Camas Stage Co., Inc. v. Kozer

• Decision Date: 29 July 1922
• Citation: 209 P. 95,104 Or. 600
• Parties: CAMAS STAGE CO., INC., v. KOZER, SECRETARY OF STATE.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

209 P. 95

104 Or. 600

CAMAS STAGE CO., INC., v. KOZER, SECRETARY OF STATE.

Supreme Court of Oregon

July 29, 1922

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; George G. Bingham, Judge.

Action by the Camas Stage Company, Incorporated, against Sam Kozer as Secretary of State of Oregon. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is a suit in equity. The plaintiff is a corporation of the state of Washington, engaged in operating motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire within the state of Washington and between the states of Washington and Oregon, and, while thus engaged, drives its motor vehicles over the highways of the state of Oregon. Sam Kozer, the defendant, is Secretary of State of Oregon, and, by virtue of his office is required to enforce the provisions of the Oregon Motor Vehicle Law.

The purpose of this suit is to restrain the secretary of state from enforcing the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law in the matter of collecting registration fees demanded by him.

The Oregon Motor Vehicle Law provides that--

"Every owner of a motor vehicle * * * shall, * * * before he operates or drives the same upon the highways of this state," cause the same to be registered. Section 4 chapter 371, General Laws of Oregon, 1921.

Section 25, chapter 371, General Laws of Oregon 1921, as amended by section 3, chapter 8 General Laws of Oregon, Special Session 1921, establishes the fees required to be paid to the secretary of state upon registration and before the issuance of license, as follows:

"Motor vehicles, except motor trucks, shall pay the following fees, based on the light weight of such vehicle, to wit:

Weighing 1,700 pounds or less ......................... $15 00

Weighing over 1,700 pounds and not over 2,100 pounds ... 22 00

Weighing over 2,100 pounds and not over 2,500 pounds ... 28 00

Weighing over 2,500 pounds and not over 2,900 pounds ... 34 00

Weighing over 2,900 pounds and not over 3,300 pounds ... 40 00

Weighing over 3,300 pounds and not over 3,700 pounds ... 47 00

Weighing over 3,700 pounds and not over 4,100 pounds ... 55 00

Weighing over 4,100 pounds and not over 4,500 pounds ... 62 00

Weighing over 4,500 pounds and not over 4,900 pounds ... 71 00

Weighing over 4,900 pounds and not over 5,300 pounds ... 79 00

Weighing over 5,300 pounds and not over 5,700 pounds ... 88 00

Weighing over 5,700 pounds ............................. 97 00

"Motor busses shall pay $4 for each passenger, in addition to the fees prescribed according to the weight of the motor vehicle at the rated passenger capacity, allowing twenty inches of seating space for each passenger."

The weight and seating capacity of each of plaintiff's motor vehicles so operated is as follows: One White automobile bearing Washington license No. 185087; weight 4,500 pounds seating capacity, 12 passengers. One White automobile, bearing Washington license No. 185086; weight 4,810 pounds; seating capacity, 12 passengers. One White automobile, bearing Washington license No. 185088; weight 5,415 pounds; seating capacity, 12 passengers. One White automobile, bearing Washington license No. 185089; weight 5,800 pounds; seating capacity, 15 passengers.

If the provisions of the Oregon Motor Vehicle Law are enforced against the plaintiff, the company will be compelled to pay a respective license fee, or tax, of $110, $119, $136, and $157, on the motor vehicles described above. Such "registration and license fees imposed by this act * * * shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses" exacted by the state upon the vehicle so registered and licensed. Section 26, c. 371, Gen. Laws of Oregon, 1921.

Section 37 of the act of 1921 provides for the exemption of nonresident owners, but such favor does not include a foreign corporation conducting business in Oregon.

Plaintiff avers that the Oregon Motor Vehicle Law, in so far as it attempts to require it to pay an annual license fee, or tax, upon each of its motor vehicles, is void, in that it is in contravention of subdivision 3, section 8, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and for other reasons hereinafter noted.

