Caldwell v. Percy
| Citation | 314 N.W.2d 135,105 Wis.2d 354 |
| Parties | John CALDWELL, Ronald Fisher, Kenneth Jaworski and Anthony Scifo, Plaintiffs- Respondents, v. Donald PERCY, Burton Wagner, Thomas Israel, James Powell and E. F. Schubert, Defendants-Appellants. * 80-1593. |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1981 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
Robert D. Repasky, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for defendants-appellants; Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., on brief.
Elizabeth Alexander, Asst. State Public Defender, for plaintiffs-respondents.
Before GARTZKE, P. J., and BABLITCH and DYKMAN, JJ.
Plaintiffs in this class action have been committed to the department of health and social services (department) for specialized treatment under the sex crimes law. 1 Plaintiffs allege that they have been transferred, or are in danger of being transferred, to a correctional institution for the sole purpose of confinement in violation of their right to treatment under the sex crimes law and of their rights under the mental health act. 2 Plaintiffs seek an injunction against such transfers, a declaration that their rights have been violated, and money damages. 3 The trial court certified the class and granted partial summary judgment. We reverse in part the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
The sex crimes law provides that certain sex offenders must, and other sex offenders may, be committed upon conviction to the department for a presentence social, physical and mental examination. Secs. 975.01 and 975.02, Stats. The department is required to report the results of the examination to the trial court with a recommendation for or against specialized treatment for the defendant's mental and physical aberrations. Sec. 975.04. If specialized treatment is recommended, the defendant is entitled to a hearing on the need for specialized treatment. If it is found that the defendant is in need of treatment or if he waives the hearing, the court must commit him to the department and either order him conveyed to a sex crimes law facility designated by the department or stay execution of the commitment and place the defendant on probation with the condition that he receive treatment in a manner prescribed by the court. Sec. 975.06. If the department does not recommend specialized treatment, the court may not commit the defendant to the department but must instead sentence him. Sec. 975.05; Schmidt v. State, 68 Wis.2d 512, 228 N.W.2d 751 (1975).
Plaintiffs in this action were committed to the department for specialized treatment. They were sent to Central State Hospital (CSH) for that purpose. They allege that, apparently because they are considered untreatable or unwilling to accept treatment, they have been transferred or are in danger of being transferred to the Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI). They further allege that criticism of the treatment program may be interpreted as unwillingness to accept treatment. Plaintiffs claim that they do not receive treatment or receive inadequate treatment at WCI, and that the decision to transfer them there represents an abandonment of treatment. They also allege that their rights under sec. 51.61, Stats., apply to their confinement at WCI and that those rights are being violated.
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment to establish that: (1) they have a statutory right to treatment under the sex crimes law; (2) their transfer from a treatment facility to a prison, followed by incarceration indistinguishable from a penal sentence, violates their statutory right to treatment; (3) their transfer could not legally deprive them of their rights guaranteed by sec. 51.61, Stats.
The trial court concluded that the department lacked statutory authority to transfer plaintiffs from CSH to WCI. The court entered judgment providing that persons committed under the sex crimes law may be transferred only from one treatment facility to another treatment facility as defined in sec. 51.01(15), Stats. The judgment further provided that the rights guaranteed by sec. 51.61, are not restricted by the operation of sec. 53.18.
We view the issues raised on appeal to be:
1. Does the sex crimes law provide plaintiffs with a statutory right to treatment?
2. Did the department have statutory authority to transfer plaintiffs from CSH to WCI?
3. Do the rights guaranteed by sec. 51.61, Stats., apply to committed sex offenders who are transferred to WCI?
The parties' dispute is centered on the correct interpretation of sec. 975.08, Stats. That statute provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) The department shall then arrange for (the committed person's) treatment in the institution best suited in its judgment to care for him. It may transfer him to or from an institution to provide for him according to his needs and to protect the public. The department may irrespective of his consent require participation by him in vocational, physical, educational and correctional training and activities; may require such modes of life and conduct as seem best adapted to fit him for return to full liberty without danger to the public; and may make use of other methods of treatment and any treatment conducive to the correction of the person and to the prevention of future violations of law by him.
(3) The department may make use of law enforcement, detention, parole, medical, psychiatric, psychological, educational, correctional, segregative and other resources, institutions and agencies, public or private, within the state. The department may enter into agreements with public officials for separate care and special treatment (in existing institutions) of persons subject to the control of the department under this chapter. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs argue that the sex crimes law creates a right to treatment and that transfers pursuant to sec. 975.08, Stats., may be made only for the purpose of providing treatment to committed persons. The trial court agreed with that position, and ruled that the statutes only allow transfer between treatment facilities. 4
Defendants' argument is two-fold. They first contend that the department may transfer offenders to an institution for purposes other than treatment. They note that transfer to a correctional facility is specifically authorized by sub. (3) and argue that sub. (2) allows transfer "to or from an institution," including a correctional institution, within the department's discretion. Defendants agree that the sex crimes law contemplates some form of treatment at the onset of the commitment, but stress that the committed person's release is conditioned only on a determination that he is no longer dangerous, not on his cure or on the exhaustion of all possible treatments. Secs. 975.13 and 975.14, Stats. Defendants contend that if in the department's opinion no further treatment is appropriate, the legislature has given it discretion to transfer committed persons to correctional institutions until they are no longer dangerous.
Defendants' second argument is that even if it is required to provide treatment to all committed offenders during the entire term of their commitments, plaintiffs have not proved that it has failed in that duty.
A reasonably well-informed person could understand sec. 975.08, Stats., to permit transfer for any reason, or to allow transfer solely for the purpose of treatment. Because the statute can be understood in either of two senses, it is ambiguous. Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis.2d 433, 441, 287 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1980). We may interpret an ambiguous statute by examining its language "in relation to the statute's context, scope, history, subject matter, and object intended to be accomplished." Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Mut. Savings & Loan, 96 Wis.2d 438, 450, 291 N.W.2d 869, 875 (1980). The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 164, 288 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1980).
We begin our search for the legislature's intent by examining the language of the statute and of related statutes.
In construing a statute, the primary source is the language of the statute itself. The entire section and related sections are to be considered in its construction or interpretation. In determining the meaning of any single phrase or word in a statute, it is necessary to look at it in light of the whole statute. White Hen Pantry v. Buttke, 98 Wis.2d 119, 122, 295 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Ct.App.1980), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wis.2d 169, 301 N.W.2d 216 (1981) (citations omitted).
We also bear in mind the "cardinal rule" that we are to seek the purpose of the act as a whole and to favor a construction which gives effect to that purpose over a construction which defeats the manifest object of the act. Student Asso., U. of Wis.-Milw. v. Baum, 74 Wis.2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622, 627 (1976).
Application of these rules prevents us from adopting the defendants' position that sec. 975.08(3) is sufficient in itself to establish that the legislature intended to grant the department discretion to transfer committed sex offenders to a correctional institution for any purpose. The language of the statute as a whole indicates an intent to require the department to provide treatment to those committed to it. We must construe sub. (3) in light of sub. (2), which directs the department to "arrange for (the committed person's) treatment in the institution best suited in its judgment to care for him." (Emphasis added.) That subsection allows for transfers between institutions to provide for the committed person according to his needs. It further permits the department to make use of any methods of treatment conducive to the person's correction. The statute as a whole emphasizes the goal of treating the committed offender and is a strong indicator that the legislature intended that such offenders would be...
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