Calhoon v. City of S. Lake Tahoe Police Dep't

Decision Date07 February 2023
Docket Number2:19-cv-02165-KJM-JDP
PartiesWayne S. Calhoon, Plaintiff, v. City of South Lake Tahoe Police Dep't, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
ORDER

In this civil rights action arising from an altercation between South Lake Tahoe police officers and plaintiff Wayne Calhoon defendant Sergeant Travis Cabral moves for partial summary judgment on Calhoon's second claim for failure to adequately supervise police personnel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, Cabral's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The court has compared the parties' statements of fact see Pl.'s Resp. to Statement of Undis. Mater. Facts (Resp. to UMF), ECF No. 87-1; Def's Statement of Undis. Mater. Facts (UMF), ECF No. 86-2; Computer Assisted Dispatch Log (CAD) Ex. 2, ECF No. 87-2, and reviewed the cited deposition transcripts and available cell phone footage, Cell Video, Ex. 4, ECF No. 87-2, provided by plaintiff and lodged with the court in USB format, see Notice of Lodging, ECF No. 88. Based on this review of the record, the court finds the following facts are either undisputed or, if disputed, are properly construed in the light most favorable to Calhoon.

A. Evidentiary Objections

First, Cabral objects to Calhoon's use of Drake's cell phone video and a police log of the incident, arguing the evidence is both irrelevant and not authenticated. Reply at 5; Cell Video; CAD. Parties may object to evidence cited to establish undisputed facts. See In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385-86 (9th Cir. 2010). A court may consider evidence that would be “admissible at trial.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). But the evidentiary standard for admission at the summary judgment stage is lenient: A court may evaluate evidence in an inadmissible form if the evidentiary objections could be cured at trial. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119-20 (E.D. Cal. 2006). In other words, admissibility at trial depends not on the evidence's form, but on its content. Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Though the cell phone video and police log are not currently authenticated, the court may consider them at this stage because nothing about the contents suggests they would be inadmissible at trial if properly authenticated. See Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119-20.

B. Factual Background

Wayne Calhoon, Desiree Drake and Drake's two children shared a motel room at the South Lake Tahoe Motel 6 on October 14, 2018. UMF ¶ 1. That morning, South Lake Tahoe Police Department (SLTPD) received a 911 call from Drake, requesting a civil standby to help remove her items from the room. Id. ¶ 2. Drake also shared she was feeling harassed and threatened by Calhoon. Id. In response, SLTPD sent Officers Matthew Morrison, Joseph Acker, Nick Carlquist, Derek Simon and Sergeant Travis Cabral to assist. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Acker, Carlquist and Simon arrived at the scene at 7:59 a.m. Deposition of Officer Joseph Acker Ex. F (Acker Dep.) at 40:23-24, ECF No. 86-3; Deposition of Wayne Calhoon Ex. 5 (Calhoon Dep.) at 39:2125, 40:1-4, ECF No. 87-2. Acker interviewed Drake, who was outside the room with her children, and determined Calhoon was preventing Drake from retrieving her belongings. UMF ¶ 5; Acker Dep. at 29:4-14.

Officers then announced themselves and knocked on the hotel room door twice. Calhoon Dep. at 72:2-24. Calhoon did not respond. Id. At approximately 8:08 a.m., officers again knocked on the door, this time more vigorously, and demanded Calhoon open the door. Id. at 73:6-12; Acker Dep. at 40:22. Calhoon, who had the door's safety lock engaged, partially opened the door and saw a pistol pointed between his head and breastbone. Calhoon Dep. at 73:15-25. Calhoon closed the door and retreated into the room, fearful for his life. Id. at 76:1822. At some point after Calhoon closed the door, officers threated to break it down and arrest him for failing to comply with police orders. Id. at 77:9-14.

