Calvert v. Hicks, 1:04-cv-1257-WSD.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:04-cv-1257-WSD.,1:04-cv-1257-WSD. |
| Citation | 510 F.Supp.2d 1164 |
| Parties | Jerome CALVERT, Plaintiff, v. Juanita HICKS, Individually; Tina Robinson, Individually; Phyllis Brown, Individually; and Fulton County, Georgia, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Harlan Stuart Miller, III, Alysa Beth-Ann Freeman, Miller Billips & Ates, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew George Mackenzie, Claudia P. Campo, Paula Morgan Nash, Rolesia Butler Dancy, Willie Jake Lovett, Jr., Fulton County Attorney's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Fulton County, Juanita Hicks, Tina Robinson, and Phyllis Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment [69], Plaintiffs Statement of Facts [74], Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [76], and Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [84].1
This dispute arises from the transfer, reprimand, suspension, and eventual termination of Plaintiff Jerome Calvert's ("Plaintiff') employment with the Clerk's Office of the Superior Court of Fulton County. ("Clerk's office"). Plaintiff was hired as a deputy clerk in the Clerk's Office in 1998. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts to Which There Is [sic.] No Genuine Issues to Be Tried ¶ 1.) ("Defs. Statement of Facts"). Plaintiff was given jobs with increasing responsibility from the time of his hire until early 2002. Plaintiff started in the deed room, was later transferred to the filing room and then was assigned to the civil filing room. In early 2002, Plaintiff was selected to provide direct support to a specific judge's chambers as part of what was called the "Haggerty Plan." Plaintiff provided this direct chambers support until late summer or early fall of 2002. During this four year period, Plaintiff received two counseling memos for mishandling documents and absenteeism, and two warning memos for insubordination, none of which resulted in any significant disciplinary action.
In early 2002, deputy clerk Lewis Pittman ("Pittman") announced his candidacy for Clerk of the Superior Court. Plaintiff supported Pittman's candidacy, and exhibited his support publicly by marching with Pittman in a parade in June of 2002.
Superior Court Clerk Juanita Hicks ("Hicks" or the "Clerk") "considered her deputy clerks who supported Pittman to be disloyal to her." (Defs. Statement of Facts ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Hicks, chief deputy Tina Robinson ("Robinson"), and high-level supervisor Phyllis Brown ("Brown"), each of whom is black, were angered that Plaintiff, who also is black, would support Pittman. Pittman is a white male. Hicks, who purports to have been worried about "sabotage" by Pittman supporters, transferred Plaintiff and other deputy clerks who supported Pittman to assignments "where their work could be more closely supervised." (Id. at 11.) The parties do not dispute that Hicks alone decided to enact these transfers. Plaintiff specifically was transferred from his assignment in the Haggerty Plan to inmate mail processing under the management of Defendant Brown. This transfer involved a change in physical location and job responsibility for Plaintiff, although his formal title of "Calender Clerk" and his B-23 pay "rank" did not change.
In the year following the transfer, Plaintiff received approximately twenty (20) counseling and disciplinary memoranda and disciplinary letters from Brown and her subordinates for alleged problems including tardiness, absenteeism, insubordination, and document mishandling. Plaintiff, on Brown's recommendation and with Robinson's involvement, was twice suspended. Plaintiff was transferred again in late 2003. There is no record of any disciplinary action against Plaintiff after his transfer from Brown's supervision. Despite this absence of disciplinary action, on March 8, 2004, Hicks and Robinson decided to terminate Plaintiff and he was sent a letter of termination dated March 11, 2004.
The parties disagree regarding the circumstances of the disciplinary acts (upon which the later termination were based) taken against Plaintiff after his transfer to inmate mail. Defendants contend that Plaintiff was an inferior employee, and his discharge was the natural result of repeated disciplinary infractions. Plaintiff contends that because he was a protected civil service employee (technically, a "permanent, classified employee," see Defs. Statement of Material Facts ¶ 45) who could only be dismissed for cause, Defendants sought to "paper" his employee file with pretextual disciplinary infractions with the ultimate goal of terminating him. Plaintiff claims the transfer, reprimands, suspensions, and termination were a course of deliberate conduct taken by Brown, Robinson, and Hicks in retaliation for his political support of Pittman.
The parties agree that at least six other clerk's office employees were known or rumored to have supported Pittman: Deputy clerks Eric Styles, Dawn Nathanson, Peggy Andersen, and Cindy Laurie, and temporary employees Michael Armstrong and Lasandra Styles. Michael Armstrong, Eric Styles, and Lasandra Styles are black. Dawn Nathanson, Peggy Anderson, and Cindy Laurie are white. Eric Styles and Dawn Nathanson were transferred in response to their support of Pittman. (Defs. Brief in Support of Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 4) ("Defs. MSJ Brief'). Michael Armstrong and Lasandra Styles were terminated. No action appears to have been taken against Peggy Andersen or Cindy Laurie.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999). There is no dispute of material fact if "a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that summary judgment is inappropriate by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir.1999). The non-moving party "need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings." Id.
The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must resolve all reasonable doubts in the non-movant's favor. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Am., 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990). "[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury...." Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. "If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. But, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Plaintiff has two claims remaining in this case: a political patronage First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a traditional race discrimination claim under § 1983. Defendants argue both of Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law. The Court disagrees.
The First Amendment to the Constitution "protects political association as well as political expression." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Significant impairments to First Amendment rights "must survive exacting scrutiny." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). For a state to infringe upon an individual's political association rights, the state interest used to justify the violation "must be paramount ... of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest." Id. at 362, 96 S.Ct. 2673. This paramount interest "must outweigh the incurred loss of protected rights" and be the least restrictive means. Id.
The practice of political patronage allows "public employees [to] hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable manner, support for the favored political party [or candidate]." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. 2673. "The cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association." Id. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 2673.
The need for political loyalty in some governmental positions is an adequately paramount state interest, but only if "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Party affiliation can be an appropriate requirement when the position is confidential or involves the making of policy which "relate[s] to the needs of partisan political interests." Id. at 519, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (...
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