California v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P.
Decision Date | 25 January 2013 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 07-CV-1883-MMA(WVG) |
Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KINDER MORGAN ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
[Doc. Nos. 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215
& 216]
This matter is before the Court following a hearing on the parties' pending dispositive motions. After further consideration of the moving papers, exhibits, and oral arguments, the Court affirms its tentative rulings as explained in further detail below and enters judgment in favor of Defendants Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., Kinder Morgan Management, L.L.C., Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P. "D," SFPP, L.P., Kinder Morgan G.P., Inc., and Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (collectively, "Kinder Morgan").
This action arises from events surrounding the contamination and prolonged remediation of soil and groundwater on approximately 166 acres of City-owned land surrounding and underlying Qualcomm Stadium in San Diego, California (the "Property"). [First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Doc. No. 32 ¶ 26.] Kinder Morgan owns land adjacent to the Property, on which itoperates the Mission Valley Terminal. [Id. ¶ 27.] The Mission Valley Terminal is an industrial facility engaged in the business of transporting, storing, and distributing petroleum products. [Id.] Since the 1960s, the Mission Valley Terminal has been the central hub of the gasoline distribution system in San Diego County.
The following facts are not reasonably in dispute. As early as 1992, the City was on notice that Kinder Morgan and its predecessors released petroleum products into the soil, contaminating the Property and groundwater. [Id. ¶ 30; Defs.' Stmt. of Uncontroverted Facts ("SUF") ¶ 1.] In 1992, the California Regional Water Quality and Control Board ("Water Board") ordered the investigation and remediation of contamination at the Mission Valley Terminal. Pursuant to this order, Kinder Morgan and its predecessors have spent approximately $60 million addressing the petroleum beneath the Property. Since 1992, the City has received copies of Kinder Morgan's reports to the Water Board, and has provided input in the Water Board's oversight of remediation efforts. [Id. ¶ 2.] Despite the contamination, the City has never cancelled a sporting event at the Property, lost use of the Property, or lost any revenue from operating the Property. [Id. ¶ 17.]
From 2001 through 2004, the City considered suing Kinder Morgan for damages allegedly caused by the contamination. [Id. ¶ 3.] In 2005, the Water Board issued Addendum No. 5 to its order, requiring Kinder Morgan to complete the soil remediation by December 31, 2010, and the groundwater remediation by December 31, 2013. [Add. No. 5 to CAO 92-01, Doc No. 206-4.] On August 14, 2007, the City sued Kinder Morgan, alleging that petroleum releases from the Mission Valley Terminal contaminated the Property and damaged the City. [Doc. No. 1.] The following claims remain: public nuisance, continuing private nuisance, continuing trespass, negligence, California Business and Professions Code section 17200, and declaratory relief. [Doc. Nos. 32, 97, 98.]
A party may move for summary judgment on all or part of its claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (). "Once the moving party meets its initial burden, . . . the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"[T]o defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . the nonmoving party must introduce some 'significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.'" Fazio v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 125 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 252). However, when assessing the record to determine whether there is a "genuine issue for trial," the Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in [its] favor." Horphag Research Ltd., 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The ultimate question on a summary judgment motion is whether the evidence "presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
As a threshold matter, Kinder Morgan moves to exclude the testimony of the City's expert, Ray Forrester, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court finds that Forrester's opinion fails to satisfy the requirements of Daubert, and therefore GRANTS Kinder Morgan's motion.
The City retained Forrester as an expert to provide his opinion regarding the remediationefforts at the Mission Valley Terminal. Forrester is a chemical engineer with over 30 years of experience remediating contaminated sites. [See generally Forrester Rep., Doc. No. 206-4.]
Generally, Forrester opines that Kinder Morgan has not adequately remediated the Property, and that alternative technologies are better equipped to quickly and effectively remediate the site. Forrester's opinion rests, in large part, on the presupposition that both the groundwater and soil on the Property should be remediated to "background condition."1 He is aware of the Water Board's remediation requirements, yet asserts that the goals of the Water Board and those of the City as a landowner are not the same. Forrester states:
The goals of the [Water Board] and those of a landowner who has been impacted by contamination from an off-site source may be similar but not the same. The Water Board has goals designed to address the interest of the state and community as a whole. The impacted landowner has concerns about the safety of those accessing their property, their property value, and its usability. Each of these three factors is heavily impacted by the time required to remedy the contamination that has migrated onto their property. . . . Just because [Kinder Morgan's] actions may have been approved by the [Water Board] doesn't mean that the [Water Board] would not have approved more responsive and timely attempts to address the contamination. . . . The distinction between the [Water Board's] goals and those of the City of San Diego is integral to understanding the points made in my opinions provided below.
[Forrester Rep., Doc. No. 221-7 at 11.]
Forrester's report contains the following eleven opinions:
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