Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 15 January 1931
• Docket Number: 73.
• Citation: 153 A. 283,160 Md. 248
• Parties: CAMBRIDGE MFG. CO. ET AL. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

153 A. 283

160 Md. 248

CAMBRIDGE MFG. CO. ET AL. v. JOHNSON.

No. 73.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 15, 1931

Appeal from Cicuit Court, Dorchester County; Robert F. Duer, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Samuel Richard Johnson, claimant, opposed by the Cambridge Manufacturing Company, employer, and the State Accident Fund, insurer.Pending claimant's appeal from an order of the State Industrial Accident Commission disallowing the claim claimant died, and his widow was substituted as appellant in the proceeding.From a judgment of the circuit court reversing the order of the commission, employer and insurer appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTTDIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

William L. Marbury, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Willis R. Jones, Asst Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.

James A. McAllister, of Cambridge, for appellee.

DIGGES J.

The record in this case presents two questions for our determination, both of which arise out of a claim made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, codified asarticle 101.The Cambridge Manufacturing Company, one of the appellants, is engaged in the business of manufacturing, mixing, and selling poultry and dairy food.The original claimant, Samuel Richard Johnson, now deceased, was employed in this work from September, 1923, to October 17, 1928; and at the time of his leaving, and for more than two years prior thereto, he had been foreman.The operation of mixing the feed caused the atmosphere of the room to be impregnated with dust, which at times was quite thick.It further appears that in September, 1928, the claimant, who had been ailing for about a month, consulted a physician and was advised that he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis; that he stopped work on October 17, 1928, and remained disabled until his death on July 17, 1929.The claimant asserted that he believed his condition was aggravated by the inhalation of dust in the room in which he worked, and there was medical testimony tending to support him.On November 17, 1928, the claimant applied for compensation; and in answer to the inquiry, "Describe how accident occurred,"he said: "By constant inhalation for the past five years of dust from powdered alfalfa meal, chops, fish meal, etc., while mixing poultry food;" that he was 32 years of age and married.The defendants, being the employer and the State Accident Fund, insurer, who are the appellants here, asked a hearing before the commission on two issues, namely: "1.Did the claimant suffer an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment?2.When, if at all, did the claimant sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment?"After a hearing, the commission on February 21, 1929, passed an order disallowing the claim; and on March 1, 1929, an appeal was taken to the circuit court for Dorchester county.On July 17, 1929, while the appeal was pending, the claimant died.Subsequently, on March 15, 1930, the appellee, widow of the claimant, who had been appointed his administratrix, filed a suggestion of his death and asked that she be permitted to appear as appellant in the proceedings.The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the claim of the deceased, if he had any, did not survive his death, so as to become a part of his estate.This motion was overruled, and on the same day the case was presented to the jury on the single issue: "Did Samuel Richard Johnson sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Cambridge Manufacturing Company?"At the close of the testimony the defendants offered a prayer for an instructed verdict in its favor on the ground that there was no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover; which prayer was rejected.The answer of the jury on the issue presented was, "Yes"; that is, the jury found, as a matter of fact, that the claimant did sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Cambridge Manufacturing Company.On this finding of the jury, the court reversed the order of the State Industrial Accident Commission.The appeal is prosecuted from that order.

The two questions, then, for our decision are: (1) May an appeal from an order of the commission denying a claim for total disability be prosecuted by the claimant's administratrix for the benefit of his estate?(2) Was the ruling of the trial court on the defendants' first prayer, which sought a directed verdict on their behalf on the ground that there was no evidence legally sufficient submitted in the case to entitle the plaintiff to recover, correct?We will consider these questions in the order named.

A general statement of the apparent legislative purpose is helpful in reaching a conclusion on the first question.If we approach this question in the light of the declared purpose of this legislation in the state of Maryland, as also the general purpose of all such legislation in this country and in England, we are bound to conclude that the purpose was to withdraw from litigation common-law actions brought by employees against employers for accidental injuries growing out of and sustained in the course of the employment, and to substitute in the place of the right of action in such cases certain definite and specified amounts to be paid to the injured party, and to his dependents as defined in the statute in case the injured party died as a result of the injury within three years from the time of the accident causing the injury.Sound economic thought recognized that it is inevitable that employees engaged in extrahazardous occupation will be injured or killed and that the care and support of such persons or their dependents will become a burden upon the state, as representing the people at large, and that such result flowing from the conduct of extrahazardous businesses is a legitimate expense of the business itself and ought to be borne by it in the same manner that the hazard from fire or the replacement of broken or damaged machinery is taken care of.It was also recognized that the common-law defenses, resorted to in actions brought by the employee against the employer, of the fellow-servant doctrine, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence, frequently resulted in denying any recovery whatever; while, on the other hand, experience had shown a strong tendency on the part of juries to mulct defendants in heavy damages, sometimes out of all proportion to the actual injury sustained.That the people of the state, at the time of the passage of the present Workmen's Compensation Act, fully realized the evils of the old system, is shown by the preamble to the original act.With this in mind, the statute was designed to benefit both parties: The employers, by making it impossible to have exorbitant and unreasonable judgments obtained against them; and the employees, by providing for them definite and certain compensation for bona fide injuries sustained during their employment, without the danger of being defeated by the application of the hard and fast rules of the common law.The cost to the employer of the proper operation of such a system is not onerous, if by the administration of the law its subjects are confined to those provided in the statute and in the manner therein provided.There is an undoubted tendency on the part of commissions and the courts, due to the persistent application of injured persons, to broaden the provisions of the law through administrative or legal interpretations.This, it seems to us, is a real danger to be guarded against, lest the economic benefit sought to be accomplished by such enactments be practically frustrated by employers being driven to the necessity of employing only those who are physically perfect, thereby excluding entirely competent and efficient persons, who may have some slight ailment or disease, from receiving any employment at all.This was not the purpose of the Legislature; and if an interpretation be given which is tantamount to health insurance, it will become more and more difficult for employees who have passed middle age, or who from one cause or another are not perfect physical specimens, to obtain and keep employment.Whom, then, did our act purpose to compensate?Clearly two, and only two, classes of persons: First, the injured party himself; and, second, in case the injury resulted in death, such persons as the act provided are his dependents, entitled to receive compensation because of the loss of support theretofore rendered them, which loss was occasioned by the injury.In our opinion, it cannot be gathered from this legislation as a whole that it was the intent of the lawmakers to enrich persons who were strangers to the injured party and who were not directly affected by his loss of earning capacity.It is clear that it was never the intention to create an insurance to the injured party, which upon his death would form a part of his estate.Such conclusion is reached from the declared legislative purpose, and an examination of the structure and framework of the act as a whole.This being true, are there any specific provisions contained in the act, or are there any previous decisions of this court, which compel a determination in the case before us contrary to what we believe to have been the general purpose of the Legislature?

There appears to be no case in this court where the question has been directly passed upon, although it can be easily seen that its determination is important as an instruction to the commission in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Law.It being a case of first impression, its decision must...