8:14-cv-2167-T-30AEP
| Decision Date | 22 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 8:14-cv-2167-T-30AEP |
| Parties | CORNELIUS CALDWELL, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS NOCCO and GENE SMITH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
In this action alleging violations of state and federal civil rights, Plaintiff Cornelius Caldwell claims that he was unlawfully arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 23) and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Dkt. 30). The Court has reviewed the pleadings, depositions, record evidence, and the relevant law and concludes that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
On the evening of Saturday, April 6, 2013, Caldwell and two friends, Stinyard and Solar, went to a party at the home of an acquaintance. (Caldwell Dep., p. 20). There, Stinyard and Solar, the parties agree, both drank alcohol. (Id. at 29). All three stayed at the party till approximately 5:00 AM on Sunday April 7, though Caldwell slept for a few hours in an upstairs bedroom. (Id. at 20). When they left, the three friends first took a fourth friend home and then drove toward Dade City, where they planned to go fishing. At just after 6:00 AM, Caldwell was driving the three on Route 301 as they approached a small hill. (Id. at 32-33). Pasco County Sheriff's Deputy Gene Smith, meanwhile, was in his patrol car, in the median, just over that hill. (Id. at 33).
Deputy Smith has been in law enforcement, in Michigan and in Florida, since 1995, with a few breaks for military service and other employment. (Smith Dep., p. 9, 15, 25). He began working for the Pasco County Sheriff's Office in 2009. In 2011 he was chosen for the Selective Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP), a police unit that undergoes advanced training and specializes in DUI and drug enforcement. (Id. at 59). As part of that unit, Smith attended Advanced Roadside Impairment Detection training (ARID), where attendees learn about various drugs and the effects they have on people who are under the influence of them. (Id. at 78-79). For most of his career Smith has been in traffic enforcement, during which time he has made more than 300 DUI arrests. (Id. at 42).
When Caldwell drove over the hill on Route 301, he was speeding, and Smith initiated a traffic stop. (Caldwell Dep., p. 33). Beyond this, the parties dispute most of the facts surrounding the traffic stop. In fact, the disputes begin before the stop occurred. Caldwell, for example, believed that he was travelling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mph zone. Smith, according to his deposition testimony and arrest affidavit, clocked Caldwell on radar at 65 mph. Upon seeing Smith's patrol car, Caldwell testified that he slowed to 55 mph; Smith testified that he slammed his brakes and dropped to 30 mph. (Caldwell Dep., p. 34; Smith Dep., p. 90).1 Smith testified that Caldwell was slow to pull over. (Smith Dep., p.101). Caldwell, on the other hand, testified that Smith did not initiate the stop until Caldwell had traveled miles past his patrol car. (Caldwell Dep., p. 35-36).
When Smith approached the car he did not smell alcohol or drugs, but nonetheless suspected that Caldwell was under the influence of drugs. Smith testified, "[Caldwell's] pupils were the size of flying saucers" and they did not respond to Smith's flashlight. (Smith Dep., p. 102). Smith further testified that he greeted Caldwell politely, introduced himself, and upon seeing Caldwell react slowly to light, asked if he had had any drinks that night. In response, Caldwell looked "lethargic, kind of dazed, out there, out of it" and admitted to having had a few drinks. (Id. at 101; 105).
Caldwell recounts their exchange differently. "He was very aggressive," Caldwell testified. "He told me to put my hands up—or, all of [our hands] where he could see them." (Caldwell Dep., p. 37). According to Caldwell, he does not drink or do drugs, and he told Smith that he had not consumed alcohol that evening. (Id. at 38). Caldwell testified that, at all times during the traffic stop, he was awake and alert. (Id. at 45).
Smith called for backup, and three officers soon arrived on scene. (Smith Dep., p. 112). Smith then had Caldwell perform roadside sobriety tests. They offer differing accounts of how Caldwell performed. According to Smith, Caldwell failed the Walk and Turn, the One Leg Stand, and the Finger to Nose tests. (Dkt. 30-3). Caldwell recalls the Walk and Turn and the One Leg Stand, and also recalls being told to spell the alphabet forwards and backwards. (Smith Dep., p. 43-44). Aside from the backwards-alphabet test, which Caldwell considered an unreasonable test, he testified that he passed the tests, that he "walked that line perfectly." (Caldwell Dep., p. 45). Caldwell and his passenger Stinyardalso testified that Stinyard tried to video record the encounter and Caldwell's performance on the field sobriety tests, but that he stopped when Smith threatened him with arrest. (Caldwell Dep., p. 51; Stinyard Dep., p. 24). Smith does not recall anyone ever trying to record their encounter.
After the field sobriety tests were completed, Smith arrested Caldwell on suspicion of DUI. The parties also agree that Smith conducted the investigation alone and that the other officers merely provided backup and paid little attention to the interactions between Smith and Caldwell.
Although not necessary to resolve this motion, a few additional, undisputed facts provide helpful context. At the station, Caldwell took a breathalyzer test which returned a reading of 0.00. (Dkt. 30-1). Caldwell also provided a urine sample. His first attempt to provide urine failed, however, because he dropped the specimen cup into the toilet. (Caldwell Dep., p. 57). Smith gave him a second cup, warned him not to drop it again, and observed Caldwell supply a sample. (Id. at 58). Caldwell was then sent to a holding cell, where he remained until his release later that day. (Caldwell Dep., Ex. 2).
Caldwell's urine specimen was tested at a Tallahassee lab of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) on April 26, 2013. The test did not detect the presence of any drugs, though at the time the FDLE did not test for bath salts or synthetic marijuana. . Physical searches of Caldwell and his car likewise failed to find any evidence of drug use. The criminal case against Caldwell for DUI was later reduced by the State Attorney's Office to a traffic citation for careless driving. (Smith Dep., p. 142).
Caldwell's lawsuit has three counts. Count I is a state law claim for false arrest against the sheriff of Pasco County, Chris Nocco, in his official capacity and on a theory of vicarious liability. Count II is a state law claim for false arrest against Smith in his individual capacity. And Count III is also a claim for false arrest against Smith in his individual capacity, but under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Nocco and Smith move for summary judgment on all counts. The Court will discuss each count below, in reverse order, and grant the motion only on Count II.
A motion for summary judgment forces a court to "pierce the pleadings and [] assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Motions for summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue over any material fact and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; rather, the record must reveal a "genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Facts are material if, under the applicable substantive law, they might affect the outcome of the case. See id. And disputes over those facts are genuine"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id.
The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying" the relevant documents that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
If the moving party meets its burden, non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Conclusory allegations will not suffice. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). Neither will "a mere scintilla of evidence supporting" the non-movant's claims. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (1th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). The non-movant must instead present facts that are significantly probative to support those claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 ().
This Court may not decide a genuine dispute over a material fact at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). If any such dispute exists, "the Court must deny the motion and...
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