Camacho v. Samaniego, D-1425
| Citation | 831 S.W.2d 804 |
| Decision Date | 06 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. D-1425,D-1425 |
| Parties | Mary CAMACHO, Individually and d/b/a Afuera Out Bail Bonds et al. v. Leo SAMANIEGO, Sheriff of El Paso County, Texas, and El Paso County. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
This case involves a challenge by various bail bond issuers to the El Paso County Commissioners Court's pre-conviction bail bond filing fee. The trial court, El Paso County Court at Law No. 2, rendered summary judgment against the issuers and upheld the fee. On appeal, the court of appeals on its own motion held that the statutory county court had no constitutional authority to hear the case. Accordingly, it vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the suit. We hold that because the statutory county judge was, pursuant to a constitutionally valid statute, sitting as a district court judge, the trial was legally conducted in a court of proper jurisdiction. We further hold, however, that the county was not authorized to impose the fee in question. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, render a declaration that the fee is illegal, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
In 1983, pursuant to the authorization of the El Paso County Commissioners Court and County Bail Bond Board, 1 the Sheriff of El Paso County began collecting a two-dollar fee on each surety bail bond filed for the release of persons from the El Paso County Jail. The fee was required of all persons in the business of issuing bail bonds on each bond filed in a felony or misdemeanor charge. No fee was assessed, however, for cash or personal bonds. For a few years, the Sheriff billed the bond businesses on a monthly basis; but commencing in 1987, payment was required upon presentation of the bond. The Commissioners Court raised the amount of the fee on several occasions, the current charge being $18.00 for each bond. 2
The first action challenging this fee was brought against El Paso County and its Sheriff, Leo Samaniego, on January 25, 1988, by Mary Camacho, individually and doing business as Afuera Out Bail Bonds, and Nancy Merrill, doing business as Merrill Bail Bonds. 3 They claimed that the fees violated both the Texas Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure. As damages, they sought a return of all fees paid pursuant to the orders, four times that sum as a penalty under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 3909, pre-judgment interest, and costs of court.
Although the face of the petition indicated a filing in district court, by law the statutory county courts of El Paso County have, since 1987, exercised substantially equivalent jurisdiction with state district courts. When suit was filed, Section 25.0732 of the Government Code provided in relevant part:
(a) In addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 4 and other law and except as limited by Subsection (b), a county court at law in El Paso County has the jurisdiction provided by the constitution and by general law for district courts.
(b) A county court at law does not have jurisdiction of:
(1) felony cases;
(2) suits in behalf of the state to recover penalties, forfeitures, or escheat;
(3) misdemeanors involving official misconduct;
(4) contested elections; or
(5) appeals.
(c) A county court at law has, concurrent with the county court, the probate jurisdiction provided by general law for county courts. 5
Upon filing, the district clerk, who also serves by law as clerk of the statutory county courts as well as district courts in El Paso County in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, 6 assigned the lawsuit to County Court at Law No. 2 of El Paso County. All parties agree that the district clerk accomplished this assignment by some random selection method, not by deliberate choice. On November 18, 1988, the court, on its own motion, ordered that damages be tried separately from, and subsequent to, the action for declaratory judgment.
Some months later, Frederick S. Timmons, Jr., individually and doing business as "Get Free" Bail Bonds Co., and Alberto J. De Lachica, Jr., individually and doing business as Lachica Bail Bonds, 7 filed a substantially similar action which was assigned to the 210th District Court of El Paso County. 8 On defendants' motions Timmons and De Lachica's suit was first transferred to County Court at Law No. 2, then consolidated with Camacho and Merrill's suit. Both sets of plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought class certification of all bond businesses and all individuals required to pay a fee prior to release on bond from the El Paso County Jail. Timmons alternatively sought to join all bond businesses in El Paso County as involuntary plaintiffs pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 39. Although the court denied all these motions, the following bond businesses voluntarily intervened before trial: Armando Camacho, doing business as Camacho Bail Bonds; Alberto Lopez, Jr., doing business as Compa Bail Bonds and A-1 Bail Bonds; Fernando Lara Basoco, doing business as El Paso Bail Bonds; Dolores G. Solis, doing business as A.D. Solis Bail Bonds; Odia Harvey, doing business as Amigo Bail Bonds; and Kirsten Apodaca, doing business as Apodaca Bail Bonds.
