Calhoun v. Williams

• Decision Date: 24 July 1879
• Parties: CALHOUN v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

73 Va. 18

CALHOUN v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

July 24, 1879

Absent, Moncure, P.

1. An unmarried man, who has no children or other persons dependent on him living with him, though he keeps house, and has persons hired bye him living with him, is not a householder or head of a family, within the meaning of these terms as used in the constitution and laws of Virginia, and therefore is not entitled to the homestead exemption as provided by the same.

2. The terms " householder" and " head of family," held to have the same meaning in the provisions of the constitution and statute relating to homesteads.

This was a suit in equity in the circuit court of Smythe county brought by Rufus M. Williams against John C. Calhoun, to subject the land of Calhoun to satisfy a judgment for $115 with interest from the 16th of November, 1874, and costs $7.20, which had been rendered in said court on the 3d of October, 1875. The only defence set up by Calhoun, was that he had by a deed dated the 6th of March, 1875, set apart his land, valued by him at $1,650, and certain personal property valued at $30, as his homestead exemption; and the only question in the case was, as to his right to a homestead exemption. The facts seem to be as follows:

John C Calhoun was unmarried. By deed dated the 17th of February 1858, his father, Mark S. Calhoun, conveyed to him a tract of one hundred acres of land on the consideration of the support and maintenance of said Mark S. Calhoun and Elizabeth, his wife, during their natural lives; and further that he should pay to his sister Sarah Jane, $125 on the 6th of April, 1861, and the like sum in April, 1862, and support her during her single life; and he seems to have purchased a small tract of ten acres on which his house was built. His father and mother removed to his house and lived with him until their death. The father had been dead about ten years, the mother died in March, 1876. John C. Calhoun lived in his own house, and kept house, but he had no person living with him, except persons employed by him to work on his farm.

The cause came on to be heard on the 3d of September, 1876, when the court held that Calhoun was not entitled to a homestead, and made a decree that the land should be rented out by a commissioner named, for the payment of the judgment and costs of this suit. And thereupon Calhoun applied to a judge of this court for an appeal; which was allowed.

A. G. Pendleton, for the appellant.

Gilmore & Penn, for the appellee.

ANDERSON J.

The homestead article of the constitution of Virginia has been judicially construed, both by the federal and state courts, to confer a personal privilege upon the " householder or head of a family" ; and the question, and only question, in this case is, Is the appellant, who claims the benefit of this provision of the constitution, a householder or head of a family? This provision was not made for all persons who are residents of the state, but for a particular class of persons; otherwise it would not be limited to a " householder or head of a family." Who are embraced in that description? Worcester gives two significations to the term householder: " 1st. The occupier of a house" ; 2d. The master of a family." In which of these senses is it used in the constitution? If in the second sense, it is nearly synonymous with the terms " head of a family." And if used in that sense, then the second phrase--" head of a family" --was intended as explanatory of it. This mode of expression is not unusual in writings. When the first phrase is considered not sufficiently explicit or definite, a second is used to give the meaning with greater definiteness and clearness. And this is peculiarly appropriate when the design is to describe one particular class of persons, and not two distinct classes. If the language of the first description is not sufficiently precise or explicit, but may have two significations given to it, one of which is not descriptive of the class of persons intended, whilst the other is, the writer, in order to make his meaning certain, will use another term which shows in which sense he has employed the first phrase or term. And I think such was evidently the intention of the draughtsman of this clause of the constitution, and that the second description of the persons who were to be entitled to the privilege, was intended to be explanatory of the first, and not to constitute two classes of persons.

But if the term " householder" was intended to be descriptive of a different class from the " head of a family," it was intended to give the privilege to two distinct classes of persons; and if so, the copulative conjunction " and" would have been used, instead of the disjunctive " or," so as to read " every householder and every head of a family shall be entitled," & c.

But we need not confine ourselves to the definition given by the lexicographers. The term was evidently employed by the framers of the constitution in the sense in which it is commonly used. The term household literally means the inmates of the house--the family--those whom the house holds. The term is frequently used in the sacred scriptures, especially in the epistles of the New Testament, which, in the English version, is probably the best standard of the meaning of our language in common use. And the term household is so used in common parlance and in friendly correspondence by letter. What is more usual than to send messages of regard or affection by the writer to the household? Such messages are universally meant for the family--the inmates of the house. And if they constitute the household, who can be meant by the " householder" but the " head of the family" ? But whilst we hold that by the " householder" is meant the head of a family, we do not mean to say that every head of a family must be, necessarily, a householder.

But the whole scope of the article shows that the privilege was intended not so much for the benefit of the person to whom it is given, as for the benefit of his family; to enable the person to whom it is given to use it to save his family from suffering and want. To this end, it was necessary that the head of the family should have the power to shield a portion of his property from levy and sale under execution or distress, or other process. In Shipe, Cloud & Co. v. Repas & als., 28 Gratt. 716, 733, Judge Staples remarked " that no one can look into the provision of our constitution, and the adjudicated cases of other states, and fail to see that the primary object is to provide for the family. As was said by the supreme court of Ohio in Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio R. 498, 501, the humane policy of the homestead act seeks not the protection of the debtor, but its object is to protect his family from the inhumanity which would deprive its dependent members of a home."

That such was the intention of the framers of our constitution, to this end, to confer the privilege upon a person who had a...