Camarillo v. State, 3-680A162

Decision Date29 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 3-680A162,3-680A162
Citation410 N.E.2d 1202
PartiesFrank CAMARILLO, Jr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Timothy M. Bemis, Griffith, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Gordon R. Medlicott, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Frank Camarillo was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced to two years imprisonment. On appeal the defendant raises a single issue charging that the court erred in not permitting the defendant's expert medical witness to continue his testimony regarding the defendant's sanity and thereby violated the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The events giving rise to this charge began with the defendant's plea of not responsible by reason of insanity. The court appointed two psychiatrists to examine the defendant and determine his sanity at the time of the alleged crime. The defendant also retained a psychiatrist, Dr. Douglas Foster, to testify on the sanity issue. At trial the two court-appointed doctors testified and differed in their opinions of the defendant's sanity. The first doctor stated that in his opinion the defendant was sane at the time of the act charged. The second doctor testified that the defendant was suffering from a temporary mental disease and was unable to control his behavior at that time.

During the presentation of the defendant's case, Dr. Foster was called as the defendant's second witness and took the stand at approximately 4:00 in the afternoon. At that point the court stated that it did "not intend working past 4:30 on this case." Dr. Foster then testified that the defendant was suffering aggressive neurosis, chronic and severe, and did not act either intentionally or knowingly during the course of the alleged crime. The doctor discussed the defendant's background and family life and explained various mental illnesses and conditions. He concluded that the defendant was insane at the time of the alleged criminal act. After this testimony the following exchange occurred:

"BY THE COURT: Why don't we permit cross examination at this point when (that is) the only issue that he's been called to testify to and then you can go back to re-direct if it goes over until tomorrow.

"BY MS. FERNANDEZ: (defense counsel) Well, your Honor, I'm going to object. 1

"BY THE COURT: All right. (to the state) You may begin."

The State then cross-examined Dr. Foster until 4:30 P.M. when the proceedings were terminated for the day. The jury was dismissed and this dialogue took place:

"BY MS. FERNANDEZ: Your Honor, I would like to state that Dr. Foster cannot be here tomorrow morning.

"BY THE COURT: I expected that. That's why I suspended your direct examination, areas other than what he had been called to testify to. And that is the reason the State was given that right of cross examination, before we concluded proceedings for the day.

That is your choice, of course, not to have him recalled. I would suspect that the remedies available for that would be to strike his testimony entirely or let it go as it is right now."

The following morning, the State moved to strike the testimony of Dr. Foster. In denying that motion, the court reasoned,

"But I told you, you knew we are going to terminate as far as this case was concerned, we were going to terminate the evidence at 4:30 and you chose to go with the drug center guy first instead of the doctor which immediately rang a bell in my mind. Why is she doing that and then it got to be 4:15 and you were wondering (sic) off into an area outside of the insanity issue. And I immediately thought if he does not come back today, the State will be affectively (sic) deprived of their right of cross examination.

"And it's at that point that I broke in on your direct examination for the purpose of giving the State at least as much time on cross examination as he was being given on direct examination in order to avoid striking out his testimony entirely.

"I felt that this was the only remedy available to me. I wanted to avoid that if at all possible, keeping in mind that it's always difficult to strike anything from the minds of the jury, plus the fact we couldn't tell them(,) we could not tell the jury why his testimony was being stricken and whose fault it was. That has to be kept away from the jury."

And further:

"He was here at 2:30 and it was strategy on part of the defense as far as I could see that you called him late enough so that he could not be effectively or affectively cross examined. But I will not be part of strategy. I have to give a fair trial for both sides."

Based on these events, the...

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4 cases
  • Heald v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 14 Mayo 1986
    ...1102. This duty extends to determinations concerning the length of examination and the manner and mode of examination. Camarillo v. State (1980), Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1202. As to appellant's contention that she was entitled to an opportunity to recross-examine Dr. Davis, we find no merit. T......
  • Borst v. State, 3-1282A325
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 15 Febrero 1984
    ...is embodied in the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to proceedings in state courts. Camarillo v. State (1980), Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1202, 1204. We agree that, by excluding the testimony of Evans the trial court denied Borst his right to present a witness in hi......
  • Gould v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 26 Septiembre 1991
    ...State's witnesses, Sweet v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 924, and to challenge the State's accusations against him. Camarillo v. State (1980), Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1202. Second, Gould argues the State should have been required to demonstrate the affiants were unavailable to testify in ope......
  • Thomas, Matter of, 1079
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 14 Octubre 1980
    ... ... Thomas, be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Indiana pending the final determination of this cause, beginning retroactively on December 31, ... ...

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