Calumet R. Ry. Co. v. Moore

• Decision Date: 26 March 1888
• Citation: 15 N.E. 764,124 Ill. 329
• Parties: CALUMET R. RY. CO. v. MOORE et al. SAME v. LEFFLER et al. SAME v. FREEMAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

124 Ill. 329

15 N.E. 764

CALUMET R. RY. CO.

v.MOORE et al.

SAME

v.LEFFLER et al.

SAME

v.FREEMAN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 26, 1888.

Appeal from Cook county court; RICHARD PRENDERGAST, Judge.Frank J. Loesch

and Chas. A. Allen, for appellant.

Seth F. Crews, for appellees.

SHOPE, J.

The three cases of Calumet River Railway Co. v. Clara Moore et al.; Same v. John Leffler et al.; and Same v. Jennette Freeman et al., involving the condemnation of the right of way of appellant company's railway across adjoining tracts of land, and presenting substantially the same questions, will be considered together. An abjection common to each case is that the damages awarded were excessive, and the judgments severally rendered should be reversed.

As is not unusual in cases of like character, there was wide divergence in the evidence of the witnesses, both as to the value of the land taken, and as to damages to adjacent lands of the several owners not taken. The estimates of the value of lot 2 ranged from $100 to $1,500 per acre, and of lots 3 and 4, from $100 to $2,500 per acre. In respect of the damages to portions of the lots not taken, there was equally wide disparity. The jury seem to have considered this evidence, and fixed the damages to be awarded to appellees, in each instance, at a sum far below the highest estimates, and somewhat above the lowest given by the witnesses. Ample evidence is disclosed, independently of the personal inspection of the jury, upon which the verdict as to each tract may rest. In such cases this court will not be justified in reversing, unless it appears that the result reached by the jury is clearly unreasonable, and the damages awarded are grossly excessive, so as to evince that the verdict has been the result of passion or undue and improper motive or influence. Nothing of the kind is apparent here. Counsel concede that this rule is applicable to land taken, but question its applicability to land damaged, but not taken. We are unable to perceive upon what principle the distinction suggested can rest. The rule has its basis in the office performed by the jury. It is their special province to weigh and consider the evidence, and so long as their action is based upon evidence, and is free from the taint of corruption, passion, or prejudice, and within reason, courts must accept and give effect to it. Railroad Co. v. Blake, 116 Ill. 163, 4 N. E. Rep. 488. It is said that improper elements of damage were permitted to be shown by the evidence, and the court improperly instructed the jury in respect thereto. Two of these parcels of land, lots 3 and 4, abut upon Calumet river, and the other one is cut off from the river about 400 feet. This river falls into Lake Michigan at South Chicago. The north line of lot 2 is One Hundred and Fourteenth street; and the distance of the river, from thence to the river mouth, is three and one-half miles. From the mouth of the river, south as far as Ninety-Fifth street, more or less of the river front appears to have been docked; and from Ninety-Fifth street to the property in question it is equally available for dock purposes, though as yet no improvements of that character have been constructed, except one at Cummings, half a mile north of this property. ‘It was conceded,’ counsel for appellant says in his brief,' ‘by all the witnesses, that this river property had a value as possible dock property,’ and the evidence clearly tended to show that fact. But it is said that the evidence does not show that there is now any demand for docks at this point on the river, and that the consideration of such possible demand introduced speculative elements, and that the estimates in respect thereof were speculative and remote, and therefore improper. In proceedings for condemnation of private property for public use, as is here sought to be done, the damages to be awarded as compensation to the land-owner must be based upon the fair cash value of the land at the time of the condemnation thereof. The questions ordinarily to be determined by the jury are, (1) what is the present market value of the land taken? and (2) to what extent, if at all, will the remainder of the tract of land not taken be depreciated in its market value by reason of the taking and appropriation of the land taken to the proposed use? The compensation is to be estimated with reference to the uses for which the property is suitable in its then condition, having regard to its location, situation, and quality, and to the business wants in that locality, or such as might reasonably be expected in the near future. If these lots were available for dock purposes, for which, as shown, there was no immediate demand, their value when improved by the building of docks, the profits that might be derived therefrom, or the value of the lots at some future time, as when business or the wants of the community...