Caldwell-Watson Foundry & Machine Co. v. Watson

• Decision Date: 23 January 1913
• Citation: 62 So. 859,183 Ala. 326
• Parties: CALDWELL-WATSON FOUNDRY & MACHINE CO. v. WATSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

62 So. 859

183 Ala. 326

CALDWELL-WATSON FOUNDRY & MACHINE CO. v. WATSON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 23, 1913

On Rehearing, May 13, 1913

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; C.W. Ferguson, Judge.

Action by Frederick Watson against the Caldwell-Watson Foundry &amp Machine Company, for damages for injury received while in its employment.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.Affirmed.

Mayfield J., dissenting.

The facts of the case sufficiently appear from the opinion.

The following charges were refused the defendant:

"(2) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendants exercised such care in furnishing a hydraulic press as any other reasonably prudent employer would have exercised under similar circumstances, you cannot find that they were negligent in or about furnishing or maintaining the hydraulic press, a part of which injured plaintiff."

(4) General affirmative charge.

"(5) If you believe the evidence in this case, the defendant's hydraulic press was not defective within the meaning of the Employer's Liability Act."

(6) Affirmative charge as to the first count.

"(7) If you believe the evidence in this case, you cannot find that the defendant was negligent in or about furnishing plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work.

"(8) If you believe from the evidence that the said pin mentioned in the evidence was made by defendant in a proper manner according to the plan and pattern of a well-regulated and reputable manufacturing concern engaged in the manufacture of hydraulic presses, then the plaintiff cannot recover merely on account of the fact, if it be a fact, that the collar of said pin was only the thickness shown by the evidence."

"(1) I charge you that, even if you believe from the evidence that the hydraulic press mentioned in the complaint was defective, you cannot find for the plaintiff unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that this defect could have been discovered and remedied by such an inspection as an ordinarily prudent person engaged in the business in which the defendants were engaged would have given it, and also that the defendants were negligent in failing to make such inspection."

"(3) If you believe from the evidence that defendants were guilty of no negligence in the manufacture of the press described in the complaint, you must find for the defendant."

"(9) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant's hydraulic press was built in accordance with a plan by which similar presses sold by reputable dealers in such articles and used by persons engaged in a business similar to that in which defendants were engaged when plaintiff was injured, whose business was well conducted, and that defendant had no knowledge of any danger that might arise from said press, or of any defect therein, you must find for the defendant.

"(10) If a master builds a machine in accordance with the plans by which machines have been built by reputable manufacturing concerns, and used by reputable persons engaged in a business similar to that of the master, and which served the purpose for which they were built without accident and in a satisfactory manner for 10 years or longer, the master is not liable for an injury caused by the breaking of the machine, after it had been used 10 years, if no defect existed therein which could have been detected by a reasonable inspection at the time of the breaking, and which was not present when it was manufactured."

The second part of the oral charge excepted to is as follows:

"Now, the plaintiff claims the right to recovery because they say, even if it was properly constructed in the first instance, that they negligently allowed it to get into a defective condition, and that by reason thereof the plaintiff suffered damages because of their alleged negligence in that particular."

The third exception is as follows:

"Now, upon that point, I want to say right here that where the relation of master exists, as it is sometimes called, employer and employé, as is claimed in this case, it is the duty of the master or employer to furnish to the employé a reasonably safe place to work in, and reasonably safe tools, appliances, or instruments to work with, and keep them in a reasonably safe condition."

231Hk2843 Newest, Safest, and Best Equipment.

The law does not require a master to use the best possible appliances, and he may show that they were such as were adopted and used by prudent persons engaged in the same business, though this fact is not conclusive that the machine was not defective, and does not necessarily exempt the master from liability.

Tillman, Bradley & Morrow and Charles E. Rice, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Allen & Bell and R.D. Coffman, all of Birmingham, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

This case was tried upon count 1 of the complaint, and which is a defect count, under subdivision 1 of section 3910 of the Code of 1907, and is predicated upon a defective hydraulic press, which was a part of the defendant's plant or machinery, etc.The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that he was injured by a pin, plug, or screw, which flew out and hit him on the leg, fracturing the bone, and that there was an inherent defect in said press, in that it contained a certain hole which was not necessary, or, if necessary, that it could have been forced instead of straight, and would have been safer from producing accident than the one in question.There was also evidence that the pin or plug was not put in in a workmanlike manner.This furnished evidence from which the jury could find that there was a defect in the ways and works, etc., and for which the master was responsible, if it arose from negligence, either in furnishing a defective instrumentality or failing to remedy or repair same.

In 2 Labatt on Master & Servant, p. 1963, § 670, it is said: "Wherever an instrumentality is not in a proper condition for the purpose for which it was applied, there is a defect in its condition within the meaning of the act.If the whole arrangement of a machine is defective for the purpose for which it is applied, there is a defect so as to bring it within the act, although each part may be sufficient.It follows, therefore, that whenever there is such an unsuitableness for the work intended to be done and actually done, the liability contemplated by the suit arises although the appliance is perfect of its kind and in good repair and suitable for other kinds of work.In such case the employer is in fault because he has furnished appliances for a use for which they are unsuitable, and in effect in so ordering and carrying on his work that, without fault on the part of an ordinary workman, the natural consequences will be that the appliance will be used for purposes for which it is unsuitable."

In Dresser on Employers' Liability, § 39, p. 206, it is said: "The question is whether the fact that the machine was unfit for the purpose for which it was applied constitutes a defect in its condition.The question really almost answers itself.If it was not in a proper condition for the purpose for which it was applied, there was a defect in its condition within the meaning of the act.The argument of the defendant comes to this: That if the employer has a...