Calvert v. Carpenter

• Citation: 96 Ill. 63,1880 WL 10077
• Parties: JOSEPHINE CALVERTv.RACHAEL A. CARPENTER et al.
• Decision Date: 17 September 1880
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

96 Ill. 63

1880 WL 10077 (Ill.)

JOSEPHINE CALVERT

v.RACHAEL A. CARPENTER et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Feb. 4, 1880.Rehearing denied Sept. 17, 1880.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District; the Hon. NATHANIEL J. PILLSBURY, presiding Justice, and the Hon. GEO. W. PLEASANTS and Hon. LYMAN LACY, Justices;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. A. A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

This was a bill in chancery, filed by appellant, Josephine Calvert, in the Henry county circuit court, against appellees, to contest the validity of the will of the mother of appellant, Lydia W. Naudain, who died at Philadelphia on the 6th of July, 1873, on the alleged grounds of a want of testamentary capacity, and undue influence on the part of Rachael Ann Carpenter, the principal legatee under the will. There was a trial of the cause before the Hon. GEORGE W. PLEASANTS and a jury, at the October term, 1875, of the circuit court, resulting in a verdict and decree against the validity of the will. At the September term, 1876, of the Supreme Court, this decree, on appeal by these appellees, was reversed on the ground that it was not sustained by the evidence, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. See Carpenter et al. v. Calvert, 83 Ill. 62.

At the October term, 1878, of the court below, there was another trial of the cause before the Hon. A. A. SMITH, judge, and a jury, which also resulted in a verdict and decree against the validity of the alleged will. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District this decree was reversed and a final judgment entered in that court dismissing complainant's bill. From this latter judgment appellant has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The instrument in question was executed by Mrs. Naudain at her residence in Geneseo, Henry county, in this State, on the 6th day of January, 1873, just six months before her death. Her estate was worth some $6000 or $8000. By the provisions of the will she gave the homestead property and household furniture to Miss Rachael Ann Carpenter, the principal legatee, and also made the following special bequests, viz: To Jemima W. Carpenter, Lizzie C. Hall and Rachael Ann Carpenter, she gave her wardrobe and jewelry, to be divided as her niece, Rachael Ann Carpenter, and her daughter, Josephine Calvert, should direct; to Josephine Calvert, $300; to her grandson, Harry Calvert, $300; to her granddaughter, Elizabeth Gender, $300; to her nephew, James Walter, $300; to her half-sister, Sarah Granger, $100; to Jemima Carpenter, $300; to Lizzie C. Hall, $300; to Sallie C. Worth, $300; to Edward G. Carpenter, $300, and to Frank G. Carpenter, $300. The residue of her estate is given to Miss Sarah Ann Carpenter. The only lineal descendants of Mrs. Naudain are Mrs. Josephine Calvert and her children, Harry W. Calvert, Lizzie G. Gender and Willie B. Calvert. Mr. CHARLES DUNHAM, Mr. E. C. MODERWELL, and Messrs. LAWRENCE, CAMPBELL & LAWRENCE, for the appellant.

Mr. LEVI NORTH, and Mr. GEORGE W. SHAW, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

Two questions are presented by the record before us. First, did the Appellate Court err in reversing the decree of the circuit court? Second, after a verdict and decree in favor of appellant, had the Appellate Court, admitting the decree to be erroneous, power to dismiss the bill and enter a final judgment in that court? Preliminary to passing upon the question whether the Appellate Court erred in reversing the decree of the circuit court, it may be proper to advert to the doctrine of this court with respect to the effect of the verdict of a jury in cases of this character.

Ordinarily in chancery cases, where a feigned issue is directed by the chancellor to be made up and submitted to a jury, with respect to some controverted fact arising in the case, the verdict of the jury upon such issue is not conclusive upon the question submitted, but merely advisory in its character, and the chancellor may, when satisfied that truth and justice require it, render a decree contrary to the verdict.

But this doctrine has no application to contested will cases arising under our statute, like the one before us. The verdict of the jury in cases of this character is to have the same force and effect as is given to a verdict in a case at law, under a like state of facts. And where in such case the verdict is not manifestly against the weight of evidence, the court is bound by it in the same manner and to the same extent as if it were a case at law. This...