Camacho v. Puerto Rico Port Authority

Citation254 F.Supp.2d 220
Decision Date25 March 2003
Docket NumberCIVIL 01-168(JAG)(JA).
PartiesOscar CAMACHO, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico

Harry A. Ezratty, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

Jorge A. Fernandez Reboredo, San Juan, PR, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

ARENAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Oscar Camacho filed the instant action against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority ("PRPA") under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 5.) Plaintiff also pleads supplemental jurisdiction under the Puerto Rico Labor Discrimination Statute, 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146 et seq. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The main argument advanced by plaintiff is that the PRPA, in direct contravention of his constitutional and statutory rights, terminated his harbor pilot license on account of his age. PRPA now moves for summary judgment claiming inter alia that: (1) plaintiff is not an employee as defined by the ADEA; (2) plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; (3) the license termination was made in accordance with Puerto Rico law; (4) the mandatory retirement at age 70 is a Bonafide Occupational Qualification; and (5) the license cancellation was not a discriminatory act under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See PRPA's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 30.) Plaintiff subsequently filed his opposition to PRPA's motion. (Docket No. 31.) Having considered the submissions of the parties, and for the reasons explained below, I find that PRPA's motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To succeed in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and that a trier of fact could reasonably find in its favor. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000).

The court must view the facts in light most hospitable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Patterson v. Patterson, 306 F.3d 1156, 1157 (1st Cir.2002). "`[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting /. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996)). A fact is considered material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law. Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993).

THE FACTS

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. The Puerto Rico Ports Authority is a quasi-governmental agency created by and organized under the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to, among other things, control, license, and nominate harbor pilots for the various ports in the island of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 5, at 2.) It can sue and be sued. (Id.) On October 1, 1981, the PRPA issued a harbor pilot license to plaintiff Oscar Camacho. (Id.) Since that date, and up to June 15, 2000, Mr. Camacho worked as a duly licensed and authorized harbor pilot for the port of San Juan. (See Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts, Docket No. 30, at 1-2.) Plaintiff asserts, and defendant does not dispute, that during all the time Mr. Camacho worked as a harbor pilot, there were no complaints or reprimands with respect to his general performance or his physical abilities to perform his duties. (Docket No. 31, at 1.) On June 14, 2000, Mr. Camacho testified as a witness against PRPA in a court proceeding in which the plaintiff in that case, Daniel Murphy, claimed that PRPA had discriminated against him due to his natural origin. (Id.) The following day, PRPA gave plaintiff written notice that it was revoking plaintiffs license since he had attained the age of 70. (Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts, Docket No. 30, at 2.) Said action is allegedly mandated by Puerto Rico law pursuant to Act 226 of August 12, 1999 (hereinafter Act 226).1 However, plaintiffs claim of discrimination is substantially grounded on the fact that, notwithstanding its own regulations, the PRPA has allowed other pilots to continue working over the mandatory retirement age. (Amended Complaint, Docket No. 5, at 3.)

THE ADEA CLAIM

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., was enacted: (1) "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than their age; [ (2) ]to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and (3) ] to help employers and workers to find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(2000); Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 355, 105 S.Ct. 2717, 86 L.Ed.2d 286 (1985). Indeed, "Congress enacted the ADEA to prevent the arbitrary and socially destructive discrimination on the basis of age." E.E.O.C. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 71 (1st Cir.1993). To advance this purpose the Act makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age. Id. § 623(a)(1); Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000). Thus, an employer will be liable if age was the motivating factor for the employer's decision. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In other words, plaintiffs age must actually play a role in the employer's decision making process and have a determinative influence in the outcome. Id.

Additionally, it is well settled that an ADEA plaintiff at all times bears the burden of proving age discrimination. Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.1998). However, hardly ever will a plaintiff be able to proffer direct evidence of a discriminatory animus. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (recognizing that there will seldom be eyewitness testimony of the employer's mental process). In that case, a plaintiff may prove his or her case through the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1995). Under said framework, in order to establish his or her prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff will have to prove that (1) he or she is over the age of forty; (2) his or her job performance was sufficient to meet the employer's legitimate expectation; (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer had a continuing need for the services provided by the position from which the plaintiff was discharged. Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2002). A rebuttable presumption of age discrimination is created if the plaintiff is successful in establishing this prima facie case. Id. at 68-69. Then, the burden of production—as distinguished from the burden of proof—shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the adverse employment action. Id. at 69. Once the employer satisfies this limited burden, the presumption is eliminated and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the alleged legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Id. With this standard in mind, I analyze the arguments of the parties in the order they are presented.

1. Employee Status Under the ADEA

PRPA denies being plaintiffs employer under the ADEA. Its contention is that it was merely the licensing organism that issued and revoked plaintiffs harbor pilot license and that plaintiff does not qualify as a covered employee under the Act. In addition, PRPA argues that case law is clear that a state agency is not an employer when it is sued in its licensing or regulatory capacity. Mr. Camacho on the other hand argues that, even though he was not an employee in the typical sense, his relation with PRPA was one of employer-employee by virtue of the statutes and regulations governing harbor pilots. According to plaintiff, an examination of both the level of control exercised over him, as well as the economic realities of the work relation with PRPA, reveals the type of employer-employee relation that the ADEA intends to cover.

The definitions of employer and employee provided by the ADEA have proven unhelpful. See Schmidt v. Ottawa Med Ctr. P.C., 155 F.Supp.2d 919, 921 (N.D.Ill. 2001), aff'd, 322 F.3d 461 (7th Cir.2003). The Act defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). The term also includes an agent of such person and a state or political subdivision of a state. Id. The term employee, on the other hand, is defined as an individual who, with certain exceptions not relevant here, is employed by an employer. Id. § 630(f). These definitions are at best circular.

In view of these vague definitions, courts among the circuits have struggled in the determination of an employer-employee relationship under the ADEA, Title VII and other...

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2 cases
  • Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 21 Mayo 2004
    ...was, for ADEA purposes, the de facto employer of the harbor pilots whom it licenses and regulates. See Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 254 F.Supp.2d 220, 227-28 (D.P.R.2003) (Camacho I). Whatever the theoretical possibilities, we do not agree that, in the circumstances of this case, a de facto......
  • Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 18 Junio 2003
    ...and Order (Docket No. 32) granting in part and denying in part PRPA's motion for summary judgment. Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, No. 01-1681, 254 F.Supp.2d 220 (D.P.R.2003). Among other things, I found that PRPA was not merely the licensing board that issued plaintiffs harbor pilo......

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