Caldwell v. State of Texas

Decision Date12 January 1891
PartiesCALDWELL v. STATE OF TEXAS
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

William Caldwell was arraigned upon the following indictment found by the grand jury of Fort Bend county, Tex.:

'In the name and by the authority f t he state of Texas. The grand jurors, good and lawful men of the state of Texas, county of Fort Bend, duly tried on oath by the judge of the district court of said county touching their legal qualifications as grand jurors, elected, impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire into and true presentments make of all offenses against the penal laws of said state committed within the body of the county aforesaid, upon their oaths present in the district court of said county that William Caldwell, late of the county of Fort Bend, laborer, on or about the first day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, with force of arms, in the said county of Fort Bend and state of Texas, did then and there, unlawfully and with express malice aforethought, kill one J. M. Shamblin, by shooting him with a gun, contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.' The venue was subsequently changed to Harris county, Tex., and on trial of the case, upon Caldwell's plea of not guilty, before a jury duly impaneled, a verdict was found against him of guilty of murder in the flrst degree, and awarding the punishment of death. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict, from which an appeal was taken to the court of appeals of the state of Texas, which affirmed the judgment, the opinion being delivered by WILLSON, J., (Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. App. 566, 14 S. W. Rep. 122.) Application for a rehearing was subsequently made, upon the ground that 'the indictment is fatally and fundamentally defective and void under the constitution of the state, and does not, either in form or substance, set out a valid charge of murder or any other offense known to the criminal law of the state, and is not due process of law under the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States.' This motion was heard on oral and printed arguments on both sides, and overruled. The opinion was delivered by HURT, J., (28 Tex. App. 576, 14 S. W. Rep. 124,) and stated that but one ground was urged for rehearing, namely, the sufficiency of the indictment, the objections to which were that it failed to charge that the accused murdered the deceased; that it omitted to charge the time and place of the alleged shooting; and the infliction of a mortal wound; and the date of the wounding and that of the death; and that the shooting was done unlawfully and with malice aforethought; and was fatally defective for want of certainty. The court held that as the indictment charged that Caldwell on the 1st day of August, A. D. 1888, in the county of Fort Bend, unlawfully, and with express malice aforethought, killed Shamblin by shooting him with a gun, it charged all of the acts constituting murder, and with the requisite particularity, and that consequently the indictment was sufficient; and said: 'Now, we have held that the legislature of this state has no authority to prescribe a form of indictment, and make the same sufficient, which fails to contain all of the elements of the crime. But we have never held that the legislature could not prescribe a form for indictment which would not be good if the facts constituting the crime sought to be charged are contained in the form. If the offense is sufficiently particularized to come within the rule of pleading, we would hold that such form would not be obnoxious to constitutional objections, either federal or state.' A writ of error was sued out from this court, and allowed by the presiding judge of the court of appeals of Texas, and the case comes on upon a motion to dismiss.

Section 10, art. 1, of the constitution of Texas, reads: 'In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. He shall have the right of being heard by himself o co unsel, or both; shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. And no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.' By article 605 of the Texas Penal Code, 'murder' is thus defined: 'Every person, with a sound memory and discretion, who shall unlawfully kill any reasonable creature in being within this state, with malice aforethought, either express or implied, shall be deemed guilty of murder. Murder is distinguishable from every other species of homicide by the absence of the circumstances which reduce the offense to negligent homicide or manslaughter, or which excuse or justify the homicide.' Willson, Crim. St. Tex. pt. 1, p. 203. The Code of Criminal Procedure of Texas provides: 'Art. 416. All felonies shall be presented by indictment only, except in cases specially provided for.' 'Art. 419. An indictment is the written statement of a grand jury, accusing a person therein named of some act of omission which, by law, is declared to be an offense. Art. 420. An indictment shall be deemed sufficient if it has the following requisites: (1) It shall commence, 'In the name and by the authority of the state of Texas.' (2) It must appear therefrom that the same was presented in the district court of the county where the grand jury is in session. (3) It must appear to be the act of a grand jury of the proper county. (4) It must contain the name of the accused, or state that his name is unknown, and, in case his name is unknown, give a reasonably accurate description of him. (5) It must show that the place where the offense was committed is within the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is presented. (6) The time...

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    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
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    ...v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. ......
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    • January 8, 1934
    ...63 L.R.A. 471; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 111, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97. 6 Hurtado v. California, supra; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 11 S.Ct. 224, 34 L.Ed. 816; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 20 S.Ct. 287, 44 L.Ed. 382; Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483, 27 S.Ct. 582, 51 L......
  • Duane v. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co.
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    ...Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394, 34 Sup. Ct. 779, 783(58 L. Ed. 363). The words of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 693, 697,11 Sup. Ct. 224, 226 (34 L. Ed. 816) are these: ‘Law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and when s......
  • Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller
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    ...139 U. S. 462, 11 Sup. Ct. 577, 35 L. Ed. 225;In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 11 Sup. Ct. 191, 34 L. Ed. 796;Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 11 Sup. Ct. 224, 34 L. Ed. 816;Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485. Persons or corporations cannot complain that they a......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Originalism and stare decisis.
    • United States
    • Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol. 34 No. 1, January 2011
    • January 1, 2011
    ...3 Mich. 615 (1855). (14.) See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 487. (15.) E.g., Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891) ("[N]o State can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law. Law, in its regular......

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