Callahan v. Clark
| Docket Number | 1:20-CV-00305-SPB-RAL |
| Decision Date | 14 August 2023 |
| Parties | VARIAN C. CALLAHAN, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL CLARK, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI ALBION; JERI SMOCK, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR, SCI ALBION; REKHA HALLIGAN, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, SCI ALBION; MORGAN OLIVER, SECRETARY, CORRECTCARE SOLUTIONS; MICHAEL RILEY, PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT, SCI ALBION; JANE DOE, OPTOMETRIST, SCI ALBION; WELLPATH LLC, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOSEPH SILVA, RUTH WISNIEWSKI, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
RICHARD A. LANZILLO Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
Two motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are pending before the Court, one on behalf of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and four DOC employees (“DOC Defendants”),[1] and the other on behalf of Wellpath LLC f/k/a Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“Wellpath”), a private entity with which the DOC contracted to provide healthcare services at its correctional institutions, and three Wellpath employees[2] (“Medical Defendants”). See ECF Nos. 72, 67. Both motions are before the undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motions be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Varian C. Callahan, an individual previously in the custody of the DOC, brings this action against the DOC Defendants, the Wellpath Defendants, and an unnamed optometrist designated as “Jane Doe.” Callahan asserts claims for violations of his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S. Code §§ 12101 - 12213, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S. Code § 794. All claims are based on the medical care and treatment Callahan received while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). Callahan sues each individual DOC and Wellpath Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities and Jane Doe in her individual capacity. Callahan seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory relief.
Callahan's Amended Complaint is the operative pleading before the Court.[3] See ECF No. 55. The Medical Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 67). In addition to a supporting brief (ECF No. 68), the Medical Defendants have also filed several exhibits in support of their motion. ECF Nos. 67-2, 67-3.[4] The DOC Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and a brief in support of their motion. ECF Nos. 72, 73. Callahan has filed a separate brief in opposition to each motion. ECF Nos. 76 (Medical Defendants), 77 (DOC Defendants). The motions are ripe for decision.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Furthermore, a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ().
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Expounding on the Twomblyllqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated this three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“On or about August 17, 2017, Mr. Callahan began experiencing blurred vision, accompanied by irritation and a burning sensation in and around his eyes.” ECF No. 55, ¶ 20. His eyes began to swell soon thereafter. On September 1, 2017, he submitted to CHCA Smock an “informal grievance” requesting urgent medical care for his “swollen and painful” eyes. Id., ¶ 21. When Callahan had not received medical attention or a response by September 24, he sent a sick call request and another “informal grievance addressed to Medical/Supv” repeating his symptoms, noting he had yet to be seen by medical, and again requesting care. Id., ¶ 24. Thereafter, “Corrections Officer Bill Schwab called the medical unit and requested that Mr. Callahan receive a medical exam addressing his eye complaints.” Id., ¶ 26. In response, medical staff explained that they could only see inmates listed on the medical call-out sheet, which did not include Callahan. “Based on this phone call, Mr. Callahan submitted another sick-call slip requesting care for his eyes and labeled it ‘EMERGENCY!'” Id., ¶ 27. When he had not received a response or treatment by November 25, 2017, he “submitted a third informal grievance, addressed to ‘Medical Dept Supervisor,' again requesting medical care for his swollen eyes and complaining that he had not been seen yet.” Id., ¶ 28.
Callahan had his first medical appointment for his eye condition with PA Riley on December 13, 2017. By then, he had begun “experiencing progressive intermittent vision loss,” and the swelling, pain, burning, and irritation of his eyes had increased. Id., ¶ 29. After examining his eyes, Riley arranged for an optometrist appointment that same day “as a measure of importance.” Id., ¶ 44. At his appointment with Optometrist Jane Doe, he “reported experiencing headaches, episodes of total vision loss, and hazy vision.” Id., ¶ 45. Doe observed that Callahan had “swollen eyes and 20/60 vision” and “[d]iagnosed [him] with a swollen optic nerve.” Id., ¶¶ 46,47. She then “told Mr. Callahan that she was unable to treat his condition and . .. recommended that [he] be referred to an outside ophthalmologist” because “he needed to be seen by an eye surgeon.” AZ.,¶ 49. Riley also attended this appointment. Afterward, Riley “documented the optometry visit and Mr. Callahan's ‘transient vision loss' in Mr. Callahan's chart.” Id., ¶ 54. Nurse Wisniewski and Dr. Halligan reviewed and signed Callahan's medical chart later that day.
Callahan's appearance prompted a corrections officer to bring Callahan “back to medical on an emergency basis” on January 18, 2018. Id., ¶ 79. At this impromptu appointment, “Riley told Mr. Callahan he was looking up the status of the ophthalmology referral from the previous month on his computer and then stated the referral had been canceled.” Id., ¶ 80. Riley then directed Callahan to submit another sick call request.
Callahan heeded Riley's instruction and received an appointment with PA Stroup four days later. At this January 22, 2018 appointment, Id., ¶ 82. Callahan's examination...
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