Calloway Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Woodall
| Citation | 607 S.W.3d 557 |
| Decision Date | 24 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2019-SC-0391-WC,2019-SC-0419-WC |
| Parties | CALLOWAY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Appellant v. Karen WOODALL, Spouse of Steven Spillman, Deceased; Estate of Steven Spillman; Karen Woodall and Jennifer Nelson, Co-Administratrices; Hon. Stephanie L. Kinney, Administrative Law Judge; and Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellees Karen Woodall, Spouse of Steven R. Spillman, Deceased; Estate of Steven R. Spillman by and through the Co-Administrators, Karen Woodall and Jennifer Nelson, Cross-Appellants v. Calloway County Sheriff's Department; Hon. Stephanie L. Kinney, Administrative Law Judge; Workers’ Compensation Board; and Daniel Jay Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky, Cross-Appellees |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE, CALLOWAY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT: John Christopher Hopgood, Dorsey, Gray, Norment & Hopgood, Henderson.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS, KAREN WOODALL, SPOUSE OF STEVEN R. SPILLMAN, DECEASED AND ESTATE OF STEVEN R. SPILLMAN BY AND THROUGH CO-ADMINISTRATORS, KAREN WOODALL AND JENNIFER NELSON : Jeffery Roberts, Roberts Law Office, Murray, Michael M. Pitman, Haverstock, Bell & Pitman, LLP, Murray.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STEPHANIE L. KINNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Stephanie Letitia Kinney, Pikeville.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD: Michael W. Alvey.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL: Daniel Jay Cameron, Louisville.
KRS1 Chapter 342.750 provides certain income benefits to an employee's family when an employee dies as a result of a workplace accident. In addition, if the death occurs within four years of the injury, the employee's estate is entitled to a $50,000 lump-sum payment. In this case, ten years after a workplace injury, Steven Spillman died as a result of surgery necessitated by that injury. The issues we address in this opinion are whether Karen Woodall, Spillman's surviving spouse, is entitled to a statutory income benefit and whether the time limitation as to the lump-sum benefit violates the federal and Kentucky constitutional guarantees of equal protection and Kentucky's prohibition against special legislation. We hold that Woodall is entitled to the income benefit and that the time limitation does not violate the constitutional provisions. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the Workers’ Compensation Board ("Board").
Spillman was working for the Calloway County Sheriff's Department ("the Department") on March 4, 2007, when he was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. In 2010, Spillman was awarded permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits dating to June 2007. The case was re-opened in 2013, and in October of that year, he was awarded increased PPD benefits for the remainder of the 425 weeks that he was entitled to those benefits. In January 2017, Spillman underwent surgery for his work-related injury. Unfortunately, he developed a pulmonary embolism
following surgery and died on January 17, 2017.
At all times relevant to this matter, Spillman and Woodall were married. Following Spillman's death, Woodall and Jennifer Nelson, Spillman's daughter, were named co-administrators of Spillman's estate.2 Woodall, in her individual capacity as Spillman's spouse, and the Estate filed a motion to re-open Spillman's workers’ compensation claim. Woodall sought income benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a) while the Estate sought a lump-sum benefit under KRS 342.750(6).
The ALJ denied all benefits, finding that they were time barred, and dismissed the claims. The Board found that Woodall was eligible for the surviving spouse income benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a), but that the Estate was not entitled to the lump-sum death benefit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board on both issues. Both parties have appealed to this Court.
When reviewing workers’ compensation cases, we review questions of law de novo. Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye , 415 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Ky. 2013). In this case, the facts are undisputed and all issues under review are legal issues. Therefore, we engage in a de novo review.
The Department appeals from the Court of Appeals’ holding that awarded benefits to Woodall under KRS 342.750(1)(a). The Department argues that a widow cannot claim death benefits after the deceased's 425 weeks of PPD benefits have been paid in full. The Department also argues that in order for the widow to receive death benefits, the award would have to be reopened in order to increase the initial award from PPD to a death claim.3 The Department asserts that KRS 342.125(3), as amended in 2018, is retroactive and now prohibits reopening the award if more than four years has elapsed since the initial award. The Department maintains that this time limit bars Woodall's benefits claim.
In response to the Department's arguments, Woodall contends that the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.125(3) regarding reopening claims is not retroactive, but that if it is, retroactivity is unconstitutional as applied in this case.
Procedurally, a widow is entitled to assert her claim for death benefits. In Family Dollar v. Baytos , we held that KRS 342.750 "create[s] a separate cause of action for [a] surviving spouse[ ] independent of the injured worker's claim." 525 S.W.3d 65, 72 (Ky. 2017). The Department attempts to distinguish Baytos , but any factual differences do not affect the holding that the proper way for a widow to assert her claim is "to file a claim for benefits in her own right." Id. Because reopening is inapplicable to this case, we need not address the parties’ arguments about the retroactivity of the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.125(3).
Additionally, the Department argues that a widow cannot claim death benefits after the deceased's 425 weeks of PPD benefits have been paid in full. A related issue is whether the four-year limitation found in KRS 342.750(6) also applies to KRS 342.750(1)(a). In pertinent part, KRS 342.750 states as follows:
The statute's plain text demonstrates that the four-year limitation found in subsection (6) does not apply to subsection (1)(a). However, to dispel any doubt, Baytos also addressed this issue, albeit in a footnote as it was not material to the Court's decision. This Court stated, clearly:
The portion of this provision relating to income benefits has no such limitation—in fact, there is no temporal limitation whatsoever within KRS 342.750 for the recovery of death benefits. The four-year limitation ... only applies to KRS 342.750(6), a separate provision within this statute relating to an estate's entitlement to a $50,000 lump-sum payment to offset costs of burial and transportation of the body.
525 S.W.3d at 68 n.2. Not only did we interpret KRS 342.750 such that the four-year time limitation does not apply to income benefits under subsection (1), but we also held "no temporal limitation whatsoever " on the recovery of death benefits under the statute. Id. (emphasis added).
The Department again argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Baytos . The deceased worker, Baytos, had settled his workers’ compensation injury claim with his employer for a lump sum, which he received. Baytos died the next year as a result of his work-related injury. Two years after that, Baytos's widow asserted her claim for death benefits. As noted, we determined that she was entitled to a death benefit. In the instant case, Spillman received his full 425 weeks of PPD before his death. The Department argues that because Baytos died before his 425 weeks of PPD benefits would have expired, Baytos's widow was entitled to death benefits while Spillman's widow was not. These limited factual distinctions, however, do not compel a different legal result. The claims of both Baytos and Spillman had been settled, paid in full, and closed.
The plain language of KRS 342.750(1)(a) does not impose any temporal limitation on benefits available, and we decline to read one into it. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's holding, which had remanded to the ALJ for a determination of Woodall's eligibility for benefits under this statute.
The Estate argues that this time limitation violates the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and sections 1, 2, 3, 59, and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Specifically, it argues...
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