Calkins v. Adams County Co-op. Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 52050,52050
• Citation: 259 Iowa 245,144 N.W.2d 124
• Parties: Kenneth CALKINS, Appellant, v. ADAMS COUNTY COOPERATIVE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 124

144 N.W.2d 124

259 Iowa 245

Kenneth CALKINS, Appellant, v. ADAMS COUNTY COOPERATIVE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 52050.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 14, 1966.

Lee R. Watts, Corning, for appellant.

Jones, Cambridge, Carl & Howard, Atlantic, and Eugene W. Mullin, Corning, all for appellee.

SNELL, Justice.

This is a law action wherein plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries. Defendant's motion to dismiss was sustained and plaintiff appeals.

Defendant is a corporation and owns and operates a transmission line for the purpose of selling and distributing electric energy.

Plaintiff alleged that he was riding his horse and driving livestock along a road. He said that he and his horse came in contact with a guy wire attached to a pole in the transmission line of defendant and as a result he was thrown and injured. The petition then states:

'Plaintiff does not set forth any specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant which caused the damage and injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff relies in this action upon his allegation of general negligence and carelessness under section 489.15, Code of Iowa, 1962.'

It should be noted that there is no claim of irregular installation of the guy wire, that it was out of place or line so as to interfere with normal or anticipated traffic or was energized or electrically 'hot.'

The pertinent part of section 489.15, Code of Iowa relied on by plaintiff provides:

'Injury to person or property. In case of injury to any person or property by any such transmission line, negligence will be presumed on the part of the person or corporation operating said line in causing said injury, but this presumption may be rebutted by proof.'

By motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action defendant tendered three main points. We summarize and paraphrase.

1. That the statute is applicable only to injuries received from the transmission of electricity and does not apply to the poles or guy wires of an electric line.

2. That the statute if construed as sought by plaintiff would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

3. That plaintiff made no claim of freedom from contributory negligence.

We quote from the trial court's ruling:

'To find the meaning and effect of sec. 489.15 it is necessary to determine the legislative intent--to ascertain why the legislature chose to make, by a specific statute, an exception to the ordinary procedural rules of presumptions and burden of proof. It seems to this court that a special and extraordinary statute was adopted because of the special and extraordinary hazard and danger to persons and property created by the transmission of a dangerous substance, electrical energy. The utility undertakes to generate and transmit this dangerous substance; it does so by means of equipment and facilities under its control, therefore, its negligence is presumed, subject to rebuttal, if damages result from the escape of this substance, or from the transmission of an excessive charge. The poles, wires, guy-wires themselves present no special or extraordinary hazard or danger. It is the conclusion of this court that the application of Sec. 489.15 should be confined to the extraordinary hazards and dangers apprehended by the legislature, and that the facts alleged in plaintiff's petition are not within the purview of this statute.'

On appeal two issues are tendered, they are: 1. The construction of the statute, and 2. the constitutionality of the statute if construed as claimed by plaintiff.

I. The words 'such transmission line' in the statute include the poles, wires, cross arms, guy wires, etc. of the transmission line. Iowa Railway and Light Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 550, 231 N.W. 461. See also special concurrence in Litchford v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 247 Iowa 947, 955, 75 N.W.2d 346. In the Lindsey case section 489.15 was not involved. In Litchford plaintiff suffered burns caused by electricity.

II. The presumption created by the legislature in § 489.15 has been applied in favor of injured parties on numerous occasions. Walters v. Iowa Electric Co., 203 Iowa 471, 212 N.W. 884; Beman v. Iowa Elec. Co., 205 Iowa 730, 218 N.W. 343; Isaacs v. Eastern Iowa Light & Power Co-op., 236 Iowa 402, 19 N.W.2d 208; Litchford v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Co., supra.

Defendant does not argue that the presumption was not properly applied in the cited cases. It is argued that all of those cases dealt with injury from the electricity itself and that it was only in relation to such type of cases that the legislature intended to create the presumption. The trial court agreed and turned its opinion on that point.

III. When so construed and limited the constitutionality of the statute is not challenged.

Chapter 489, Code of Iowa, deals with electric transmission lines. Because of the inherent danger and special care required incident to the transmission of electricity special statutes are necessary and proper. However, to create a special rule for determining liability, when electricity had nothing to do with the injury, just because a guy wire is used to stabilize a pole belonging to an electric transmission company rather than to a telephone company, is an entirely different matter.

Here there is no claim that electricity or the transmission thereof had anything to do with plaintiff's injury.

Under the cases cited in Divisions I and II, supra, the situation in the case at bar would be within the purview of the statute if electricity had anything to do with the injury.

IV. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees due process of law and proscribes the denial to any person 'the equal protection of the laws.' A statute that creates an unreasonable discrimination contravenes the constitution.

The rule, supported by numerous authorities is stated in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 551 as follows:

'* * * due process of law and the equivalent phrase 'law of the land' have frequently been defined to mean a general and public law operating equally on all persons in like circumstances, and not a partial or private law affecting the rights of a particular individual or class of individuals in a way in which the same rights of other persons are not affected. Under this guaranty not only must a statute embrace all persons in like situation, but the classification must be natural and reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious. Due process of law is denied when any particular person of a class or of the community is singled out for the imposition of restraint or burdens not imposed upon, and to be borne by, all of the class or of the community at large, unless the imposition or restraint is based upon existing distinctions that differentiate the particular individuals of the class to be affected from the body of the community. An act which affects only, and exhausts itself upon, a particular person or his rights and privileges, and has no relation to the community in general, is rather a sentence than a law and one which condemns without a hearing. It would seem that it may safely be stated as a general rule that whatever, in the matter of classification, complies with the requirements as to the equal protection of the laws will, so far as such an objection is concerned, be likewise upheld as amounting to due process of law. In fact, the courts frequently refer to both clauses at once in discussing the constitutionality of statutes.'

In § 490 it is said:

'Due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment was defined in terms of the equal protection of the laws--that is, as being secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice'

The statute before us, if construed as sought by plaintiff, creates a demonstrable discrimination

Guy wires are commonly used to stabilize not only electric transmission line poles but telephone poles and corner fence posts.

Plaintiff claims he and his horse came in contact with a guy wire He was thrown from his horse and injured. Had the same thing happened because of contact with a guy wire attached to a telephone pole or a corner fence post there would be no presumption of negligence. Just because plaintiff came in contact with a particular guy wire that he does not even claim was any more dangerous than other ordinary guy wires he claims the benefit of a special rule.

It is plausibly argued that such a construction of the statute is within its wording. A cursory reading of the statute might lead to that conclusion but the result would be unsound and discriminatory. It is clear that the statute is fairly open to construction.

It might be argued that electric transmission lines require a different and heavier type of construction than telephone lines thus creating a reasonable distinction. Common observation discloses that some electric transmission lines use taller and heavier poles than the telephone lines across the road. However, this is not always apparent. Frequently and along many roads only a close look can reveal which is the electric line and which is the telephone line.

The various types of construction used by public utilities have nothing to do with the problem before us.

In the case before us the type and character of construction is not the issue Plaintiff claims a presumption of negligence not because of the construction but because the overhead wires carried electricity for sale rather than lower voltage electricity for transmitting communications.

When electricity has nothing to do with an injury we think the statutory construction sought by plaintiff would create a clear and unconstitutional discrimination.

V. It is argued that the statute relates...