Calumet Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Markman

• Decision Date: 15 July 1964
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 49327
• Citation: 200 N.E.2d 419,50 Ill.App.2d 430
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: CALUMET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO, a corporation of the United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert P. MARKMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Page 419

200 N.E.2d 419

50 Ill.App.2d 430

CALUMET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO, a corporation of the United States of America Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert P. MARKMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 49327.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

July 15, 1964.

Mortimer, Ryan, McKay & Hoffman, Chicago, for appellant.

Irvin J. Jacobson, Chicago, for appellees.

McCORMICK, Justice.

The plaintiff, Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chicago, appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate an order entered in the Circuit Court of Cook County on the 25th day of April 1963, modifying the decree of foreclosure entered in the same court on January 17, 1963.

It appears from the record that at the time of the commencement of the mortgage foreclosure action ten separate mortgages encumbering ten separate parcels were sought to be foreclosed. Subsequently, and while the suit was pending, the foreclosure action was terminated insofar as it related to eight of the ten parcels. The plaintiff proceeded with its foreclosure of the mortgages on the remaining two parcels. The defendants defaulted and a hearing was had before a master in chancery who, on January 17, 1963, filed a transcript of proceedings together with his report. That report contained a recommendation that the plaintiff, in addition to the mortgage indebtedness owing on each of the two parcels, should be allowed the sum of $3,750.00 on each parcel as attorney's fees.

Following the filing of the report a decree of foreclosure was entered by the court on January 17, 1963. The decree followed the recommendation of the master and allowed a total of $7,500.00 in attorney's fees covering both parcels. The master also found that at the time of the foreclosure there remained due and owing of the original indebtedness $16,893.89 on one parcel and $20,663.31 on the other parcel. The property was sold at a master's sale in accordance with the decree of foreclosure and the sum of $49,750.00 was realized from the sale of both parcels. Accrued interest, taxed costs, and the expenses of the master's sale totaled $7,740.86. This amount, added to the attorney's fees allowed of $7,500.00 and the unpaid balance of the original indebtedness of $37,557.20, gives the sum of $52,798.06 as the total amount due and owing to the plaintiff, and the proceeds of sale being insufficient to satisfy this indebtedness, a deficiency judgment totaling $3,048.06 was assessed against Robert P. Markman. Should the allowance for attorney's fees be reduced--and it will appear in the course of this opinion that they were reduced by the trial court to $5,000.00 for both parcels--then it follows that the deficiency judgment is thereby reduced in an equivalent amount; that is, from $3,048.06 to $548.06. An order was entered in the Circuit Court of Cook County on March 14, 1963, approving the master's report of sale, together with the deficiency.

On March 15, 1963, one of the defendants filed a petition in which she set out, among other things, that the total amount foreclosed in the instant case was $37,000.00, and that the fees recommended in the schedule of the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations would not exceed $2,500.00; and that on or about February 28, 1963, she first learned that the master had recommended that a deficiency judgment be assessed against the petitioner. In the petition the statement is made that during the pendency of the foreclosure the plaintiff's attorney had received substantial fees in connection with the refinancing of six parcels of property originally made a part of the plaintiff's complaint for foreclosure, and that 'the Plaintiff's attorney had a verbal agreement with ROBERT MARKMAN one of the Defendants herein, to charge and accept a fee of $950.00 for each parcel of the property so that the total for the two within properties would be $1900.00.' The defendant prayed that the report of sale be amended to include a fair and reasonable attorney's fee and that the recommendation for a deficiency judgment be denied and 'for such other and further relief as may be equitable.'

On March 19, 1963 the plaintiff filed a document entitled 'Motion to Strike and Dismiss Petition.' An examination of the document indicates that it is an answer to the petition denying various allegations therein made.

On April 25, 1963 the court entered an order in which it was stated that 'the Court having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises,' ordered that the decree of foreclosure heretofore entered be modified by reducing the attorney's fees from $3,750.00 per parcel to the sum of $2,500.00 per parcel, or a gross fee of $5,000.00, and that the deficiency judgment on both parcels thus be reduced to $548.06.

On June 20, 1963 the court entered an order which recited: 'On motion' of the 'attorneys for Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chicago, plaintiff herein, for vacation of the order entered on April 24, 1963 [sic], whereby the Decree of Foreclosure heretofore entered herein was modified regarding attorney's fees' and the deficiency judgment, and 'the Court being fully advised in the premises having heard counsel in open Court,' denies the motions.

On July 18, 1963 the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the order of the court denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate the order modifying the decree of foreclosure. We could have properly struck plaintiff's record and abstract and dismissed the appeal on our own motion because of the violation of practically every rule with reference to records and abstracts. The record is not paged as provided in Supreme Court Rule 36 [Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, c. 110, § 101.36], nor is the record arranged in chronological order in accordance with the same rule. The abstract fails to set out any dates on which any orders were entered; nor does it set out in proper form the order or orders appealed from. However, we will consider the case on its merits.

The plaintiff here urges that the decree of foreclosure which was entered in the trial court was a final order and that the motion made by the defendants to modify such decree was of necessity made under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act [Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, c. 110, § 72]. In support of his position the plaintiff relies upon Fairfield Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Central National Bank, 19 Ill.App.2d 465, 154 N.E.2d 333. That case grew out of a foreclosure suit in which on February 2, 1956 a decree had been entered in the trial court approving the sale and entering a deficiency decree. On February 20, 1956 an appeal bond was approved which provided that it should act as a supersedeas. The appeal was perfected and the Appellate Court rendered a decision on February 27, 1957 in Fairfield Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Central National Bank, 13 Ill.App.2d 133, 140 N.E.2d 739. In that case the court states in its opinion that a decree of foreclosure had been entered in the trial court, based on the report of the master after hearing. No appeal was taken from that decree. Subsequently, after the sale the trial court entered a decree approving the sale. The defendant filed objections to the latter decree. No report of proceedings was filed in the case and the court holds that the recital in the decree, that the master had proceeded in due form of law, was controlling. [Citing cases.] The court, after finding that the rights of the parties must be determined as of the time of the entry of the decree approving the master's report of sale and distribution, affirmed the decree. After that appeal and the affirmance of the decree the defendant filed a petition to redeem, alleging among other things that approximately 11 months had elapsed during the appeal, and that the time should be excluded from the running of the period of redemption. In its opinion in 19 Ill.App.2d 465, 154 N.E.2d 333, the Appellate Court held that the supersedeas in the first case did not toll the expiration of the redemption rights of the mortgagor. The court also held that the original decree of foreclosure was a final decree even though the court retained jurisdiction for the enforcement, or carrying into execution of the decree as in the instant case; and it was further held that the subsequent report and confirmation of the sale would merely be a mode of enforcing the rights of the creditor. In support of that conclusion the court cited certain cases, including Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 141, 35 N.E. 881, where the court says: '* * * a decree of foreclosure and sale has been held to...