California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1981
• Citation: 170 Cal.Rptr. 817,28 Cal.3d 692,621 P.2d 856
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 621 P.2d 856 CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 31283.

Page 817

170 Cal.Rptr. 817

28 Cal.3d 692, 621 P.2d 856

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 31283.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Jan. 19, 1981.

Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, Greer D. Knopf, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, Larry J. Frierson and Paterson & Taggart, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

Russell M. Koch, County Counsel, Doris Lacy, Deputy County Counsel, Merced, and Robert J. Henry, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

Laurence D. Steinsapir, Robert M. Dohrmann, Howard M. Knee and Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Krepack, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

BY THE COURT:

California Teachers Association (CTA) sought a peremptory writ of mandate from the superior court directing the San Diego Community College District and its chancellor (district) to reclassify and reemploy certain part-time teachers (part-timers) as contract or regular employees for the 1976-1977 school year and to award the part-timers back pay, with interest, equal to the difference between their salaries as temporary employees and the salaries to which they would have been entitled as permanent employees.

The superior court granted the writ on the issue of reclassification but denied it as to back pay. The district appealed from the former ruling Cal.App., 164 Cal.Rptr. 173, and CTA appealed from the latter. Most of the issues presented in these appeals were resolved by our decision in Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 369, 155 Cal.Rptr. 575, 594 P.2d 1000. The principal question remaining, which we now must decide, is the appropriate method of computing the back pay to which those part-timers who will be reclassified are entitled.

CTA brought this action on behalf of its members who were part-time instructors in the district during the 1976 spring semester and who were classified as temporary employees because they worked less than 60 percent of the hours per week considered a full-time assignment for permanent employees having comparable duties.

The district employs three classes of instructors: regular (permanent or tenured), contract (probationary) and temporary. Some regular and contract teachers are employed part-time and are paid a salary prorated to the salary of a full-time teacher. Temporary teachers are paid a flat hourly rate which is less than the amount paid a salaried employee. Temporary employees do not receive certain fringe benefits associated with contract or regular employment, and they may be dismissed without notice or hearing. They are not, however, expected to hold office hours, serve on professional committees or supervise student activities, all of which are required of full-time teachers.

In Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist., supra, 24 Cal.3d 369, 155 Cal.Rptr. 575, 594 P.2d 1000, we clarified the meaning of Education Code section 13337.5 (now recodified as § 87482). ¹ We held that the final paragraph of that section must be read independently from the preceding three paragraphs and that therefore part-timers coming under that provision shall be classified as temporary employees only. Section 13337.5 does not, however, apply to persons who were hired before its effective date, November 8, 1967. (Ibid.; see also Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 114 Cal.Rptr. 589, 523 P.2d 629.) We therefore concluded that part-time employees who had been employed before November 8, 1967, became regular employees pursuant to section 13346.25 and were entitled to receive pro rata back pay insofar as such claims were not barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (Code Civ.Proc., § 338, subd. 1).

Our holding in Peralta that the plaintiffs who had been employed before November 8, 1967, were entitled to additional back pay was based on our conclusion that Education Code section 13503.1 applied to community college districts. ² Present arguments of the district and amici urging reexamination of that conclusion are essentially the same as those ably articulated in the dissent in Peralta, and we are not persuaded to overrule that case.

Since the rights of part-timers who were initially employed before November 8, 1967, are clearly encompassed in CTA's description in its petition of those on whose behalf the action was brought, ³ we turn now to the principal issue in this case. What is the proper method of determining pro rata pay under section 13503.1?

Section 13503.1 provides that "In fixing the compensation of part-time employees, governing boards shall provide an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount provided full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same grade or assignment."

The key question is the meaning of the phrase "time actually served." CTA asserts that it refers to classroom hours only. The district, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase "time actually served" refers to time spent working on the job, including time spent both inside and outside of the classroom.

In construing a statute "we begin with the fundamental rule that a court 'should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' " (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) "An equally basic rule of statutory construction is, however, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them." (Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 604, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512; Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d, at p. 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) Although a court may properly rely on extrinsic aids, it should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1; Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764, 150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227.) "If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." (People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 183, 217 P.2d 1; Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 604, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512.)

The language of section 13503.1 supports the district's position. Community college instructors commonly have a number of duties besides classroom teaching. Such duties include counseling, holding office hours, supervising student activities and serving on professional committees. The phrase "time actually served" clearly encompasses those activities as well as classroom teaching. Moreover, the scanty legislative history of the statute appears to support its plain meaning.

Section 13503.1 was amended in 1968 to read as stated. The amendment originated from Senate Bill No. 138, introduced by Senator Rodda. The portion of the statute at issue here formerly provided that the measure of the ratio was as the amount of "time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time required of full-time employees assigned to the same grade." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language was deleted in favor of the language now at issue, thereby making the measure the time "actually served by full-time employees" rather than the time "required of full-time employees." The Legislative Counsel's Digest provides little guidance as to the purpose of the change. It states only that the amendment "Alters the method for establishing the rate of compensation for such part-time employee as a ratio to amount paid full-time employees."

CTA relies on a statement by the author of the bill, Senator Rodda, in support of its proffered interpretation of "time actually served" as referring only to classroom hours taught. This statement was submitted by Senator Rodda to Governor Reagan in support of the bill's approval. The statement said: "Certificated employees may contract with a school district to serve on a part-time basis. Such part-time certificated employees are paid a pro-rated amount in proportion to the amount of time they serve as to the amount of time required of full-time employees of like positions on the salary schedule.

"This legislation would provide that part-time employees shall be paid on the basis that the proportion of the time actually served bares (sic) to the minimum schoolday as provided in law, thereby proportional to the amount of state income received.

"Inasmuch as every school district may determine the amount of time required of full-time employees, there is a lack of consistency as to the basis upon which part-time employees may be paid. Under current law, it is possible for a school district to receive the equivalent state income generated by a full-time teacher while paying that teacher on a part-time basis.

"The effect of this bill would be to make the proportional ratio of salary payments to part-time employees based upon and consistent with the amount of state income they generate by their teaching activities; it would make such application consistent throughout the state."

The district objects to use of Senator Rodda's statement in determining the Legislature's intent. CTA, however, asserts that we must not consider this point because no objection to the use of the material was made in the trial court. The interpretation of a statute, however, is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court. (See Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 604, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512; ...