Calvert v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill.
Decision Date | 27 May 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-60-AW-GRJ |
Citation | 462 F.Supp.3d 1253 |
Parties | Donald CALVERT and Mariam Martin, individually and as assignees for Travis A. Stewart and Shelly M. Stephens, Plaintiffs, v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Jeffrey James Humphries, Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Juan Pablo Caceres, Paul Hudson Jones, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
FINAL ORDER
This case involves a dispute about insurance coverage. Both sides have moved for summary judgment, and Defendant Safeco has moved to dismiss. ECF Nos. 32, 33, 35. This order grants Safeco's summary judgment motion, ECF No. 32, denies Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, ECF No. 35, and denies as moot Safeco's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 33.
The issue is whether a Safeco insurance policy covered a particular accident. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Donald Calvert and Mariam Martin were passengers injured in a single-truck accident. ECF No. 1-1 (SAC) ¶ 39(c). Shelly Stephens owned the truck, having bought it just a few days before. SAC ¶ 39(a). Travis Stewart was driving with Stephens's permission. SAC ¶ 6.
The two injured passengers (Calvert and Martin) sued Stephens (as owner) and Stewart (as driver) in state court. See generally SAC. Stephens and Stewart turned to Safeco, Stephens's insurer, but it denied coverage. SAC ¶ 11. Stephens and Stewart then agreed to entry of judgments against them, and they assigned to the injured passengers all rights under Stephens's insurance policy.1 SAC ¶ 12. That led to this case, in which the passengers (as assignees) seek a declaratory judgment that the Safeco policy covered the accident.2
The policy provided liability coverage for "[a]ny person using [Stephens's] covered auto with [her] express or implied permission." ECF No. 1-4 at 61. It is undisputed that Stephens owned the truck and that Stewart was driving with permission. The whole issue, then, is whether the truck was a "covered auto." If it was not, there is no coverage: the policy specifically excludes coverage for any vehicle Stephens owned other than a "covered auto." ECF No. 1-4 at 63.
The policy defines "covered auto" as any vehicle listed on the declaration page and any "newly acquired vehicles." ECF No 1-4 at 59-60. The truck was not on the declarations page, ECF Nos. 1-1 ¶ 6; 1-3 at 3, so it had to be a "newly acquired vehicle" for coverage to exist. The policy attached certain conditions for any "newly acquired replacement vehicle" or any "newly acquired additional vehicle." ECF No. 1-4 at 59. The truck was an additional vehicle—not a replacement vehicle, see ECF No. 35 at 2—so these limitations applied:
ECF No. 1-4 at 60. The parties agree that Stephens acquired the vehicle within the 30 days before the accident. ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 1, 5; ECF No. 35 at 11. And they agree Stephens insured the truck with another insurer, First Acceptance. See ECF No. 31-2 at 6. But the First Acceptance policy did not provide liability coverage; it included only personal injury protection and coverage for property damage, comprehensive losses, and collision. The dispute is whether this other insurance policy still counts as an "other insurance policy." As Plaintiffs explain, "[t]he crux of the dispute in this case hinges on what Safeco meant when it said, ‘and there is no other insurance policy that provides coverage for the additional vehicle.’ " ECF No. 35 at 12 (emphasis removed).
According to Plaintiffs, this phrase is ambiguous and therefore must be interpreted in favor of coverage. Cf. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc. , 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007) (). They say that another insurance policy does not "provide[ ] coverage for the additional vehicle" (as that Safeco policy uses that phrase) unless it includes "coverages that duplicate coverages under the Safeco policy." ECF No. 35 at 12-13. Safeco responds that there is no ambiguity—that under the policy's plain language, the First Acceptance coverage was a "policy that provides coverage for the additional vehicle." ECF No. 36 at 4. Safeco has the better of this argument.
The policy does not define "other insurance policy that provides coverage." But under Florida law, undefined terms in insurance policies do not necessarily make the language ambiguous. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 711 So. 2d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 1998). Instead, Nateman v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. , 544 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (marks and citation omitted). Applying common everyday usage, I conclude that the First Acceptance policy "provided coverage" for the truck. ECF No. 31-2 at 6. It may not have provided liability coverage—or coverage identical to Stephens's other coverage—but it nonetheless "provided coverage."
The Safeco policy could have required the other insurance to provide "identical" coverage or some other category of coverage, but it did not. The phrase is unambiguous. Cf. Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Easdon Rhodes & Assocs. LLC , 872 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017) ( ); Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Alpine Towing, Inc. , No. 18-21387-CIV, 2019 WL 2009176, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019) ( ).
Because Safeco's interpretation of the contract is correct, Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion must be denied. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory relief they seek. For the same reasons, Safeco's summary judgment motion is granted. That leaves Safeco's motion to dismiss. Safeco argued that Stewart never had a judgment, so he never...
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...That is a different conversation based on different language not presented in this case. See, e.g. , Calvert v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. , 462 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1255 (N.D. Fla. 2020), aff'd , 20-12343, ––– Fed.Appx. ––––, 2021 WL 81594 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2021) (affirming holding that clause......