California State Board of Equal. v. Coast Radio Prod.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 14311.,14311.
• Citation: California State Board of Equal. v. Coast Radio Prod., 228 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1955)
• Parties: CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Appellant, v. COAST RADIO PRODUCTS, a copartnership composed of Henry L. Smith and Joseph Boroff, and Henry L. Smith and Joseph Boroff, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

228 F.2d 520 (1955)

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Appellant, v. COAST RADIO PRODUCTS, a copartnership composed of Henry L. Smith and Joseph Boroff, and Henry L. Smith and Joseph Boroff, Appellees.

No. 14311.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

December 14, 1955.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Edward Sumner, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of California, for appellant.

Robert E. Rosskopf, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, FEE, and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court affirming an order of a referee in bankruptcy permanently enjoining appellant Board of Equalization from collecting from the discharged appellee partnership or the discharged individual partners, sales tax indebtedness of $1,980.01, which was incurred prior to the date appellees were adjudicated bankrupts.

Prior to September 29, 1950, appellees Smith and Boroff were doing business as Coast Radio Products, a copartnership. On that date an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in the United States District Court,¹ against the co-partnership. Voluntary petitions in bankruptcy by said copartners were filed in the same court on December 13, 1950. Orders of adjudication were entered in all cases on the filing date. The partnership and the individual copartners were discharged on February 7, 1951, and March 8, 1951, respectively.

Schedules of Debts filed in the respective proceedings listed taxes due and owing to appellant under the California Sales and Use Tax Law, totaling $1,980.01. Although appellant received notice of the proceedings, it filed no claim for the above taxes within six months of the creditors' meeting.²

The first and final report of the Trustee reported that when reduced to cash the bankrupt's assets netted $17,126.63. After payment of tax claims (excepting the instant one) and prior labor claims, there remained as of April 21, 1953, the sum of $3,887.61. On July 29, 1952, the partnership filed a petition which alleged that appellant had sought and will continue to seek to effect collection of the $1,980.01 tax liability from the discharged appellees. The petition closed with a prayer that the petitioners be discharged from any liability to the Board of Equalization for sales taxes due before October 9, 1950, which were provable in bankruptcy, and that the Board of Equalization be forever enjoined from attempting to enforce against the bankrupts any sales tax claims provable in bankruptcy which were incurred before October 9, 1952.

After hearing, the referee concluded (a) that if the Board of Equalization had filed its claim for sales tax within the six months' period allowed by law,³ its claim would have been paid in full; (b) it would be inequitable and unjust and would deny to bankrupts the benefits of the bankruptcy Act if the Board of Equalization were permitted to collect from discharged bankrupts the amount of sales tax which would have been paid from the bankrupt estate if the claim had been timely filed; and (c) by reason of the above, bankrupt Coast Radio Products, and bankrupts Smith and Boroff were entitled to an injunction enjoining the enforcement of any tax claims due from said bankrupts on or before October 20, 1950, to the extent that said claims were provable in bankruptcy. Upon the above grounds the injunction was granted as prayed. From an order of the district court affirming the action of the referee, this appeal is brought.

The question presented here is whether a referee in bankruptcy may enjoin a State from enforcing its non-dischargeable tax claim against after-acquired property of a discharged bankrupt if it did not file a timely claim against the bankrupt estate when there were funds on hand sufficient to fully satisfy said tax claim.

Appellant contends that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to affect in any way the after-acquired assets of a discharged bankrupt,⁴ that any defense including discharge, to a creditor's suit against a discharged bankrupt upon a debt existing at the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, is properly raised in the creditor's suit and not in the bankruptcy court,⁵ that the actions of the referee herein constitute a suit brought against the State of California without its permission as required by law.⁶

We do not agree with the contention advanced by appellant that the bankruptcy court lacks power over after-acquired assets of a bankrupt so that the bankrupt's remedy against a pre-bankruptcy creditor's suit after discharge is limited to pleading the discharge in bankruptcy. Such a construction would seriously weaken the benefit of a discharge and impair the object of the Act which is to

"relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."⁷

A perusal of the cases persuades us that the bankruptcy court generally has the power to enjoin an attempted collection of a pre-existing debt against after-acquired property in pursuance of its power to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of its judgments or decrees.⁸ Exercise of such injunctive powers of the bankruptcy court has been held especially applicable against those who pursue and harass a discharged bankrupt by suits in the state courts hoping by this method to circumvent the bankruptcy laws and recover their debt by reason of the bankrupt's ignorance of the necessity to plead his discharge in bar or by his fear of the financial burden and possible loss of employment often incident to defense of such actions.⁹ Such proceedings encourage a multiplicity of suits and fail to provide the bankrupt with a speedy and adequate remedy. For this reason, exhaustion by the bankrupt of his State remedies is not a prerequisite to the exercise of the bankruptcy court's injunctive power.¹⁰ But this is not to say that the exercise of such power is mandatory upon the bankruptcy court. It is permissive and should be exercised only in the sound discretion of the court. Injunctive relief may be obtained either by ancillary proceeding in equity or by motion in the regular bankruptcy proceeding.¹¹ Cases cited¹² in support of appellant's contention that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction are not controlling in this case since they are founded upon the existence of a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.¹³ While on the facts presented therein, the remedy provided may have been adequate, in this instance it is not plain nor speedy nor efficient, and the cases are without application here. Nor, as appellant urges, does this proceeding constitute a suit against the state so as to come within the purview of Section 6, Art. XX of the California Constitution,¹⁴ since:

"The process of dealing with state tax assessments is one essential to the administration of a bankruptcy estate and does not amount to a suit against the state."¹⁵

Having established the general power of the referee to make an order enjoining collection of a pre-existent debt from the after-acquired property of the discharged bankrupts, we will now pass to a consideration of the propriety of his exercise of the power in this case.

A discharge in bankruptcy releases a bankrupt from all of his provable debts with certain exceptions, foremost of which is taxes due to the United States or to any State, county, district, or municipality.¹⁶ Such debts,¹⁷ are not affected by discharge and may be collected by a subsequent action against after-acquired property,¹⁸ although all or part of such debts may be collected by participation in the bankrupt estate.¹⁹ Collection of a portion of such debt by dividend does not bar the collection of the unpaid balance by subsequent action.

Appellees here do not contend that tax claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy, but they do contend that where, as here, the State was scheduled as a creditor, and assets were sufficient to pay its claim in full, the State was negligent in failing to file its claim, and the bankrupts should, in equity, be entitled to the same protection that they would have had under the Act if the claim had been properly filed and paid. This, in effect, raises the question of whether by its conduct a taxing body may be estopped to collect a tax liability.²⁰

In California it seems established that while the State and municipal corporations, in the exercise of public rights, are not impliedly within ordinary limitations statutes, nonetheless under certain rare circumstances where justice requires it, an estoppel in pais may be asserted even against the public.²¹ The cited cases make it clear that each case wherein an estoppel is sought to be set up against the government must be decided on its facts. An estoppel arises where one party by concealment or false representation intentionally deceives another party as to the true state of the facts to the detriment of the second party. Four elements are necessary: "(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury."²²

In considering appellant's actions in the collection of its tax indebtedness from appellees, it must be realized that at the time of the bankruptcy, appellant could pursue alternative courses: It could either file its claim in the bankrupt estate to secure payment from the proceeds thereof or it could rely upon the non-dischargeable nature of the debt, ignore the proceedings and bring an action to collect from appellees after-acquired property. It was in no-wise obligated to take the former course merely because there happened to be sufficient funds in the estate to satisfy the claim in full. To so hold would be to read by implication into the bankruptcy law the...