Callahan v. City of Philadelpha

• Decision Date: 21 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1816,99-1816
• Citation: 207 F.3d 668
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) THOMAS A. CALLAHAN, IV, Appellant v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, RISK MANAGEMENT; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, WARRANT DIVISION OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, MUNICIPAL COURT EVICTION UNIT; RICHARD ZIA Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 668

207 F.3d 668 (3rd Cir. 2000)

THOMAS A. CALLAHAN, IV, Appellant v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, RISK MANAGEMENT; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, WARRANT DIVISION OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, MUNICIPAL COURT EVICTION UNIT; RICHARD ZIA

No. 99-1816

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 21, 2000

Decided March 28, 2000

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 99-00918) District Judge: Honorable Charles R. Weiner

James J. McEldrew, III Thomas A. Lynam, III One Liberty Place, Ste. 5050 1650 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103, Attorneys for Appellant

Howard M. Holmes David M. Donaldson Zygmont Pines Administrative Office of PA Courts 1515 Market Street, Suite 1414 Philadelphia, PA 19102, Attorneys for Appellees Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Warrant Division of the Division of the First Judicial District and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Municipal Court Eviction Unit

William F. Martin Acting City Solicitor Sarah E. Ricks Deputy City Solicitor, Appeals 1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595, Attorneys for Appellee City of Philadelphia

BEFORE: MANSMANN, GREENBERG, and ALARCON,^* Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Thomas A. Callahan, IV, appeals by leave granted on October 1, 1999, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b)(2), from an amended order entered August 25, 1999, in the district court and from an earlier order entered April 23, 1999. The August 25, 1999 order certified that the district court's April 23, 1999 order dismissing the action against two defendants involved a controlling issue of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Callahan commenced this action by filing a complaint in the district court on February 22, 1999, against four defendants which he named as (1) City of Philadelphia Risk Management; (2) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Warrant Division of the First Judicial District; (3) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Municipal Court Eviction Unit; and (4) Richard Zia. We refer to the Warrant Division and Eviction Unit as the judicial defendants. In his complaint, Callahan asserted that Zia is a law enforcement officer employed by the judicial defendants which were responsible for his training and supervision and which issued him firearms. Callahan alleged that Zia, while acting as a law enforcement officer, beat and arrested him leading to Zia's prosecution and conviction of serious state crimes. Callahan further alleged that the judicial defendants and the City were liable to him under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for their deliberate indifference and failure to train Zia adequately and that Zia was liable to him under section 1983 and the common law.

The judicial defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the jurisdictional theory that the Eleventh Amendment barred the action against them and on the statutory construction theory that they are not "persons" under section 1983 and thus cannot be found liable. The district court granted the motion on the latter ground in a memorandum opinion and the order entered April 23, 1999. In its opinion, the district court pointed out that under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 901, 911, and 1121 (West Supp. 1999), the First Judicial District "is one of sixty judicial districts in the Commonwealth and that the Municipal Court is a trial court within the First Judicial District." Thus, the court found "as a matter of law that both are part of the Unified Judicial System of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," citing Pa. Const. art. V. It then held that "it is well established that state judicial entities are not persons within the meaning of S 1983," citing Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F. Supp. 758, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1991), as well as the cases Pokrandt cited. The court did not consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Callahan moved for reconsideration but the district court denied that motion on July 14, 1999. The court subsequently entered the August 25, 1999 order, following which we granted leave to appeal.

The district court is exercising jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a)(1), (3) and (4), and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) and exercise plenary review. See McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S.Ct. 182 (1999).

II. DISCUSSION

Initially, we emphasize that the distinction between the Eleventh Amendment and 42 U.S.C. S 1983 defenses the judicial defendants have raised should be kept clear. While the judicial defendants urge that we affirm on both bases there is a difference between them, although in some cases they will overlap. Thus, we do not doubt that an action for damages under section 1983 brought unambiguously against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a district court would face insurmountable hurdles, both because the Commonwealth is not a person within section 1983 and because the Eleventh Amendment would bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the action. Yet the overlapping is not complete because the Commonwealth would not be a person within section 1983 even if sued in a state court, though it could not raise an Eleventh Amendment objection in such a forum. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment may bar an action against a state in a federal court even though it is not brought under section 1983. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999).

That said, we still think it appropriate to make our section 1983 analysis by considering the three factors we set forth in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), in determining whether the defendant there had an Eleventh Amendment defense, even though Fitchik was not a section 1983 action. In Fitchik, building upon our earlier decision in Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1969), we indicated that the following factors are appropriate to consider:

(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the state (this includes three of the Urbano factors -whether payment will come from the state's treasury, whether the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's debts);

(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes four factors -how state law treats the agency generally, whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune from state taxation); and

(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has.

Id. at 659. We then indicated that "[a]lthough no single Urbano factor is dispositive, the most important is whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury." Id. We believe, however, that this factor is less significant in a section 1983 "person" analysis than in an Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional analysis. In this regard, we observe that the Eleventh Amendment's central goal is to prevent entry of federal court judgments that must be paid from the state treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 664-70, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356-59 (1974). On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, approached the question of whether a state is a person within section 1983 simply as a statutory construction matter.

While we are not certain as to what would be the source of funds to pay a judgment against the judicial defendants, Callahan argues that it would be the City and not the Commonwealth and we will assume that he is correct in this assertion. Of what we are certain, however, is that the judicial defendants receive funding from both the Commonwealth and the City.¹ The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has described the local funding of the Pennsylvania courts as follows:

The Judicial Code requires that County officials provide adequate staff for the courts:

Whenever necessary, it shall be the duty of county officers to appoint or detail such county staff as shall enable the judges of the courts embracing the county to properly transact the business before their respective courts.

42 Pa.C.S.A. S 2302. Further, the County is required to establish and maintain a judicial and related account. 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3541. Out of this account the County must pay:

(1) Salaries, fees and expenses of:

(i) Appointive judicial officers.

(ii) Other system and related personnel which by statute are required to be paid by the political subdivision.

(2) Salaries, fees and expenses of jurors, witnesses and all other persons paid under authority of law by the political subdivision for the maintenance of judicial and related functions.

42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3544. The Code also provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, each county shall continue to furnish to the court of common pleas and community court embracing the county, to the minor judiciary established for the county and to all personnel of the system, including central staff entitled thereto, located within the county, all necessary accommodations, goods and services which by law have heretofore been furnished by the county.

42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3722. Finally, we note that the Second Class County Code mandates that a salary board shall fix the compensation of certain court employees:

The board, subject to limitations imposed by law, shall fix the compensation of all appointed county officers, and the number and compensation of all deputies, assistants, clerks and other persons whose compensation is paid out of the county treasury, and of all court...