Camardo v. GM Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 87-CV-1335A.
Decision Date | 19 June 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 87-CV-1335A.,87-CV-1335A. |
Citation | 806 F. Supp. 380 |
Parties | John A. CAMARDO, Sr., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS HOURLY-RATE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Carol E. Heckman, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), for report and recommendation on defendant's summary judgment and dismissal motions.1 Magistrate Judge Heckman filed a Report and Recommendation on June 22, 1992 denying defendant's motions for dismissal and summary judgment. Instead, she recommended awarding plaintiff summary judgment. Defendant objects to the Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the findings of the Magistrate Judge, denies defendant's summary judgment and dismissal motions, and further awards summary judgment to plaintiff.
Objections to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation are governed by Rule 30(a)(3) of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of New York ("Local Rules"). Specifically, Local Rule 30(a)(3) provides that the "written objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for such objection and shall be supported by legal authority."
It is clear from the plain meaning of the rule that objections to a Report and Recommendation are to be specific and are to address only those portions of the proposed findings to which the party objects. It is improper for an objecting party to attempt to relitigate the entire content of the hearing before the Magistrate Judge by submitting papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a "second bite at the apple" when they file objections to a Report and Recommendation, as the "goal of the federal statute providing for the assignment of cases to magistrates is to `increase the overall efficiency of the federal judiciary.'" McCarthy v. Manson, 554 F.Supp. 1275, 1286 (D.Conn.1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (Former 5th Cir.1982) (en banc)) (footnote omitted). "The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts of unnecessary work." Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.1980). There is no increase in efficiency, and much extra work, when a party attempts to relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.
Defendant in the instant action attempted to take a "second bite" when it filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Instead of citing objections to specific portions of the proposed findings and recommendations, defendant merely submitted a revised version of the same arguments it presented to the Magistrate Judge. Entire portions of the brief were transposed into the objections2. The Fifth Circuit said:
it is reasonable to place upon the parties the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specifically consider. This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.
Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410. In the accompanying footnote, the court said Id. at 410 n. 8. Defendant clearly did not "pinpoint" specific portions of the report and recommendation to which it objected, but instead, attempted to rehash its entire argument and have this Court conduct a duplicative review where nearly every issue presented to the Magistrate Judge was raised for a second time on objection.
Failure to abide by the Local Rules constitutes reason enough to dismiss defendant's objections as courts have broad discretion in interpreting and applying their Local Rules. Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.1992); Smith v. Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir.1988); Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1983). Accordingly, the Court dismisses defendant's objections for failure to comply with Local Rule 30(a)(3).
The above notwithstanding, the Court has, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), made a de novo determination of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court has also reviewed the submissions of the parties and has heard argument from counsel. Upon de novo review, the Court adopts the proposed findings for the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Heckman's Report and Recommendation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the objections are dismissed due to defendant's failure to comply with the Local Rules; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted in its entirety on the merits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. Richard J. Arcara pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) to hear and report on all dispositive motions. Presently before the court are Defendant's motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 and 19 and/or for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The following constitutes the undersigned's proposed findings and recommendations for the disposition of said motions.
Plaintiff John A. Camardo ("Plaintiff"), born April 18, 1935, was employed by General Motors Corporation ("GMC") at its Tonawanda plant from October, 1961, through July 11, 1983, when he suffered a back injury on the job. Plaintiff alleges that he tried to go back to work on July 15, 1983, but claims his leg "buckled and gave way" on his way into the plant (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, Item 18, p. 2). Plaintiff returned home, and has not worked since. He has received medical treatment from several physicians for both physical and mental injuries.
Plaintiff received disability benefits under GMC's disability plan from July 12, 1983 through December 1, 1983. In response to GMC's request, Plaintiff underwent a company physical on December 6, 1983, and was told by the company doctor that he could return to work the next day, with a 25 lb. weight restriction. At that time he was also handed a written "Return to Work Notice" containing the same directions and information. He claims that severe back and leg pains prevented him from returning to work on December 7, 1983 and, in fact, caused him to be placed into traction for approximately two weeks. Item 18, p. 2.
In August, 1984, Plaintiff received an award of Social Security disability benefits based on the Social Security Administration ("SSA")'s determination that he was totally disabled from gainful employment as of July 11, 1983. Plaintiff has also been receiving New York State Workers' Compensation benefits from July 12, 1983 to present.
In his complaint, filed October 15, 1987 (Item 1), Plaintiff seeks a judgment directing Defendant General Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan ("Defendant" or the "Plan") to provide him disability pension benefits, pursuant to the requirements of § 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The Plan provides for a disability pension for GMC employees who become totally and permanently disabled prior to attaining age 65 with at least 10 years of credited service . Plaintiff alleges that upon his receipt of the favorable decision from the SSA, he contacted GMC regarding application for disability pension benefits and was advised by an unidentified GMC personnel department employee that he was not entitled to such benefits because his employment with GMC had terminated his employment as of December 12, 1983. See, Item 17, Par. 15.
Plaintiff's attorney wrote the Plan Administrator on October 11, 1984, to request application forms on Plaintiff's behalf (Item 17, Exh. H), and received a response dated October 18, 1984 from Mrs. Ida Law, GMC's Employee Benefits Supervisor, which denied his request for pension application forms, explaining that Plaintiff was ineligible since his employment record showed that he was released as a "voluntary quit" as of December 12, 1983 and therefore was not an "employe" sic within the meaning of the Plan. Item 17, Exh. I. Plaintiff's attorney wrote back on February 12, 1985, requesting an appeal from the ineligibility determination and advising the supervisor that it was "difficult to determine how Plaintiff could `voluntarily quit' at a time when he was totally and permanently disabled." Item 17, Exh. J. Plaintiff claims that there was no response to this appeal, and none appears in the record. By letter dated December 8, 1986, Plaintiff renewed his request for application forms and information about the appeal process. Item 17, Exh. K. Again, Plaintiff claims there was no response.
GMC, as Defendant, moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff was not a GMC employee within the meaning of the Plan since he refused to comply with the "Return to Work Notice" delivered to him on December 6, 1983, which required him to report to work within 3 days, and Plaintiff therefore became a "voluntary quit" having "broke seniority" under § 111(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between GMC and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW") (the "National Agreement") (see Exhibits of Defendant GMC, Item 11(a), Exh. 1, pp. 83-84); (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his three-fold administrative remedies as provided in the National Agreement (id., pp. 26-43 (Grievance Procedures)), including his GMC...
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