Caldwell v. Quinlan
| Decision Date | 25 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 88-0292. |
| Citation | 729 F. Supp. 4 |
| Parties | L. Daniel CALDWELL, Plaintiff v. J. Michael QUINLAN, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
L. Daniel Caldwell, pro se.
Plaintiff L. Daniel Caldwell, a former inmate incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois,1 brings this pro se civil rights complaint against the Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Director"). In his complaint, plaintiff, a nonsmoker, claims that his frequent exposure to passive tobacco smoke violates his Eighth Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that defendant's actions are unconstitutional and an injunction requiring defendant to provide plaintiff with a completely smoke-free environment. At bar is defendant Director's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the time plaintiff's complaint was filed, the Warden at Marion had established a nonsmoking/smoking policy designed to accommodate the concerns of both "individuals who choose to smoke or not to smoke." Institutional Supplement No. Mar. 1653.1, United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois, August 18, 1986 ("Supplement"). Among other things, the Marion policy designated conference rooms and classrooms, elevators and the library as "nonsmoking" areas; it divided the dining hall into "smoking" and "nonsmoking" areas; and let innates determine whether office and workplace areas would be "smoking" or "nonsmoking." Finally, the Warden ordered that two of the prison's modular housing units be designated as "nonsmoking" areas and urged that "every effort ... be made to identify the Camp inmates who desire to be placed in the `No-Smoking' unit and accommodate their placement in the unit on a space-available basis." Supplement, ¶ 4(C).
Despite these efforts, plaintiff Caldwell complains that he has been exposed to second-hand smoke. He has occasionally been confined in a two-man cell and/or a dormitory room along with tobacco smokers. He eventually was confined to a single-man cell because he was a nonsmoker, but complains that second-hand smoke drifted over from near-by "smoking" cells. Plaintiff also alleges that second-hand smoke drifted over to the "nonsmoking" sites in the common areas. He further complains of exposure to passive smoke while being transported to and from various prison facilities. Plaintiff asks this Court to order the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to create a totally smoke-free environment for nonsmoking inmates and to separate nonsmokers from smokers in cells, cellhouses, workplaces, indoor recreation areas and all forms of transport throughout the federal correctional system.
The operation of our correctional facilities is "peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of our government," not the judicial branch. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), overruled on other grounds in Thornburgh v. Abbott, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). The Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1970). With these principles in mind, the Court now examines the claims made in this case.
While the authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, they made no attempt to define the contours of that prohibition. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Instead the Amendment draws "its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958).
This Court readily recognizes that our society has dramatically changed its views about smoking and its effects. Two hundred years ago, many of our most revered founding fathers were tobacco farmers. Today, the United States Surgeon General condemns smoking as a "health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking and Health (1964). Nevertheless, contemporary society has yet to view exposure to second-hand smoke as trangressing its "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). As plaintiff himself notes, the Surgeon General has only recently warned against the effects of second-hand smoke. And, only now is society at large debating whether smoking should be permitted in public areas, the workplace or on common carriers. This Court can not find that the Director's failure to constantly segregate smokers from nonsmokers constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" and it certainly cannot find that plaintiff's occasional exposure to smoke drifting over from designated "smoking" areas violates the Eighth Amendment.2
The Due Process clause guarantees that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government (Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889)) and prisoners claiming a due process violation must demonstrate that they have been deprived of a protected liberty or property interest by arbitrary government action. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).
This Court is unable to find that defendant's smoking policy involves a protected liberty interest. Individuals do not have a constitutional right to be free from passive smoke. See Kensell v. State of Okl., 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.1983); Fed. Emp. for Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v. U.S., 446 F.Supp. 181, 183-185 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd 598 F.2d 310 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 926, 100 S.Ct. 265, 62 L.Ed.2d 182 (1979);...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Clemmons v. Bohannon
...in perpetuity the ability of prisoners ... to litigate their ETS claims." Id. at 851-52. Finally, the court in Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F.Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C.1990), stated that "contemporary society has yet to view exposure to secondhand smoke as transgressing its 'broad and idealistic concep......
-
Mott v. State of Ind.
...States does not compel the state to do so. This court is also flattered that its decision in Gorman, was followed in Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F.Supp. 4 (D.D.C.), aff'd without op., 923 F.2d 200 (D.C.Cir.1990). See also West v. Wright, 747 F.Supp. 329 (E.D.Va.1990). Certainly, McKinney v. An......
-
McKinney v. Anderson
...it does mandate an environment that does not expose inmates to a significant risk of harm to their health. Similarly, in Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F.Supp. 4 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 200 (D.C.Cir.1990), the court held that a totally smoke-free environment was not required where prison au......
-
Steading v. Thompson, 90-2588
...that exposure to tobacco smoke does not violate the eighth amendment, Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir.1989); Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F.Supp. 4 (D.D.C.), affirmed without opinion, 923 F.2d 200 (D.C.Cir.1990), two others have ordered district courts to hold trials to determine ......