Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3486-ODE.,No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3487-ODE.,CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3486-ODE.,CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3487-ODE.
• Citation: 333 F.Supp.2d 1367
• Parties: Lee CALEY; William Etzel; Stanley Walker; and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION; and General Dynamics Corporation, Defendants. Dianne Jackson; Marlon Green; Robert Vouk; Willie Mae Stewart; and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation; and General Dynamics Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

333 F.Supp.2d 1367

Lee CALEY; William Etzel; Stanley Walker; and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION; and General Dynamics Corporation, Defendants.

Dianne Jackson; Marlon Green; Robert Vouk; Willie Mae Stewart; and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation; and General Dynamics Corporation, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3486-ODE.

No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-3487-ODE.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

August 24, 2004.

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Harlan Stuart Miller, III, Miller, Billips & Ates, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER

ORINDA D. EVANS, Chief Judge.

These related civil actions seeking damages and equitable relief are presently before the Court on Defendants' motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss [Caley-# 3, Jackson-# 3], Plaintiffs' motions to compel discovery [Caley-# 26, Jackson-# 23], Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment [Caley-# 29, Jackson-# 26] and Defendants' motions to strike or stay Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment [Caley-# 33, Jackson-# 28].

I. Background

Both of these cases were filed on November 17, 2003. The Caley complaint asserts claims on behalf of an estimated class of two hundred workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., against Defendant Gulfstream and its parent company, Defendant General Dynamics. The complaint charges Defendants with violating the FLSA by deliberately mischaracterizing Plaintiffs as exempt from overtime pay requirements, and therefore failing to pay Plaintiffs the monies they were owed for hours worked in excess of forty per week. Counsel for Plaintiffs in that action also filed the Jackson complaint on behalf of an estimated class of one hundred workers, charging the same Defendants with violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, and asserting certain other contract claims under Georgia law. The Jackson complaint also sets forth individual claims of race discrimination for Plaintiffs Jackson, Vouk, Green and Stewart, a claim of retaliation by Jackson and a gender discrimination claim by Vouk under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., along with a retaliation claim by Vouk under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a).

In response to the Caley and Jackson complaints, Defendants did not file answers but rather filed the pending motions to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims and to dismiss the actions. On March 8, 2004, Plaintiffs filed Rule 56(f) motions to hold Defendants' motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss in abeyance pending the completion of discovery. The same day, Plaintiffs also filed motions to amend the complaint in each action to assert certain contract defenses and to seek a declaratory judgment to the effect that the arbitration agreement in question is unenforceable.

On March 10, 2004, Defendant General Dynamics filed a motion in each case, later joined by Defendant Gulfstream, to designate and treat the Caley and Jackson actions as related. On March 26, 2004, said motions were granted.

On April 16, 2004, a hearing was held and a verbal order entered deferring ruling on Defendants' motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss, granting in part Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motions for the limited purpose of supplementing the record on the issue of consent to arbitrate, and granting Plaintiffs' motions to amend the complaints. The parties were given sixty days to supplement the record on the issue of consent.

On June 15, 2004, Defendants filed supplemental briefs in support of their motions to compel arbitration. That same day, Plaintiffs filed the pending motions to compel discovery. Subsequently, on July 15, 2004, Plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgment as to whether the at-issue arbitration agreement is enforceable. Defendants have moved to strike or stay Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment.

II. Facts

The named plaintiffs in both Caley and Jackson are current and former employees¹ of Gulfstream² who were employed at its Savannah, Georgia facility during the relevant period from summer of 2002 until spring of 2003. During the summer of 2002, Gulfstream decided to adopt a dispute resolution policy ("DRP") to serve as the sole method for resolving covered employment-related disputes between itself and its employees. On or about July 15, 2002, Gulfstream mailed to all of the workers employed at its Savannah facility a copy of the DRP, an explanatory cover letter and a question and answer form. Said documents were mailed by an outside company, Advantage Marketing, using first-class postage, and were sent to the employee addresses on file with Gulfstream's human resources department — the same addresses to which employee W2 forms and benefit statements are mailed. Beyond mailing the aforementioned documents to its employees, Gulfstream placed the DRP and accompanying informational documents on the company intranet, and further distributed the DRP electronically through the Management Newsletter that is emailed to approximately 1,000 employees. Furthermore, Gulfstream also posted notices relating to implementation of the DRP, but not the DRP itself, on thirteen bulletin boards throughout the Savannah facility.

