Caldwell v. St. Charles Gaming Co.

• Citation: 347 So.3d 562
• Decision Date: 29 January 2020
• Docket Number: 2019-CC-1238
• Parties: Don CALDWELL, Individually, and Sheronda Caldwell, Individually v. ST. CHARLES GAMING COMPANY d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino-Lake Charles
• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

347 So.3d 562

Don CALDWELL, Individually, and Sheronda Caldwell, Individually

v.ST. CHARLES GAMING COMPANY d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino-Lake Charles

No. 2019-CC-1238

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

January 29, 2020

David Inge Clay, II, Evans Martin McLeod, and Harry Alston Johnson, III, for Applicant - Defendant.

Kevin Louis Camel, for Respondent.

BODDIE, J., Justice ad hoc^* We granted this writ to review a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and holding the Grand Palais Casino ("Grand Palais") is a "vessel" for purposes of general maritime law.¹ The decision contradicts the court's earlier decision in Benoit v. St. Charles Gaming Company, LLC , 17-101 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/8/17), 230 So. 3d 997, writ denied , 17-2051 (La. 2/2/18), 233 So. 3d 615, cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 104, 202 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2018), which held the Grand Palais is not a vessel. After a de novo review of the record, and for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Grand Palais is a not vessel under general maritime law. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and grant defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff's suit.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was employed by Grand Palais Riverboat L.L.C. ("defendant")² as a technician on the Grand Palais, a riverboat casino, and was injured on April 9, 2015, when the gangway attached to the riverboat malfunctioned and collapsed. Plaintiff filed a petition for damages, alleging that the Grand Palais was a vessel under general maritime law, 1 U.S.C. § 3, and that he was a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq. , at the time of the accident.

The Grand Palais was built as a riverboat casino in conformity with the requirements of Louisiana law which authorize gaming activities to be conducted on riverboat casinos that sail on designated waterways. See La. R.S. 27:41 -113, formerly La. R.S. 4:501 -562. In 2001, the Grand Palais was moored to its current location in Westlake by nylon mooring lines and steel wire cables, pursuant to La. R. S. 27:65(B)(1)(c), which allows riverboat casinos to conduct gaming activities while docked if the owner obtained the required license and paid the required franchise fees.

The Grand Palais has not moved since March 24, 2001. Necessary services for the Grand Palais's operation as a casino are provided via shore-side utility lines, which supply electricity, water, sewage, cable television, telephone and internet services. These utility lines have not been disconnected since 2001. Additionally, the casino computer systems, including the slot machines, are located on land. Guests enter the Grand Palais via a steel structure incorporated into the interior of the land based hotel pavilion.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff is not a seaman entitled to damages under the Jones Act, as he was not employed on a "vessel in navigation," relying in part on the court of appeal's decision in Benoit.

Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing he is employed on a "vessel in navigation," because there is no evidence the Grand Palais is incapable of navigation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the cross motions for summary judgment. Both plaintiff and defendant sought review with the court of appeal.

The court of appeal, sitting en banc, rendered a split (10-2) decision, denying defendant's application and granting plaintiff's application. See Caldwell v. St. Charles Gaming Company , 18-868, 18-915 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/03/19), 279 So. 3d 940 (Pickett and Gremillion, JJ., dissenting). The majority acknowledged that the court in Benoit reasoned the Grand Palais was no longer a vessel under general maritime law, because, although originally designed to transport people over water, the riverboat casino had been moored indefinitely for sixteen years, and dockside gambling was its primary purpose. Id. at 2-3, 279 So. 3d at 941-42.

Judge Saunders, writing for the majority, noted that he had dissented in Benoit because the Grand Palais was designed for navigation, was capable of navigation and had been used in navigation. Id. at 4, 279 So. 3d at 942. He concluded that the " ‘[f]requency of navigation is simply not part of the equation.’ " Id. (quoting Benoit , 17-101, 230 So. 3d at 1002 (Saunders, J., dissenting)).

