Callahan v. Parker, No. 646
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | DOUGLAS |
| Citation | 395 U.S. 258,23 L.Ed.2d 291,89 S.Ct. 1683 |
| Parties | James F. O'CALLAHAN, Petitioner, v. J. J. PARKER, Warden |
| Docket Number | No. 646 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
v.
J. J. PARKER, Warden.
Page 259
Victor Rabinowitz, New York City, for petitioner.
James van R. Springer, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, then a sergeant in the United States Army, was stationed in July 1956, at Fort Shafter, Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii. On the night of July 20, while on an evening pass, petitioner and a friend left the post dressed in civilian clothes and went into Honolulu. After a few beers in the bar of a hotel, petitioner entered the residential part of the hotel where
Page 260
he broke into the room of a young girl and assaulted and attempted to rape her. While fleeing from her room onto Waikiki Beach, he was apprehended by a hotel security officer who delivered him to the Honolulu city police for questioning. After determining that he was a member of the Armed Forces, the city police delivered petitioner to the military police. After extensive interrogation, petitioner confessed and was placed in military confinement.
Petitioner was charged with attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape, in violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.1 He was tried by court-martial, convicted on all counts, and given a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and
Page 261
allowances, and dishonorable discharge. His conviction was affirmed by the Army Board of Review and, subsequently, by the United States Court of Military Appeals.
Under confinement at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia, that the court-martial was without jurisdiction to try him for nonmilitary offenses committed off-post while on an evening pass. The District Court denied relief without considering the issue on the merits, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. This Court granted certiorari limited to the question:
'Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10, U.S.C. § 801 et seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having no military significance, alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?' 393 U.S. 822, 89 S.Ct. 177, 21 L.Ed.2d 93.
The Constitution gives Congress power to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,' Art. I § 88 cl. 14, and it recognizes that the exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply. The Fifth Amendment specifically exempts 'cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger' from the requirement of prosecution by indictment and from the right to trial by jury. (Emphasis supplied.) See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40, 63 S.Ct. 2, 16, 87 L.Ed. 3. The result has been the estab-
Page 262
lishment and development of a system of military justice with fundamental differences from the practices in the civilian courts.
If the case does not arise 'in the land or naval forces,' then the accused gets first, the benefit of an indictment by a grand jury and second, a trial by jury before a civilian court as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and by Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution which provides: in part:
'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.'
Those civil rights are the constitutional stakes in the present litigation. What we wrote in United States, ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17—18, 76 S.Ct. 1, 5—6, 100 L.Ed. 8, is worth emphasis:
'We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property. Unlike courts it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served. And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of
Page 263
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals.
'Moreover, there is a great difference between trial by jury and trial by selected members of the military forces. It is true that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an order, leaving post, etc. But whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task. This idea is inherent in the institution of trial by jury.'
A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant's peers which must decide unanimously, but by a panel of officers2 empowered to act by a two-thirds vote.
Page 264
The presiding officer at a court-martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.3 Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials.4 Apart from those differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.5
Page 265
A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.6
That a system of specialized military courts, proceeding by practices different from those obtaining in the regular courts and in general less favorable to defendants, is necessary to an effective national defense establishment, few would deny. But the justification for such a system rests on the special needs of the military, and history teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain carries with it a threat to liberty. This Court, mindful of the genuine need for special military courts, has recognized their propriety in their appropriate sphere, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508, but in examining the reach of their jurisdiction, it has recognized that
'There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service. * * *
'Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22—23, 76 S.Ct. 1, 8, 100 L.Ed. 8.
While the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some constitutional rights of the accused who are court-martialed, courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subleties of constitutional law. Article 134, already quoted, punishes
Page 266
as a crime 'all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.' Does this satisfy the standards of vaguencess as developed by the civil courts? It is not enough to say that a court-martial may be reversed on appeal. One of the benefits of a civilian trial is that the trap of Article 134 may be avoided by a declaratory judgment proceeding or otherwise. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22. A civilian trial, in other words, is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Rivers, Bankruptcy No. 1-81-00682.
...interfere with the internal discipline necessary 19 BR 447 to maintain the military as an effective fighting force. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960); McElroy v. United States......
-
Middendorf, Ii v. Henry Henry v. Middendorf, Ii, Nos. 74-175
...by grand jury also exempts the military "inferentially, from the (Sixth Amendment) right to trial by jury." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1685, 23 L.Ed.2d 291, 296 (1969). But there is no reason to assume that the same inferences from the Fifth Amendment exemption ......
-
United States v. Williams, Criminal Case No. 3:17mj84
...military personnel before District Courts where the offense involved is essentially civilian in nature." Id. (citing O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)). O'Callahan had established a "service-connection" test to determine the jurisdiction of a court-martial, but O'Callahan's test was......
-
United States v. Ali, 12-0008/AR
...of historical facts unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported in the record."). [8] Solorio overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), in which the Supreme Court held that court-martial jurisdiction depended on the "service connection" of the offense charged. Solorio, 483 U......
-
In re Rivers, Bankruptcy No. 1-81-00682.
...interfere with the internal discipline necessary 19 BR 447 to maintain the military as an effective fighting force. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960); McElroy v. United States......
-
United States v. Ali, 12-0008/AR
...of historical facts unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported in the record."). [8] Solorio overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), in which the Supreme Court held that court-martial jurisdiction depended on the "service connection" of the offense charged. Solorio, 483 U......
-
Holmes v. Laird, No. 71-1518.
...77 S.Ct. 1409, 1 L.Ed. 1544; Reid v. Covert, supra note 34, 354 U.S. at 16-19, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148. 52 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 80 S.Ct. 305, 4 L.Ed. 2d 282 (1960); Gris......
-
U.S. v. Mariea, Nos. 85-1770
...system constitute totally separate systems of justice, with different procedures, protections and personnel. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262-66, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1685-87, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); Toth, 350 U.S. at 15-19, 76 S.Ct. at 4-6. It is clear that for service personnel--espec......
-
STARE DECISIS, WORKABILITY, AND ROE V. WADE: AN INTRODUCTION.
...388-91). (114.) Id. at 709-10. (115.) Id. at 710. (116.) Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). (117.) O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (118.) Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448. (119.) Id. (citing O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 284 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). (120.) Id. (121.) Id. (122.) Id. ......
-
INCIDENT TO SERVICE: THE FERES DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
...265, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 972 (2013). [249] UCMJ art. 2(a)(10) (codified at 10 U.S.C. [section] 802(a)(10)). [250] O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 [251] UCMJ art. 2(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. [section] 802(a)(1) (2012)). [252] O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273-74; see also Solorio ......
-
ORTIZ V. UNITED STATES: THE SAVIOR OR DEATH SENTENCE OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM?
...all the circumstances into consideration, is thus compromising. MCM, supra note 5, pt. IV, [paragraph] 89.c(2) [40] O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 271 (1969). [41] UCMJ art. 133 (codified at 10 U.S.C [section] 933). [42] See UCMJ arts. 25, 25a, and 29 (codified at 10 U.S.C. [section][s......
-
Student Note Unequal Justice: Why Congress Should Expand the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction to Review the Courts-martial System
...and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 12 VAND. L. REV. 435, 452–53 (1960)). 40. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272, (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 41. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). 2021] UNEQUAL ......