California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California

Decision Date17 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. A066471,A066471
Citation46 Cal.Rptr.2d 44,39 Cal.App.4th 15
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8147, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,986 . et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California

Fred H. Altshuler, Indira Talwani, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Berzon & Rubin, San Francisco, for appellants.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Robert H. Wright, Los Angeles, Richard Chernick, Los Angeles, Kelvin H. Booty, Jr., County Counsel, Douglas Hickling, Chief Assistant County Counsel, County of Alameda, Oakland, for respondents.

REARDON, Associate Justice.

Effective in 1994, the Judicial Council promulgated Rules of Court allowing electronic recording of superior court proceedings, despite a statutory scheme authorizing official shorthand reporting of these proceedings and the Legislature's rejection of legislation authorizing electronic recording. (See Cal.Rules of Court, rules 33(e), 891, 892, 980.3.) As Rules of Court are only valid to the extent that they comply with the constitutional charge to be "not inconsistent with statute," we conclude that these rules were promulgated in excess of Judicial Council authority. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6.)

In our case, appellants California Court Reporters Association, Inc. (CCRA) and others 1 petitioned for a writ of mandate to prevent respondents Judicial Council of California and others 2 from allowing electronic recording of superior court proceedings. The trial court denied the petition and CCRA appeals. CCRA contends, inter alia, that the California Rules of Court authorizing and funding electronic recording in superior courts are invalid because they are inconsistent with statutory law. We agree and thus reverse the judgment.

I. FACTS

The facts of this case are undisputed. For more than a century, state law has provided that the official record of superior court 3 proceedings be taken down in shorthand. (CODE CIV.PROC., § 2694; see Stats.1866, ch. 235, § 1, pp. 232-233; Stats.1872, ch. 296, § 1, pp. 400-401; Cal.Code Amends. 1873-1874, ch. 383, § 24, p. 288; Cal.Code Amends. 1880, ch. 35, § 269, pp. 21, 53].) In 1986, the Legislature authorized a demonstration project in selected counties--including Alameda County--to assess the feasibility of using electronic means of producing a verbatim record of these proceedings. (§ 270, subd. (a).) By January 1992, the Judicial Council was to report to the Legislature on the feasibility of electronic recording of official superior court proceedings. 5 (§ 270, subd. (g).) In 1992, the Judicial Council sponsored a bill that would have allowed electronic recording to be used after January 1, 1994. The Assembly Judiciary Committee rejected the bill and it was never reported from committee to the full Assembly. (See Assem.Bill No. 2937 (1991-1992 Reg.Sess.) §§ 1-3; see also Los Angeles County Court Reporters Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 403, 408-409 & fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 341.)

Under the terms of the statute, the demonstration project was to end on January 1, 1994. 6 (§ 270, subd. (a).) In November 1993, the Judicial Council adopted Rules of Court allowing official electronic recording of superior court proceedings after January 1, 1994. 7 (Cal.Rules of Court, rules 33(e), 891, 892, 980.3.) The Alameda County Superior Court also adopted local rules governing the electronic recording of its proceedings.

In December 1993, appellants California Court Reporters Association, Alameda County Official Court Reporters Association and five individuals petitioned the Alameda County Superior Court for a writ of mandate to preclude the Judicial Council and Alameda County officials from implementing the electronic recording rules. CCRA also sought an alternative writ and a stay order. In January 1994, the parties stipulated that the rules would not be implemented until a final decision was reached on the petition. 8 The Judicial Council demurred to the petition for writ of mandate. The parties agreed that the trial court 9 hear the merits of the petition, posing only questions of law. In March 1994, the trial court issued a statement of intended decision, upholding the challenged rules as "not inconsistent with statute." Judgment denying 10 the petition for writ of mandate was entered in May 1994.