The majority then examined the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co. , 543 U.S. 481, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L. Ed. 2d 932 (2005). In Stewart , the plaintiff was injured while employed on a dredge known as the "Super Scoop," which was being used to dig a trench under the Boston harbors. The dredge was a floating platform with a bucket that removed silt from the ocean floor. It had limited means of self-propulsion but was capable of navigating short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables. The plaintiff was injured, and made claims under the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 - 950. The lower courts denied the claims, finding the dredge was not a vessel. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the argument that the dredge was not a vessel because its primary purpose was not navigation or commerce and it was not in actual transit at the time of the plaintiff's injury. See Caldwell , 18-868, 18-915 at 5-6, 279 So. 3d at 943-944 (discussing Stewart , 543 U.S. at 495, 125 S.Ct. 1118 ).

The court of appeal majority also cited its prior opinion in Lemelle v. St. Charles Gaming Co. , 11-255 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/4/12), 118 So. 3d 1, writ denied , 12-339 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So. 3d 627, cert. granted judgment vacated , 568 U.S. 1141, 133 S.Ct. 979, 184 L.Ed.2d 759 (2013). In that case, a patron was injured on the M/V Crown Casino ("Crown"), a riverboat casino that had been moored dockside since 2001. The patron sought damages against the owner of the Crown under general maritime laws. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the status of the Crown under general maritime law. The trial court granted the patron's motion, finding the Crown to be a vessel. The court of appeal reversed. Judge Thibodeaux dissented, finding the riverboat was capable of navigation, even though it was not being used for that purpose. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of its opinion in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida , 568 U.S. 115, 133 S.Ct. 735, 184 L.Ed. 2d 604 (2013). However, the case settled prior to review by the court of appeal.

Based on the aforementioned analysis, the court of appeal concluded the Grand Palais is a vessel. The majority noted the defendant does not dispute that the Grand Palais was a vessel prior to 2001. The majority reasoned that, at the time of plaintiff's accident, the Grand Palais had not been "disabled, removed from the water, or sunk to the bottom of the lake enclosed in a coffer dam" and "defendant works diligently to maintain the Grand Palais in a fully operational condition as required by law." Id. at 10-11, 279 So. 3d at 947. The majority held:

In keeping with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co. , 543 U.S. 481, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005), and Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla. , 568 U.S. 115, 133 S.Ct. 735, 184 L.Ed.2d 604 (2013), we find that the Grand Palais Casino was a vessel at the time of the alleged accident. Accordingly, we reverse and set aside the trial court's ruling denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs, Don and Sheronda Caldwell, as to the issue of seaman status, and we hereby enter judgment granting summary judgment finding that plaintiff, Don Caldwell, was a seaman at the time of his accident on April 9, 2015.

Id. at 11, 279 So. 3d at 948.

Judge Kyzar concurred with additional reasons, to which Judge Perry joined, stating in part:

One land based casino has now been authorized by the legislature, that being in New Orleans. All other casinos operating legally within the state, other than tribal casinos which are not under the state's jurisdiction, operate via authority of La. R.S. 27:41 -113. Thus, if they are not, in fact, vessels capable of navigation upon water, they are in violation of law and are operating illegally. It is extremely obvious given this record that St. Charles Gaming Company, Inc. works very hard to keep the Grand Palais in compliance with La. R.S. 27:44 as a working riverboat so as to maintain its license to operate as a casino. The operators cannot have it both ways, to be a vessel for casino-licensing purposes but not a vessel for all other legal purposes, at least not applying the plain wording of the law as it currently exists.

It is not for us to legislate, but to apply the law as written and to interpret the law only when necessary. If the legislature decides to end the pretense of the present state of riverboat gaming and allow for true dockside gambling, it has the power to do so with the stroke of the legislative pen.

Id. , 279 So. 3d at 949 (Kyzar, J., concurring). Judge Pickett dissented for the reasons assigned in Benoit , to which Judge Gremillion joined. Id. , 279 So. 3d at 948 (Pickett, J., dissenting).

Defendant filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's decision.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. Reynolds v. Bordelon , 2014-2371, pp. 2-3 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d 607, 610 ; La. C.C.P. art. 966. A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo , with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e. whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 3, 172 So. 3d at...