The cover letter mailed with the DRP on July 15, 2002 read in part, "The DRP will become the exclusive procedure to resolve covered workplace disputes — so you should carefully read the enclosed brochure. This policy, which will become effective on August 1, 2002, will be a condition of continued employment. All covered claims will be subject to this DRP at that time." (Caley-# 25, Jackson-# 22, Ex. 1, Att. 1 (hereinafter "8/1/02 DRP") at 11.)

The DRP itself sets up a four-level dispute resolution process for all "covered claims" including: level one — human resources review, level two — management review, level three — mediation and level four — arbitration. Employees must complete each level of the process before proceeding to the next. Furthermore, an employee must proceed to the next level within thirty days following completion of the previous level or all rights to pursue the covered claims are waived.³ Gulfstream "may elect to bypass one or more steps prior to arbitration for disputes with applicants for employment, with former employees, or if the Company is the initiating party," and no time-based waiver applies to the company. (8/1/02 DRP at 1.)

The DRP defines covered claims as "employment-related claims between an individual Employee and the Company, its individual managers and other present or former employees." (8/1/02 DRP at 1.) Said definition is followed by examples of those claims which are covered by the DRP and a list of excluded claims such as claims covered by the National Labor Relations Act and claims for workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the claims asserted in this lawsuit are covered claims.

The DRP also sets forth specific rules for discovery at the arbitration stage of the process. The policy calls for disclosure of witnesses and documents at least twenty days prior to the arbitration hearing, endows the arbitrator with the power to issue protective orders, allows for depositions by the agreement of the parties or by order of the arbitrator, and invests the arbitrator with the power to resolve all discovery disputes.

The DRP explicitly provides that it is the sole and exclusive remedy for covered claims and that employees and Gulfstream waive any right to jury trial for such claims. The policy further provides that Gulfstream retains the right to modify or terminate the DRP following thirty days written notice, and that the policy in effect at the time a claim is received shall govern the process by which the claim is determined.

On the third page of the DRP, under an underlined heading entitled "Acceptance/No Change In Terms of Employment," the policy states,

The submission of an application, acceptance of employment or the continuation of employment by an individual shall be deemed acceptance of the DRP. No signature shall be required for the Policy to be applicable. The mutual obligations set forth in this DRP shall constitute a contract between the Employee and the Company but shall not change an Employee's at-will relationship or any term of any other contract or agreement between the Company and Employee. This Policy shall constitute the entire agreement between the Employee and Company for the resolution of Covered Claims.

(8/1/02 DRP at 3 (emphasis added).) The effective date of the DRP, August 1, 2002, is listed prominently as part of the title heading on the first page of the policy. Plaintiffs in both the Caley and Jackson matters were employees of Gulfstream at the time of the mailing and posting of notices of the DRP, and they remained in such employment past the policy's effective date.

In March 2003, Gulfstream set about modifying certain terms of the DRP. Accordingly, on or about March 7, 2003, Gulfstream distributed and noticed the new version of the DRP by utilizing the same methods that were used in the policy's initial adoption. The terms of the modified DRP were substantially similar to those of the original. However, certain changes were made, including the prohibition of bringing claims as class or collective actions. (4/10/03 DRP at 3.) Again, an employee's acceptance of the modified DRP was deemed from continuation of employment. The effective date of the modification was April 10, 2003. Plaintiffs were employed when notice of the DRP revision was given and were still employed on April 10, 2003. As noted previously, the Jackson named plaintiffs were laid off on April 11, 2003.

When the Caley and Jackson putative class action complaints were filed counsel for Defendants...