Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Kaminski
| Decision Date | 11 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 45,45 |
| Citation | 352 Mich. 507,90 N.W.2d 685 |
| Parties | CAMDEN FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, subrogee of Eugene Szymanek, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward KAMINSKI, Jr., Defendant-Appellant, Joe Warchol and Rita Warchol, Defendants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Erickson, Dyll, Marentay, Van Alsburg & Slocum, Detroit, for defendant-appellant Kaminski, Eugene V. Douvan, Detroit, of counsel.
Stanley H. Maples, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellee, John E. Marlin, Detroit, William J. Weber, Lansing, of counsel.
Before the Entire Bench.
The facts in this case suggest once again the boundless ingenuity and infinite resource of our native motorists for getting themselves in trouble. This suit grows out of a rather weird intersection collision between the defendants' two cars following which the Warchol car proceeded out of control into the front door of the corner building of plaintiff's assured, setting it on fire. The plaintiff fire insurance company paid the loss and sued both sets of driver-owners in the Detroit common pleas court and got a joint judgment against both. Defendant Kaminski sought a new trial for failure of the trial judge to give certain requested instructions and for error in the instructions he did give. His motion was denied and he appealed to circuit court, where he again lost, and he now appeals here. After judgment the Warchols evidently folded their hands and did nothing.
Here is our bizarre factual situation: Yemans and Lumpkin are two intersecting streets in Hamtramck. Yemans is a one-way street going from east to west; Lumpkin is a wider two-way 'through' street going north and south. All traffic going west on one-way Yemans must stop before entering or crossing two-way Lumpkin. Defendant Kaminski was driving north on Lumpkin. Defendant Rita Warchol was driving east (that is, the wrong way) on Yemans. The Warchol car was crossing Lumpkin when Kaminski's car struck the Warchol car. As noted, the Warchol car then mysteriously managed to proceed south-easterly into the corner building of plaintiff's assured, setting it on fire. Both drivers were familiar with the intersection.
At the trial, as might be expected, each set of defendants sought to blame the other. It was the theory and testimony of the Warchols that however negligent Mrs. Warchol was in driving the wrong way on a one-way street, she was a 'sitting duck' when the accident happened and that Kaminski had a duty to observe her and avoid the accident, and that therefore Kaminski's negligence and not hers was the proximate cause of the accident and the consequent fire loss. Kaminski's theory and testimony was that he had a right to assume that no vehicle would be proceeding the wrong way on Yemans, and that he had a right to rely upon this assumption unless and until he saw or by the exercise of reasonable care should have seen to the contrary, which he claimed he had no chance to do. The respective testimony of the defendants was sharply conflicting on the question of relative speeds, position of the cars, and relative closeness to the intersection just prior to the collision.
In his long and discursive charge to the jury the learned trial judge instructed the jury on quite a number of things, including a number of Warchol-inclined instructions, including the following:
'I am asked to charge you and do charge you:
"The Statute giving the right of way to cars on trunk line highways does not authorize one to assume that in all events he may proceed without looking * * *'
'He must look to see what is plainly and apparently before his vision as he goes down the street, as he looks ahead.
"* * * or if unable to see, without exercising precaution commensurate with reasonable prudence."
The court seemed excessively beguiled by the idea that the 'wrong way' Warchol car might have had little or nothing to do with the accident. We give typical quotations:
'Counsel for the defendants, Warchol, has properly challenged your attention to the question of whether or not the direction of operation of the Warchol car had anything to do with this accident.'
Then again:
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