Caldwell v. Walters
| Decision Date | 01 October 1851 |
| Citation | 18 Pa. 79 |
| Parties | Caldwell <I>versus</I> Walters. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Jane M. Walters, the plaintiff below, claims in this action her share as one of the heirs of a tract of land of which her father, Daniel McDonnal, died seised. The defendants, claiming under the same title, defend under a judgment entered against Charles S. Walters and Jane M. Walters, his wife, in favor of Elizabeth Stewart. The declaration filed is on a bond, executed by the said Charles and Jane, his wife, dated 14th April, 1829, conditioned for the payment of $129, with a confession of judgment by attorney in pursuance of an alleged warrant of the date of the bond, which judgment is entered on the 11th May, 1829. On this judgment a fieri facias was issued in 1830, and a levy made on the right, title, and interest of Charles S. Walters and Jane M. Walters in the tract of land claimed. By virtue of a venditioni exp. the same was sold at sheriff's sale, August 1830, and a deed made to Elizabeth Stewart, the plaintiff, for $100, who by deed in 1834 in consideration expressed of one dollar, conveyed to James Caldwell, one of the defendants, who entered and made improvements; and in 1840 obtained a patent from the Commonwealth, by payment of balance of purchase-money due on same. Charles S. Walters died some time after the sheriff's sale, and before the institution of this action.
The question presented here is the legal effect of the judgment referred to against Mrs. Walters, when a feme covert, and the proceedings on it during her coverture, to divest her title in the lands claimed, and bar her recovery. The question is one of importance to the public, so far as it relates to her title acquired by a judicial sale; and it is important as it relates to the protection of feme coverts, in the use and enjoyment of their real estate against the encroachment of a husband or others.
The bond and warrant of attorney of Mrs. Walters being executed by a feme covert, were not merely voidable, but absolutely void: Dorrance v. Scott, 3 Wh. 313. By law the wife is incompetent to execute a writing obligatory, or a warrant to confess judgment that will be obligatory on herself or her representatives. Whilst the common law has been changed in Pennsylvania, by usage and Acts of Assembly, allowing a feme covert to convey her real estate by deed executed and acknowledged before an officer of the law, in the form and manner provided for her protection; yet it has not been relaxed any in relation to writings obligatory or other personal obligation, by a feme covert, executed for the payment of money or the performance of any other act.
So absolutely void is the bond of a married woman in contemplation of law, that her coverture at the execution thereof may be given in evidence for the purpose of showing that it is void under the plea of non est factum; or may be pleaded specially: James v. Fowks, 12 Mod. 101; Lambert v. Atkins, 2 Camp. 273. In the last case it is said by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, that a deed executed by a married woman is void ab initio. In Reed v. Jewson, cited by BULLER, J., in 4 Term Rep. where a feme covert sole trader gave a bond and warrant of attorney to enter up judgment, on which execution was taken out, the Court held the warrant of attorney to be void, and set aside the judgment. The letter of attorney, said ASTON, J., is an "absolute nullity."
In Dorrance v. Scott, Justice KENNEDY says, that a judgment entered against a wife by virtue of a bond and warrant of attorney, executed by her as a married woman, is to be deemed, according to all the authorities on the subject, void against her for want of authority to enter it; and consequently can be no lien on her real estate as such. In the same case this Court ruled that a judgment so entered was so destitute of validity, that a judgment had in the same Court on a scire facias founded on such judgment was to be considered void as against the wife, having nothing to support it.
Public sentiment in this Commonwealth has been manifested by legislation in favor of extending and protecting the rights of feme coverts over their estates; but it would be to little purpose that they are by law allowed the power of disposition, and the power and control of husbands restrained, if the liability of wives by bond or by authority to confess judgment, is to impose on them an obligation that will give validity and even effect to a judgment entered against them under such authority, that will operate to divest and pass their real estate.
The defendants derive title under this judgment against Jane M. Walters, which, in contemplation of law, was of no authority, and void ab initio. Being destitute of all validity, it could be no lien to charge her real estate. But it is said that a judgment is not to be inquired into or reversed by a collateral proceeding, except for fraud. The established rule on this subject admits of an exception in favor of parties not privy to it, and who would otherwise be without remedy; and in case of a void judgment requiring no reversal to make it a nullity. This distinction was made in Godfrey's case, 11 Co. 44, and in Randal's case, 2 Mod. 308, was apparently recognised by the Court. In Winter v. Perry, Cro. Eliz. 199, a plea to a scire facias against bail, that the defendant in the original action was dead at the rendition of the judgment, was at first deemed inadmissible, as going to avoid the judgment, which it was said could be done only by writ of error; but it seems subsequently to have been received. It was said by C. J. GIBSON, in Campbell v. Kent, 3 Penn. Rep. 80, "Perhaps the true ground both of that and Randal's case is that the judgment was not only injurious, but void, having been rendered against a party not in existence, and therefore requiring no reversal to render it a nullity."
The validity of the judgment against Mrs. Walters was a legitimate subject of investigation and trial in this action, for two reasons: one, that being entered on a warrant of attorney against a married woman, it was void ab initio, without authority, and not requiring a reversal to render it a nullity. Again, without such investigation, Mrs. Walters would be without remedy, as she was a feme covert at the time of the execution of the bond and confession of judgment, and during all the proceedings thereon, and for some years after the sheriff's sale of her right in this land. As such she could not interpose for redress or protection. Her will was in the keeping of her husband. She could...
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| Barkley's Appeal
...v. Templeton, 95 Pa. 262; Klein v. Caldwell, Trustee, 91 Pa. 140; Glidden v. Strupler, 52 Pa. 407; Quinn's Ap. , 86 Pa. 447; Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 79; Davidson's Ap., 95 Pa. 394; Buchanan v. Hazzard, 95 240. When error of law is apparent on the face of the decree, a review of the decr......
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West Arch Building & Loan Assn. v. Nichols
...with notice of all irregularities in the proceedings, especially a want of inquisition or waiver thereof, or want of notice: Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 79; Kimball Kelsey, 1 Pa. 183; Gardner v. Sisk, 54 Pa. 506; Kunselman v. Stine, 183 Pa. 1. The sheriff's return to the fi. fa. issued unde......
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Baker v. The Singer Manuf'g Co.
... ... The reason is, because she cannot be sued ... alone: Caudell v. Shaw, 4 Term R. 361, cited in ... Ware v. Henry, 1 Pears. 77; see also Caldwell v ... Walters, 18 Pa. 82. In Brunner's Appeal, 47 Pa. 67, ... it was held that the judgment note of a married woman, given ... for a debt ... ...
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Podol v. Shevlin
...The sheriff's vendee acquires no title whatever under the judgment: Hecker v. Haak, 88 Pa. 238; Shannon v. Newton, 132 Pa. 375; Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 79. F. Jenkins, for appellee. -- The sheriff's deed cannot be collaterally attacked: Heister v. Fortner, 2 Binney 40; Allison v. Hankin......