California Teach. Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 71-2243.
• Citation: 333 F. Supp. 436
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, a California Corporation, on behalf of its members, et al., Petitioners, v. NEWPORT MESA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.

333 F. Supp. 436

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, a California Corporation, on behalf of its members, et al., Petitioners, v. NEWPORT MESA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.

Civ. No. 71-2243.

United States District Court, C. D. California.

October 7, 1971.

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Peter T. Galiano, Richard C. Anthony, Burlingame, Cal., and Hirsch Adell and Warren, Adell & Miller, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel of County of Orange and Iryne C. Black, Deputy County Counsel, Santa Ana, Cal., for respondents Newport Mesa Unified School District and others.

Ray T. Sullivan, Jr., County Counsel of County of Riverside, James H. Angell, Asst. County Counsel, Winlock W. Miller and Steven A. Broiles, Deputy County Counsels, for respondents Riverside Junior College District and others.

James R. Dooley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for United States, appearing as amicus curiae with permission of the Court.

HAUK, District Judge.

This matter arises upon the Complaint of the California Teachers Association on behalf of all of its members, and particularly the eight teachers named therein, against various school districts in the County of Orange and in the County of Riverside, State of California, seeking injunctive relief restraining the School Districts from imposing any wage and fringe benefit freeze on the salaries and benefits of the teachers; and from refusing to pay increased salaries and fringe benefits to which the teachers are allegedly entitled under individual written contracts between the School Districts and the teachers, as well as pursuant to 1971-1972 salary schedules previously adopted by the Districts. It is claimed, of course, that the wage and fringe benefit freeze was imposed by the School Districts in obedience to Presidential Executive Order No. 11615 of August 15, 1971, 36 Fed.Reg. 15727 (1971),¹ pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, Title II (1970), as amended P.L. 92-15, 85 Stat. 38 (1971).² And it is charged that this Executive Order

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as well as the statute under which it was issued are both violative of the Federal Constitution, with the alleged result that the teachers are entitled to injunctive relief not only by way of final judgment, but also by way of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pendente lite, to be issued by a three-judge Federal Court which the school teachers request be convened pursuant to Title 28 United States Code, Sections 2281, 2282, 2284.

The Court issued its Order to Show Cause on September 20, 1971, setting a hearing on the application for the temporary restraining order, the prayer for a preliminary injunction pendente lite, and the request for the convening of a three-judge court, for October 4, 1971. At the hearing all parties stipulated that the Court should expand the hearing to include the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by the Riverside Respondents as well as the Order to Show Cause, the Anthony affidavit in support thereof, and the Orange Respondents' Return thereto, along with the respective points and authorities submitted by all parties, including the United States of America as Amicus Curiae.

Now having analyzed and considered all of the aforesaid pleadings, including the points and authorities submitted by the Assistant United States Attorney upon the Court's Certification to the United States Attorney General, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 that the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 affecting the public interest has been drawn in question in this suit, and having heard and considered the arguments and further points and authorities made and submitted by counsel for Petitioners, Respondents and Amicus Curiae at the said hearing, the Court now renders its Decision and Order Denying the application for a temporary restraining order and the prayer for a preliminary injunction pendente lite; denying the request for a three-judge court; and dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend.

At the outset and without belaboring the matter at too great length, we ask ourselves what are the guidelines by which we are to convene or not to convene a three-judge Federal Court. It has been said by the Fifth Circuit that except for situations in which there can be absolutely no doubt at all that there is no constitutional issue, the request for a three-judge court must be granted. Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 912-913 (5th Cir. 1968). But despite the protestations of Chief Judge Brown in Jackson that this is the better course, he does admit that it inevitably leads to unwarranted expenditures of judicial energy. And it has been rejected in other Circuits. The Third Circuit, through Chief Judge Biggs, refused to adopt the Fifth Circuit's "no-doubt-at-all" test, and holds that when an application is made which might require adjudication by a three-judge court, both the district judge and the chief judge of the circuit, each acting separately, must perform the judicial function of judging and concluding, as a matter of law, whether the pending case raises a substantial constitutional issue and therefore requires three judges for its adjudication. Miller v. Smith, 236 F.Supp. 927, 933 (E.D.Penn. 1964).

The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, has stated what we believe to be the correct rule. Judge Aldrich discusses both the Third and the Fifth Circuit views and, rejecting the Fifth Circuit's "no-doubt-at-all" test, holds that "in determining whether a complaint alleges a case appropriate for a three-judge court, the district judge performs a judicial, as distinguished from a ministerial, function," and accordingly, he must ascertain whether the "request possesses a reasonable degree of legal merit." But contrary to the Third Circuit's view, Judge Aldrich goes on to say that once the district judge finds that a three-judge court should be convened, and once the request has been formally made by the district judge, then the chief judge's duty is "solely ministerial" for the reason that "it is the district judge's case, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(1), whereas unless the chief judge designates himself, his contact with the case is merely ephemeral." Merced Rosa v. Herrero, 423 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970).

Moreover, we must always proceed with great caution and reluctance in reviewing the request for a three-judge court since the statute authorizing this unusual tripartite bench is to be treated "not as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S.Ct. 480, 483, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941).

As Phillips points out, a three-judge court "entails a serious drain upon the federal judicial system." 312 U.S. at 250, 61 S.Ct. at 483. And as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93, 80 S.Ct. 568, 579, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960) (dissenting opinion) quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Harlan in Swift and Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965):

"The convening of a three-judge trial court makes for dislocation of the normal structure and functioning of the lower federal courts, particularly in the vast non-metropolitan regions; and direct review of District Court judgments by this Court not only expands this Court's obligatory jurisdiction but contradicts the dominant principle of having this Court review decisions only after they have gone through two judicial sieves. * * *"

Thus proceeding with the care and circumspection directed by the Supreme Court, we scrutinize the Complaint here in the light of the guidelines which under recent decision are decisive:

(a) Does the complaint pose any substantial attack upon the constitutionality of the Statute itself or the President's Executive Order? Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933), reh. denied, 366 U.S. 922 81 S.Ct. 1090, 6 L.Ed. 2d 245 (1961); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Certain Carriers, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 100 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C.Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 84 S.Ct. 1181, 12 L.Ed.2d 187 (1964); Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 88 S.Ct. 63, 19 L.Ed. 2d 102 (1967).

(b) Does the complaint seek injunctive relief against a Federal officer or agency engaged in the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970? Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 48 S.Ct. 585, 72 L.Ed. 990 (1928); Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 60 S.Ct. 947, 84 L.Ed. 1249 (1940).

(c) Is the enforcement, operation or execution of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 the direct object of the requested injunctive relief? Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F.Supp. 111 (D.D.C.1967), aff'd 132 U.S.App.D.C. 176 407 F.2d 306 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 89 S.Ct. 619, 21 L.Ed.2d 570 (1969).

NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK

As a threshold issue this Court must first determine whether or not a "substantial constitutional question" has been raised by the Petitioners contentions hereinafter stated. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.1970); Carlough v. Finch, 309 F.Supp. 1025 (S.D.Fla.1969); Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116 (C.D.Cal.1971).

Petitioners have raised five grounds for challenging the constitutionality of the act in question, all of which we find are plainly insubstantial.

1. Due Process—Fifth Amendment

Petitioners commence their attack with the allegation that the implementation of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 has unlawfully deprived them of the wage increases to which they are entitled without a proper hearing, and is thus a violation of due process under the Fifth³ and Fourteenth⁴ Amendments. Petitioners' reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment is obviously...