Calhoun v. Massie

• Decision Date: 14 November 1918
• Citation: Calhoun v. Massie, 123 Va. 673, 97 S.E. 576 (1918)
• Parties: CALHOUN. v. MASSIE.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

97 S.E. 576

CALHOUN.

v.MASSIE.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 14, 1918.

Error to Circuit Court, Nelson County.

Action by C. C. Calhoun against Bland Massie. To review judgment sustaining demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

C. C. Calhoun, of Washington, D. C, in pro. per.

Caskie & Caskie, of Lynchburg, for defendant in error.

KELLY, J. This writ of error brings under review a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to a declaration in assumpsit. The action was based upon the following contract in writing, dated April 18, 1911:

"Fee Agreement. This agreement, witnesseth: That I, Bland Massie of Tyro, Nelson county, Virginia, have employed C. C. Calhoun, of Washington, D. C, as my attorney to represent my claim against the government of the United States for property taken by the Federal forces during the late Civil War, and in consideration of his professional services in the prosecution of said claim, I hereby agree and bind my heirs and legal representatives, to pay to him, his heirs or legal representatives as a fee a sum equal to 50 per cent. of the amount which may be collected upon said claim, said fee to be a lien on any warrant which may be issued in payment of said claim."

The declaration, after setting out the contract, made the following material allegations: That the plaintiff, C. C. Calhoun, faithfully and efficiently performed the work required of him by the contract; that he successfully prosecuted the claim of the defendant, Bland Massie, before the Court of Claims of the United States, involving extensive and varied legal services set out in detail in the declaration; that as a result of these services the Court of Claims found in favor of the claim to the amount of $1,-900; that this finding was approved by Congress and an appropriation made to pay the claim; that the same was paid to the defendant by a treasury warrant, less 20 per cent. which was paid by a like warrant to the plaintiff on account of his fee and accepted by him without waiving his rights under the contract to 50 per cent. of the amount; that thus far he has only received 20 per cent. of the sum collected; and that 30 per cent. thereof is still wholly unpaid and due to him by the defendant.

The declaration then proceeds to set out that subsequent to the execution of the contract, subsequent to the performance of the plaintiff's services thereunder, and subsequent to the finding of the Court of Claims and the certification thereof to Congress, an act, commonly known as the "Omnibus Claims Act, " was passed by Congress, approved March 4, 1915, entitled "An act making appropriations for payment of certain claims in accordance with findings of the Court of Claims, reported under the provisions of the acts approved March 3, 1883, and March 3, 1887, and commonly known as the Bowman and the Tucker Acts, and under the provisions of section numbered one hundred and fifty-one of the acts approved March 3, 1911, commonly known as the Judicial Code" (chapter 140, 38 Stat. L. p.962); and that this act, which included the defendant's claim, contained a provision (38 Stat. L. p. 996) limiting fees of attorneys for claimants to 20 per cent. of the amount of the claims as allowed and directed to be paid, said 20per cent. to be in full of all demands for services rendered by attorneys in behalf of claimants.

The declaration concludes with the following averment or proposition, which raises the only really controverted question presented for our decision, to wit:

"That the act of Congress, Omnibus Claims Act. § 4. 38 Stat. L. p. 996, is null and void and unconstitutional and of no force and effect in so far and to the extent it may undertake to fix and regulate the amount of fee should be paid to the plaintiff as attorney for the claimant, the defendant, which he had earned under a written agreement with the defendant, and which agreement was executed and services performed thereunder prior to the passage of said act, which agreement specified there should be paid to the plaintiff the sum of 50 per cent. of the amount of the claim collected. * * *"

Several grounds were assigned for the demurrer to the declaration, but the one which stated more directly than any of the others the ground chiefly relied upon was:

"That the appropriation made by Congress to pay said claim was conditioned upon the application of a certain sum, and no more, to the plaintiff."

If section 4 of the act was constitutional and valid, this ground was well taken, and the demurrer was properly sustained.

The record before us does not contain a copy of the order entered by the Court of Claims, but merely shows by an averment in the declaration that there was a finding by that court favorable to the claim, and that the same was certified to Congress. The Court of Claims had no jurisdiction to go further in hearing and determining the claim, and manifestly did not undertake to go further, than to ascertain and report the same to Congress, "together with such conclusions as shall be sufficient to inform Congress of the nature and character of the demand, either as a claim, legal or equitable, or as a gratuity against the United States, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimant, etc." 2 U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, p. 1468, § 1136, subsec. 1; Id., p. 1499, § 1142. Whether the claim would be paid or not, and upon what conditions, still remained a question which depended absolutely upon the will and action of Congress. Whatever legislative recognition had theretofore been given by Congress to the proceedings under which the claim had, up to that time, been prosecuted, nothing had been done to confer upon either Massie or Calhoun any such rights as would thereafter disable that body from imposing any conditions which it might see fit to impose with reference to the payment of the claim. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640, 32 Sup. Ct. 580, 56 L. Ed. 928, referring to a contention that a certain act of Congress was unconstitutional and void, because it impaired rights vested by a former act dealing with the same subject, said:

"No doubt such was the purport of the act. But that, in our opinion, did not confer upon them (certain members of an Indian tribe) any vested right such as would disable Congress from thereafter making provision for admitting newly-born members of the tribe to the allotment and distribution. The difficulty with the appellants' contention is that it treats the act of 1902 as a contract, when 'it is only an act of Congress and can have no greater effect.' "

It is true that Mr. Justice Van Devanter was here discussing a controversy involving Indian tribal property, as to which the United States government possesses peculiar and plenary administrative power. But the principle involved in that case and in this one is the same, namely, that, until Congress had taken some such action as to confer vested rights on the parties, the subject remained within its exclusive power and control. The finding of the Court of Claims, though authorized by statute, is not a judgment, and...