All parties and intervenors sought summary judgment after the parties stipulated virtually all relevant facts. Defendants asserted that the orders assessing the bail bond fee did not violate the federal or state constitution or any statute, while the bond businesses moved for a partial summary judgment on all liability issues, reserving damages for later determination.
After all motions were filed, defendants for the first time contested the subject matter jurisdiction of the statutory county court. By this time, Section 25.0732 had been amended to eliminate the exclusion of appeals from the county court at law's jurisdiction. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0732(b) (Vernon Supp.1992). Pursuant to this amendment, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction to review the actions of the commissioners court. It then granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' and amended intervenors' motions for partial summary judgment.
The bond businesses appealed to the court of appeals, seeking a declaration that the fee was unconstitutional and a remand for a trial on damages only. The county and sheriff did not re-urge the alleged jurisdictional defect on appeal, arguing instead that the trial court's determination was correct. On its own motion, however, the court of appeals raised the issue of jurisdiction, reversed the trial court's judgment, and dismissed the entire cause.
The court noted that under Tex. Const. art. V, sec. 8, and Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.020, the district court had "appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court," (emphasis added), and that under Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0732(d), supervisory control over the commissioners court was expressly excluded from the county court at law's jurisdiction. 825 S.W.2d 467, 468. The court of appeals rejected the trial court's holding, reasoning that the bond issuers' action did not constitute an appeal over which the trial court had jurisdiction because "[t]here is no statutory framework for an 'appeal' from such an order [of the commissioners court]." 825 S.W.2d at 469. Rather, as a "direct attack on the order" of the commissioners court, it constituted an impermissible invocation of supervisory control over the commissioners court by the county court at law.
The court of appeals also rejected Harvey's argument that the county court at law was permitted to hear the case pursuant to section 25.0732(t), also enacted in 1989. 9 Subsection (t) provided as follows If any cause or proceeding is lodged with the district clerk and the district clerk files, dockets, or assigns the cause or proceeding in or to a county court at law and the county court at law does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the cause or proceeding, then the filing, docketing, or assignment of the cause or proceeding in or to a county court at law is considered a clerical error and that clerical error shall be corrected by a judgment or order nunc pro tunc. The cause or proceeding is considered filed, docketed, or assigned to the district court of the local administrative judge in the first instance rather than to a county court at law of El Paso County. The judge of a county court at law of El Paso County who acts in the cause or proceeding is considered assigned to the district court of the local administrative judge for that purpose and has all the powers of the judge of that district court under the assignment.
The court of appeals read this language not as increasing the jurisdiction of the statutory county courts, or as accomplishing a legitimate transfer to a court of proper jurisdiction, but as providing "a retroactive panacea to cure filing mistakes affecting subject matter jurisdiction." 825 S.W.2d at 469. Such a cure, the court held, "amounts to a legislative encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary." 825 S.W.2d at 469, thus violating the separation of powers clause of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. II, sec. 1. 10
The court reasoned that because the legislature in Tex. Gov't Code § 25.0732(d) refused to extend the statutory county court's jurisdiction to include supervisory power over the commissioners court, it could not effectively extend that power by the automatic transfer mechanism of section 25.0732(t):
What is expressly denied under the Constitution and subsection (d) cannot be indirectly accomplished through subsection (t). If the legislature has not properly conferred subject matter jurisdiction on a trial court, it cannot...
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... ... See, e.g., Lubbock County, Tex. v. Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585-86 (Tex.2002); Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 815 (Tex. 1992). The dissent itself refutes the force of these opinions by noting that "these cases all have one thing ... ...
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Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty.
... ... 17 In support of this argument, Appellants rely almost exclusively on Camacho v. Samaniego , 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1992). In Camacho , several bail bond issuers brought a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief in which they ... ...
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Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty.
... ... 17 In support of this argument, Appellants rely almost exclusively on Camacho v ... Samaniego , 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1992). In Camacho , several bail bond issuers brought a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief in which they ... ...