Calio v. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
| Docket Number | 22-2261 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2023 |
| Parties | MATTHEW CALIO, Appellant v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, doing business as CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; XYZ CORP. 1-10; ABC 1-10, Individuals (all ficticious names and/or entities who should be identified through discovery) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 24, 2023
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY (D.C. Civ. Action No. 1-19-cv-08393) District Judge Honorable Renee M. Bumb
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and MCKEE, Circuit Judges.
Matthew Calio, an employee at the Camden County Detention Center (CCDC),[1]seeks reversal of the District Court's dismissal of his complaint. Although the District Court did not use the word "moot" in its opinion, its analysis and conclusion that, based on the concessions from the CCDC and the lack of damages to Calio, there were no issues left for trial, essentially embraces our mootness jurisprudence. Since this analysis is correct, we will affirm the order dismissing the complaint.[2]
I. Background
Despite what can only be described as a tortured procedural history, the facts of this case are relatively straightforward. Calio began working at the CCDC as a Corrections Officer in 2001. In addition to his work responsibilities, he assists with the care of his mother, who suffers from dementia. Calio applied for intermittent leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the New Jersey Family Leave Act[3] (NJFLA) four times: once in 2016, once in 2017, and twice in 2018. The first application was denied because Calio had not worked enough hours to qualify for FMLA leave, but the other three applications were approved.
Specifically, he received three designation notices,[4] each of which authorized his use of FMLA leave during a specific six-month period. The first designation notice, dated March 24, 2017, covered the period from March 21, 2017 through September 21, 2017, and authorized Calio to use FMLA leave up to three times per month, each time with a duration of five days. The second designation notice, dated June 12, 2018, covered the period of June 11, 2018 through December 11, 2018, and authorized Calio to use FMLA leave for an undetermined frequency and duration. The third designation notice, dated December 4, 2018, covered the period from December 12, 2018 through June 12, 2019, and authorized Calio to use FMLA leave once per month, for a duration of five days.
At issue is the request that was approved in a designation notice dated December 4, 2018. As already noted, the designation notice authorized Calio to take intermittent FMLA leave for five days, once per month.[5] The frequency and length of the leave was based on the medical certification Calio submitted. In the certification, his mother's physician estimated that Calio's mother would have flare ups once every four weeks, lasting between eight hours and five days per flare up. The designation notice also informed Calio that, pursuant to the CCDC's policy, he was required to use his sick days concurrently with his FMLA leave. This requirement is authorized by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a).
Calio twice exceeded the FMLA leave authorized by his December 4, 2018 designation notice. The first time he exceeded his authorized FMLA leave was on January 6, 2019, which was within 30 days of his December 15, 2018, use of FMLA leave. He next took FMLA leave on January 14, 2019, which was approved because it was the first use of FMLA leave within the 30-day period of January 12, 2019 to February 12, 2019. On January 28, 2019, he sought to use FMLA leave again. That request was denied because it was the second request within the 30-day period of January 12, 2019 to February 12, 2019.[6]
These violations of the FMLA policy led the CCDC to provide Calio with two notices of disciplinary action on February 19, 2019. Together, the notices of disciplinary action recommended four days' suspension. On March 26, 2019, Calio was notified that the discipline would not be imposed and he would not need to serve any suspension time. He was further notified that "[t]he 2 dates utilized that initiated the Staff Complaints have been converted to sick days and this matter has been officially closed." Suppl. App. 3. The memorandum also encouraged Calio to recertify his FMLA leave if he needed more time than what was approved in the designation notice.
After discovery, Calio and the defendant cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court administratively terminated both motions and sought additional briefing on the procedures used to approve Calio's FMLA leave.[7]
New motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties, which the District Court denied based on its finding that genuine disputes of fact existed, albeit not relevant to this appeal. In doing so, the District Court noted that "Calio was not terminated, demoted, or reassigned, nor did he otherwise suffer any adverse financial or employment effects." App. 72.
After the Joint Final Pretrial Order ("JPTO") was filed, the District Court ordered additional briefing from the parties on what issues remained for trial. Calio reiterated his claims for equitable relief. In addition, he asserted a claim for injunctive relief, based on a theory that the CCDC had a practice of strictly enforcing FMLA approvals. Calio also sought a declaratory judgment that the CCDC's practice violated the FMLA.
After reviewing both parties' submissions, the District Court dismissed Calio's federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. The District Court found that Calio "failed to show that he suffered any damages" and that "there is no issue for the jury to decide." App. 10, 13. Specifically, the District Court observed that Calio failed to show he suffered any damages because, as it turned out, he did not actually lose any of his sick days and any mention of FMLA leave in his performance reviews inured to Calio's benefit, not detriment. Further, punitive or nominal damages are not recoverable under the FMLA.
The District Court also concluded that injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment were improper because the "argument that [the CCDC] violated the FMLA merely by disciplining employees who exceeded their intermittent (i.e., frequency and duration) FMLA allotments is misguided and without merit." App. 8. Alternatively, the theory underlying these claims was based on evidence not contained in the JPTO. The District Court noted that allowing Calio to pursue them "would essentially be allowing [Calio] to add a claim on the eve of trial" and "would be a miscarriage of justice." App. 10.
Calio filed a timely notice of appeal. Before us, he argues: (1) unforeseeable, intermittent leave cannot be strictly enforced, by its nature, so the original designation notice capping him at a five-day period once per month is, in effect, unenforceable; (2) he was therefore protected by the FMLA when he took the two days of unauthorized leave in January 2019; (3) converting those days to sick leave is FMLA interference; (4) including FMLA leave in his attendance record is a negative inference and the District Court made a credibility determination, thus erroneously granting summary judgment;[8] (5) the District Court applied the wrong standard when prohibiting him from amending the JPTO; and (6) the District Court's decision to dismiss the case was an unwarranted sanction. As a result, Calio seeks equitable relief and an injunction barring strict enforcement of FMLA approvals. He also wishes to recover costs and fees.
II. Legal standard[9]
"We review de novo a district court's determination that claims are moot." CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 622 (3d Cir. 2013). "A MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 143 S.Ct. 927, 934 (2023) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)).
"[T]he central question of all mootness problems is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occassion [sic] for meaningful relief." Jersey Cent. Power &Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1985). [10] Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002).
Here Calio seeks equitable relief...
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