Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

Citation162 F.2d 832
Decision Date28 July 1947
Docket NumberNo. 9263.,9263.
PartiesCALLEN v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Philip Price and H. Francis DeLone, both of Philadelphia, Pa. (Barnes, Dechert, Price, Smith & Clark, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.

D. J. Farage, B. Nathaniel Richter and Joseph S. Lord, III, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a plaintiff's judgment in a personal injury suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 1, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.

On December 14, 1944, plaintiff-appellee was a brakeman employed by defendant-appellant. In jumping from the stirrup of a tender then being pushed by an engine, and about to be coupled to some standing cars, appellee claimed to have hurt his back. He was apparently able to complete his work for that day but after he arrived home his back was sore. He "thought all the while it is just a little strain." He did not go to work again until about five days later. On the first day of his return he was forced to leave work early as "it kept getting worse." He then saw a Dr. Sheets who gave him a back injection and taped him. Later "it started to get bad" and he received fifteen or sixteen treatments from Dr. Fair, a chiropractor. During that period he had "terrible" pain in his sacroiliac area.

On February 14, 1945, he went to see the appellant's claim agent, Veidt, at Toledo. He brought with him a report on his condition from the chiropractor. This described his injury as "Twisting of body producing nerve pressure and inflammation in sacroiliac and lower lumbar region of spine." The prognosis was "Leaves a weakness which is more readily increased and makes him more susceptible to recurrence." After appellee gave the agent a statement, the latter took him to an X-ray clinic where X-rays were taken of his back. Appellee received no report as to these, "Only what I gathered from Mr. Veidt." When appellee and Veidt returned to the latter's office, according to appellee, Veidt said to him, "You got a lot of gall coming in here, asking for anything like that and there is nothing wrong." Appellee accepted $250 from Veidt and signed a release. He said he was influenced in accepting that sum by "The fact that he Veidt said there was nothing wrong with me and I could go back to work." He later said as to Veidt, "I thought he knew what he was talking about." Veidt testified that he based his idea of settlement on the lack of negligence or liability, saying with reference to settlement that "I wasn't concerned with his injuries." He added to this, "Except by his own medical report. That is what I was basing it on. I was basing my settlement on the liability more than on the injury." He stated that at the time of the settlement, "I didn't know he had the injuries the doctors described in this court room." He also said, "I wasn't concerned with the injury; I was concerned with the liability and I settled on the basis of no liability."

Dr. Sheets examined appellee towards the latter part of December, 1944. He found appellee suffering from sacroiliac subluxation and strapped him. Appellee again saw this doctor in March, 1945, and continued visiting him until the last of June, 1945. During that time the doctor obtained a sacroiliac belt for him. The doctor next saw appellee in October, 1945, and treated him to the date of the trial, May 31, 1946. The doctor said Callen was permanently disabled, about "fifteen to twenty per cent below par" with some psychogenic change. The only other medical witness in the case, Dr. Jepson, also testifying on behalf of the appellee, was of the opinion that the latter had "a chronic low back strain, with limited function of around fifteen per cent." The doctor refused to commit himself as to whether Callen's back condition was permanent.

Appellant's principal contention is that the Trial Judge did not properly present the release question to the jury. There was no allegation of fraud against the railroad with reference to the release which by its terms absolved the railroad from all claims of Callen arising out of the particular accident. Callen testified that he was influenced in executing it by claim agent Veidt's statement that there was nothing wrong with him. Veidt as a witness said that at the time the document was signed, he did not know Callen had the injuries the doctors described in the court room. There was thus in the trial some evidence of mutual mistake regarding Callen's injuries, an important element in the settlement. That evidence in order to void the release, had to be clear, unequivocal, and convincing. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 8 Cir., 116 F. 913, 914; Restatement of Contracts, Sections 502, 511. Whether the testimony here considered fulfilled those conditions was for the jury to pass upon under the guidance of the Court's instructions.

In his charge the District Judge commented at some length upon the release. He first said, "both sides agree that that release was not in contemplation of any sort of permanent injury." Later referring to Veidt's settlement authority being limited to $500, he said, "I think if it had been known that this man had these permanent injuries Mr. Veidt would not have handled the matter." The Court then stated:

"Now, I am going to consider that release as binding to the amount of $250.00, and if you find a verdict for the plaintiff you will deduct that from any amount you would otherwise give him. The $250.00 he got for expenses and medical bills and services that he obtained up to that time; and if you find that he is entitled to a verdict at your hands I will ask you to deduct that $250.00 from any amount you otherwise would award him, because that is...

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  • Troupe v. Chicago, D. & G. Bay Transit Co.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • June 1, 1956
    ...1904-1905, 2503-2504; 6 Id. 3780-3781; Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037; Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 162 F. 2d 832, 835, affirmed on other grounds 332 U.S. 625, 68 S.Ct. 296, 92 L.Ed. 242; Dowell, Inc., v. Jowers, 5 Cir., 166 F.2d 214, 221, ......
  • Blackwell v. CSX Transp., Inc.
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    ...his back injury was more severe and permanent than either the employee or railroad had originally envisioned. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 162 F.2d 832, 833 (3d Cir.1947), aff'd, 332 U.S. 625, 68 S.Ct. 296, 92 L.Ed. 242 (1948). The railroad employee then attempted to sue his employer fo......
  • Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co.
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    • March 28, 1951
    ...in reversing the District Court, stated that 'evidence in order to void the release, had to be clear, unequivocal, and convincing.' 3 Cir., 162 F.2d 832-833. This is the precise rule with respect to burden of proof adopted by the trial judge in his finding in the instant case. The decision ......
  • Turner v. Burlington Northern R. Co.
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    • September 18, 1985
    ...R.R., held that a FELA plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on the question whether a release was the result of mutual mistake. 162 F.2d 832, 833 (3d Cir.1947); accord Cary v. Great Northern R.R., 467 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir.1972) (jury determined whether a release of a FELA claim was the......
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