II. VALIDITY OF RULES OF COURT
A. "Not Inconsistent with Statute"

First, CCRA contends that Rules of Court authorizing and funding 11 electronic recording of superior court proceedings are invalid because they are inconsistent with statute. (See Cal.Rules of Court, rules 33(e), 891, 892, 980.3.) 12 It asserts that, by these rules, the Judicial Council seeks to authorize the use of electronic recording to make the official superior court record. CCRA argues that these rules are contrary to the Legislature's intent that the official superior court record be made by official reporters and official reporters pro tempore.

The Judicial Council is empowered to "adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute...." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, italics added; see People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960, 963, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 883 P.2d 974; In re Jermaine B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1284, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 612; Iverson v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 544, 547-548, 213 Cal.Rptr. 399.) These rules have the force of law. (Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 884, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513; see In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 863, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 819 P.2d 843; Brooks v. Union Trust etc. Co. (1905) 146 Cal. 134, 138, 79 P. 843; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 84, 89, 9 Cal.Rptr. 405.) However, the Judicial Council may not adopt rules that are inconsistent with governing statutes. (People v. Hall, supra, at p. 960, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 883 P.2d 974; In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337, 346, 146 Cal.Rptr. 352, 579 P.2d 1.) The Judicial Council purported to adopt rules 33(e), 891, 892 and 980.3 of the California Rules of Court pursuant to its constitutional authority.

The trial court concluded that the challenged rules were "not inconsistent with statute" and thus, passed constitutional muster. In doing so, it interpreted the phrase "not inconsistent with statute" to mean more than merely inharmonious, but connoting an impossibility of concurrent operative effect. On appeal, we are not bound by the trial court's ruling. The interpretation of statutes is a question of law for us to determine anew. (See California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; City of Lafayette v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 658.)

Preliminarily, we must determine the relative value to be assigned to the Judicial Council's rules and the Legislature's enactment of statutes before we turn to the merits of our inquiry. The Judicial Council argues that as it and the Legislature both derive their powers from the state Constitution, the two institutions are coequals. We find this argument to be specious. The Constitution reserves to the Legislature and the people of this state the higher right to provide rules of procedure. The Judicial Council's right is secondary--a right to adopt rules only when the higher authority of the Legislature and the people has not been exercised. (Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469, 476-477, 304 P.2d 7; Lane v. Superior Court (1930) 104 Cal.App. 340, 344, 285 P. 860.) Its rule-making power is limited by existing law as enacted by the Legislature, thus making the legislative branch an inherently higher authority than the Judicial Council itself. (See Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, at p. 476, 304 P.2d 7; Lane v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 344, 285 P. 860.) The challenged rules must be measured for consistency against the legislative enactments.

Our next task is to determine what constitutes a rule of court that is "not inconsistent with statute." (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6.) CCRA argues that a rule of court is inconsistent with a statute if it contravenes the intent of the Legislature that passed that statute. The Judicial Council contends that the trial court properly defined the term "inconsistent" to mean more than merely inharmonious or unsymmetrical, but to connote an impossibility of concurrent operative effect. It urges us to find that a rule of court is inconsistent with a statute only if the rule expressly prohibits or permits that which the statute permits or prohibits.

Construing the relevant constitutional language, the trial court defined the term "not inconsistent" as "not ... merely inharmonious or unsymmetrical, but connot[ing] impossibility of concurrent operative effect, or contradictory in the sense that the provisions cannot co-exist...." [p] " 'Inconsistent' means mutually repugnant or contradictory; contrary, the one to the other, so that both cannot stand. The acceptance or establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other.... [p] [In the context of local and state court rules], 'inconsistent' means court rules so antithetical that it is impossible as a matter of law that they can both be effective." Based on this definition, the trial court found that the rules permitting electronic recording were consistent with state law and thus, valid.

The trial court relied on out-of-state cases to determine whether the rules were "inconsistent with statute." These cases do not interpret section 6 of article VI of the California Constitution, but consider the meaning of the term "inconsistent" in other contexts. (See In re Brown (S.D.Iowa 1971) 329 F.Supp. 422, 426 [positive repugnancy between new and old law required to repeal by...

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