Califano v. Aznavorian Aznavorian v. Califano

• Decision Date: 11 December 1978
• Docket Number: 77-5999,Nos. 77-991,s. 77-991
• Citation: 99 S.Ct. 471,439 U.S. 170,58 L.Ed.2d 435
• Parties: Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellant, v. Grace AZNAVORIAN, etc. Grace AZNAVORIAN, etc., Appellant, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

439 U.S. 170

99 S.Ct. 471

58 L.Ed.2d 435

Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellant,

v Grace AZNAVORIAN, etc.

Grace AZNAVORIAN, etc., Appellant,

v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare.

Nos. 77-991, 77-5999.

Argued Nov. 6, 1978.

Decided Dec. 11, 1978.

Syllabus

Section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act, which provides that no benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for the needy aged, blind, and disabled are to be paid for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United States, held to be constitutional as having a rational basis and not to impose an impermissible burden on the freedom of international travel in violation of the Fifth Amendment. That section, which merely has an incidental effect on international travel (Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992, and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179, distinguished), clearly effectuates the basic congressional decision to limit SSI payments to residents of the United States. Moreover, § 1611(f) may represent Congress' decision simply to limit payments to those who need them in the United States. While these justifications for the legislation may not be compelling, its constitutionality, in contrast to the standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, does not depend on compelling justifications. Pp. 174-178.

D.C., 440 F.Supp. 788, reversed.

Peter Buscemi, Washington, D. C., for Califano, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Peter A. Schey, Los Angeles, Cal., for Aznavorian.

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1972 Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income program to aid the needy aged, blind, and disabled. The legislation creating the program provides that benefits are not to be paid for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United States. The primary issue in the present litigation is whether this restriction is a constitutionally impermissible burden on the asserted right of international travel.

I

The 1972 Social Security Act Amendments repealed Titles I, X, and XIV of the Act, which had provided federal aid for state programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. The amendments replaced those programs with a new Title XVI, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. This program is administered by the Federal Government through the Social Security Administration. To be eligible to receive benefits under the program, a person must be a resident of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B); be either over 65 years old or meet statutory definitions of blindness and disability, § 1382c(a); and be poor, § 1382a (income), § 1382b (resources).

Section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act, as amended in 1972, provides that no person shall receive SSI benefits "for any month during all of which such individual is outside the United States . . . ." The section further provides that

"after an individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive days." ¹

Thus, if a recipient were to leave the country on May 5 and return on July 10, he would receive his entire payment for May. He would, however, lose his benefits for June and July. He would, have been actually away the entire month of June, and, because he had been gone for more than 30 days, he would be treated as having remained outside the country until August 9. In August his payments would automatically resume.

Grace Aznavorian is an American citizen. In 1974 she was a resident of California and an eligible recipient of SSI benefits. On July 21, 1974, she left the United States and traveled to Guadalajara, Mexico. Because of an unexpected illness, she remained in Mexico until September 1, 1974. Accordingly, she did not receive benefits for August or September.

Aznavorian pursued her administrative remedies without success. She then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decision.² Asserting that the suspension of her benefits denied her due process, equal protection, and the right of international travel, all as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, she sought declaratory relief and the bene- fits which had been denied because of her visit to Mexico.³ She moved for certification of a plaintiff class including all persons denied SSI benefits because of international travel. The Secretary moved for summary judgment.

The District Court first considered the motion for class certification. It concluded that a class action was not barred by the Social Security Act because the class would be limited to those who had presented unsuccessful claims to the Secretary. Because the requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 were otherwise satisfied, it certified the class.⁴ 440 F.Supp. 788, 792-794.

The court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class. Because international travel is "a basic constitutional right," the District Court held that the statute must bear "a fair and substantial relationship in fact to the governmental purposes that it seeks to achieve." Id., at 795, 797. The court concluded that the limitation on benefits was not sufficiently related to the Government's interest in making payments only to bona fide residents of the United States to be constitutionally valid.

The District Court ordered the Secretary to provide notice of its decision to all class members who were receiving benefits at the time of the order or would have been receiving benefits except for § 1611(f). It also ordered the Secretary to pay benefits to those members of the class whose benefits had been suspended because of § 1611(f), but who in fact continued to be actual residents of the United States. Because its order was limited to persons who were still needy within the meaning of the SSI program, the court believed that its order did not violate the sovereign immunity of the United States. 440 F.Supp., at 802-803.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court, and Aznavorian filed a cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated the cases. 435 U.S. 921, 98 S.Ct. 1482, 55 L.Ed.2d 514.

II

The Secretary raises two questions on his appeal.⁵ First, he contends that § 1611(f) does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Second, he urges that in any event the District Court's award of retroactive monetary relief is barred by sovereign immunity. Aznavorian's cross-appeal takes the position that the District Court erred in awarding monetary relief only to those class members who were eligible for SSI benefits on the date of its order. Because we conclude that § 1611(f) does not violate the Constitution, there is no occasion to consider the remedial issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal.

Social welfare legislation, by its very nature, involves drawing lines among categories of people, lines that necessarily are sometimes arbitrary. This Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of such classifications in federal welfare legislation where a rational basis existed for Congress' choice.

"The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. . . . In enacting legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection 'merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." ' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491.

"To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged 'is not a toothless one,' Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2764, 49 L.Ed.2d 651. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality." Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 97 S.Ct. 431, 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389.

See, e. g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 1028, 51 L.Ed.2d 270; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231.

Aznavorian argues that, even though § 1611(f) may under this standard be valid as against an equal protection or due process attack, a more stringent standard must be applied in a constitutional appraisal of § 1611(f) because this statutory provision limits the freedom of international travel. We have concluded, however, that § 1611(f), fortified by its presumption of constitutionality, readily withstands attack from that quarter as well.

The freedom to travel abroad has found recognition in at least three decisions of this Court. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204, the Secretary of State had refused to issue a passport to a person because of his links with leftwing political groups. The Court held that Congress had not given the Secretary discretion to deny passports on such grounds. Although the holding was one of statutory construction, the Court recognized that freedom of international travel is "basic in our scheme of values" and an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty.' " Id., at 126, 127, 78 S.Ct., at 1118, 1119. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d...