Calio v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1964
• Docket Number: No. 64-248,64-248
• Citation: 169 So.2d 502
• Parties: Carolyn F. CALIO, Appellant, v. The EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF the UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 502

169 So.2d 502

Carolyn F. CALIO, Appellant, v. The EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF the UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 64-248.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 8, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1964.

Fuller & Brumer, Kenneth L. Ryskamp, Miami, for appellant.

Shutts, Bowen, Simmons, Prevatt & Boureau and Cotton Howell, Miami, for appellee.

Before CARROLL, TILLMAN PEARSON and HENDRY. JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

This litigation concerns the interpretation of a provision in a group life insurance policy.

Appellant's husband, now deceased, was employed by Florida State Theaters, Inc., until discharged by this employer. The last day which decedent worked was September 27, 1962. His employer paid him, however, until October 25, 1962, and on November 20, 1962 he died.

During the defendant's employment a group life insurance policy was in effect with appellee. The insurance contract provided, inter alia 'The insurance hereunder of any employee shall cease automatically upon the occurrence of any of the following events:

'(1) The termination of this policy,

'(2) The cessation of premium payment on account of such employee's insurance hereunder,

'(3) Upon the expiration of the thirty-first day following the last day of the month in which occurs the termination of his employment in the classes of employees insured hereunder. Cessation of active work by an employee shall be deemed to constitute the termination of his employment * * *' [Emphasis added] .

Appellant claims that the decedent's employment terminated on October 25, 1962, the last day for which salary was paid, and according to subparagraph (3) above, the insurance terminated on November 26, 1962, thereby constituting the policy as in effect on the date of appellant's husband's death.

Appellee claims, that they virtue of the second sentence of subparagraph (3) above, the decedent's employment terminated on September 27, 1962, and accordingly the insurance coverage lapsed on October 28, 1962, prior to his death, thereby precluding recovery under the policy.

Both parties moved for a summary judgment. The defendant's motion was granted, and plaintiff appeals the summary judgment. We find no error and affirm.

The contract of insurance between the parties was at all times subject to the statutes of the state then in force in regard thereto. ¹ Accordingly, § 627.0415, Fla.App.,State., F.S.A., became a part of the contract between the parties. This statute provided, in pertinent part:

'The group life insurance policy shall contain a provision that if an insurance * * * on a person covered under the policy ceases because of termination of employment * * *, such person shall be entitled to have issued to him by the insuror * * * an individual policy of life insurance * * * within thirty-one days after such termination * * *.' [Emphasis supplied]

It is apparent that the statute provides no definition as to the meaning of the term, 'termination of employment'. Appellee has undertaken by writing this particular policy to define that specific term, and thereby avoid any possible misunderstanding. Appellee has provided that termination of employment shall mean cessation of active work. Now, appellant does not claim that this definition is obscure or confusing as applied to the facts of this case, but she does say that appellee should not be permitted to define that statutory phrase. Appellant has referred us to no authority for this proposition, and our research has revealed none.

We know of no prohibition upon a private party's freedom to contract as to the meaning of certain unclear terms. We recognize, however, that insurance contracts must be interpreted wherever possible to provide insurance. ² This rule of law is applicable only where a contract is susceptible of two interpretations. This is not the situation before us. Here there is no question as to meaning of the phrase, 'termination of employment', the question is, may the definition of that statutory phrase, in a contract, be enforced by this or any other court. As noted previously, we are aware of no prohibition on such action, and therefore we should give it judicial approval. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Legislature in its statutes sometimes uses terms and phrases...