The defendant filed his demurrer, challenging the sufficiency of the complaint and the jurisdiction of the court of the subject-matter of the suit. The demurrer was sustained, and the suit dismissed. Plaintiff assigns error of the court in sustaining defendant's demurrer and in rendering and entering a decree dismissing its amended complaint.

Dan E. Powers and F. E. Swope, both of Portland, for appellant.

I. H. Van Winkle, Atty. Gen., and Grace E. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

There is a marked difference between the regulatory act designated chapter 136, Laws of 1905, under which 218 automobiles were registered and the regulatory law in force in 1921, under which 118,615 motor vehicles were registered. The legislation of this state, in providing millions upon millions of dollars for the construction and reconstruction of highways, has kept pace with the ever-increasing number of motor vehicles used upon the roads of the state. The legislative assembly, in the enactment of regulatory laws, has declared the necessity for good roads in the successful operation thereon of the motor vehicle, and likewise has recognized the destructive character of such vehicles when driven upon the highways.

That we shall learn and give effect to the intention of the Legislature is a primary rule in the exposition of statutes. The Oregon Motor Vehicle Law is the written expression of the legislative will relating to the regulation of certain vehicles that may be operated upon the highways of this state. We have searched all the laws enacted by our legislative assembly pertaining to the regulation of motor vehicles, for the purpose of discovering the legislative will.

The plaintiff asserts that this act, as applied to it, offends against the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.

A rule so commonplace that it requires no citation of authority to sustain it is that where a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which sustains the validity of the act while the other will render it unconstitutional, the construction that will support the validity of the law must be adopted.

The Legislature declared that the "purpose, object and intent" of the Motor Vehicle Law "is to provide a comprehensive system for the regulation of all motor and other vehicles."

We hold that--

"The declared purpose of the act is to be accepted as true, unless incompatible with its meaning and effect." White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 35, 98 N.E. 1056, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 805, 808, citing Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 475; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312.

The character of the registration fees may be determined from the act.

Section 51 of chapter 371, General Laws of Oregon 1921, enacts:

"The provisions of this act contained are declared to be an exercise of the police powers of the state of Oregon, and this act shall be known as the 'Oregon Motor Vehicle Law.' "

While not absolutely controlling, the legislative designation is an important factor in determining the character of the tax imposed. Portland v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 80 Or. 271, 305, 156 P. 1058, citing Gray, Lim. of Tax. Power, p. 42; Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 Or. 506, 514, 195 P. 575.

Among the powers expressly granted to the national government is the control of interstate commerce. Article 1, § 8, of the Constitution, provides that--

"The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states. * * *"

Congress has exercised the power granted it in relation to interstate commerce in a variety of acts, but it has passed no statute that in any way inhibits the exaction by the state of the fees in question by way of compensation from the plaintiff for the privilege of driving its motor cars over the highways of this state. State laws may affect interstate commerce without conflicting with the constitutional provision appealed to.

In Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 699, 2 S.Ct. 732, 27 L.Ed. 584, it was held that a state may erect or authorize the construction of wharves along the banks of its navigable rivers which are used for commerce between the states, and charge, or authorize to be charged, wharfage fees for the privilege of receiving and landing thereon passengers and freight which come from other states, without infringing upon the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.

In Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 7 S.Ct. 313, 30 L.Ed. 487, it was held that a state may construct locks in such rivers in order to improve the navigation thereof, and charge reasonable tolls to persons using such locks while engaged in interstate commerce.

In Lindsay & Phelps Co. v. Mullen, 176 U.S. 126, 20 S.Ct. 325, 44 L.Ed. 400, it was held that a state may construct or authorize the construction of booms for the purpose of increasing the facilities with which the business of floating and gathering logs may be conducted thereon, and lawfully charge, or authorize to be charged, reasonable sums for the use of such booms in the floating of logs from a point within the state to a point outside thereof, or vice versa.

The case of Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222, affirming 81 N. J. Law, 594, 80 A. 453, L. R. A. 1917B, 553, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 237, is illuminating, instructive, and strictly in point. The New Jersey statute (P. L. 1908, p. 615, § 4) provides, among other things, that:

"Every resident of this state, and every

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