Morrison and Cabral then arrived at the scene at 8:14 a.m. Deposition of Officer Matthew Morrison Ex. G (Morrison Dep.) at 19:24-25, 20:1-3, ECF No. 86-3; Calhoon Dep. 39:21-25, 40:1-4, CAD at 2; Rule 26 Report Ex. 1, ECF No. 87-2. Morrison immediately spoke to the onsite motel manager, James Hightower. Morrison Dep. at 21:5-13. Hightower testified he told Morrison Calhoon was on the motel's do not rent list and “should not have been checked in in the first place.” Deposition of James Hightower Ex. K (Hightower Dep.) at 42:20-25, 43:1-4, ECF No. 86-3. Morrison testified Hightower wanted Calhoon to vacate the room. Morrison Dep. at 24:1-4.

Morrison radioed the other officers and informed them Hightower requested Calhoon be evicted. Morrison Dep. at 24:15-18; Deposition of Travis Cabral Ex. I (Cabral Dep.) at 99:17-25, 100:1-15, ECF No. 86-3. He also shared Hightower wanted the officers to inform Calhoon of the eviction. Morrison Dep. at 24:15-18; Cabral Dep. at 99:17-25, 100:1-15. Drake then filmed the officers ordering Calhoon to exit the room, handcuffing him and allowing Drake to enter the room. Cell Video, 00:50-01:04. Calhoon opened the door and complied with officers' commands while they detained him and applied handcuffs. Calhoon Dep. at 78:25, 79:1-25, 80:1-25, 81:1-10.

Carlquist detained and handcuffed Calhoon while Cabral watched.[1] Calhoon Dep. at 83:18-20; Cabral Dep. at 110:14-25, 111:1-22; Carlquist Dep. at 102:21-23. While detaining him, Carlquist kicked Calhoon's left knee and groin, leaving injuries for which Calhoon needed crutches and a leg brace. Calhoon Dep. at 88:24-25, 89:1-9. Carlquist also conducted a control hold that tore Calhoon's pectoral muscles, id. at 89:19-24, and injured Calhoon's wrists, Response at 10. Officers refused to loosen handcuffs despite Calhoon's complaints. Id. at 14. Officers then searched the room, including the refrigerator, without consent. Calhoon Dep. at 86:12-18; Cabral Dep. at 77:16-24; Morison Dep. at 29:19-25, 30:1-25, 31:1-2. Calhoon was handcuffed for 30-40 minutes. Calhoon Dep. at 88:2-5. Calhoon was escorted to the hospital later that day because of physical injuries sustained from the police interaction and a “heart a-fibrillation” problem. Opp'n at 11 n.2, ECF No. 87; Calhoon Dep. at 83:14-24.

C. Procedural Background

Calhoon initially brought this lawsuit against the City of South Lake Tahoe, the police department and all officers involved. Initial Compl., ECF No. 1. In October 2020, after multiple amended complaints, the court dismissed the actions against the police department and City and the § 1983 claims against Officers Morrison, Acker, Carlquist and Simon.[2] Dismissal Order, ECF No. 38. Calhoon then filed a fourth amended complaint, which included supervisory liability claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant Cabral. Fourth Am. Compl. (Compl.), ECF No. 64. Cabral now moves for partial summary judgment, arguing he is protected by qualified immunity and even if he were not, Calhoon does not provide evidence of constitutional violations. See generally Mot, ECF No. 86. Calhoon opposed, Opp'n, and Cabral replied, Reply, ECF No. 90. The court heard oral argument on December 9, 2022. Mins. Hr'g, ECF No. 94. Edwin Bradley appeared for Calhoon and Daniel Bardzell appeared for Cabral. Id. The court granted the parties' leave to file supplemental briefing on the issue of supervisory liability and excessive force. Id. Cabral filed a supplemental brief in support of his motion, Cabral Supp. Brief, ECF No. 96, and Calhoon filed a supplemental brief in opposition, Calhoon Supp. Brief, ECF No. 97.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

As a general matter, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). Both parties must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 ([The nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.' Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat'lBank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). Where a genuine dispute exists, the court draws inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014).

The Supreme Court has taken care to note district courts should act “with caution in granting summary judgment,” and have authority to “deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the...

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