The Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Williams

• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COLLINS, J.
• Citation: The Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Williams, 40 A. 634, 61 N.J.L. 646 (N.J. 1898)
• Decision Date: 20 June 1898
• Parties: THE CAMDEN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. MARGARET WILLIAMS, ADMINISTRATRIX, &c., OF JOHN WILLIAMS, DECEASED, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

40 A. 634

61 N.J.L. 646

CAMDEN & A. R. CO.

v. WILLIAMS.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 23, 1898.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Margaret Williams, administratrix of John Williams, deceased, recovered judgment, on verdict, against the Camden & Atlantic Railroad Company, for damages sustained by the widow and next of kin of the decedent by reason of his death, alleged to have been caused by negligence in the operation of the defendant's street railway in Atlantic City. The deceased and his young son were passengers upon an open car drawn by a trolley car that was propelled by electricity. The negligence charged was the sudden starting of the cars while the deceased was alighting at a crossing where a stop had been made at his signal. The defense was that the cars had not stopped when the deceased started to alight, and that in any case there was negligence in the manner of his alighting that contributed to the injury. A rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted was discharged after argument (37 Atl. 1107), but the exceptions sealed at the trial were reserved, and are now before this court on writ of error. Judgment affirmed.

J. H. Gaskill, for plaintiff in error.

C. L. Cole, for defendant in error.

COLLINS, J. (after stating the facts). The second, sixth, and tenth assignments of error were waived. I will discuss the others in their order. The first is that the Carlisle table of mortality was admitted in evidence. It is common knowledge that approved mortuary tables are in constant use to aid in determining the probable expectancy of human life. They are derived from statistics preserved through a course of years, and have become standard by the test of subsequent experience. The courts have almost universally availed themselves of help from these sources when expectancy of life became involved in a judicial proceeding. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 881, and notes; Abb. Tr. Ev. p. 724; Gillett, Ind. & Col. Ev. § 85. An exhaustive history of the subject is embodied in Williams' Case, 3 Bland, 186, where Chancellor Bland seems to take judicial notice of the various tables, and makes use of them as aids in fixing the value of a life estate in lands. The right to use such standard tables in evidence has never been expressly declared in this court, but the common practice to so use them is recognized in the case of New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., 50 N. J. Law, 189, 35 Atl. 915, where such use is stated as a proper exception to the general rule excluding books of inductive science as evidence. It is an exception resting really in necessity. A very satisfactory exposition of the legitimate use of such tables as applied to actions for damages for injury resulting in death will be found in the case of Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. St. 504, 23 Atl. 239. They do not afford absolute rules for computation, but they may help to form the judgment. Each case stands by itself, and has its own conditions, and the tables must be intelligently applied to that case. Among mortuary tables, that known as the "Carlisle Table of Mortality" stands pre-eminent. It was elaborately compiled in the latter part of the last century from the statistics of certain parishes in the city of Carlisle, in England, extending over a series of years. It was received with a high degree of favor among insurers, and others concerned with forecasting the probable duration of life. It almqst entirely superseded the Northampton table, and others still earlier, now altogether obsolete. It is said of this Carlisle table in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. 13 [9th Ed.] p. 169) that "no other mortality table has been so extensively employed in the construction of auxiliary tables of all kinds for computing the values of benefits depending upon human lives." Insurers now resort to their own experience tables, compiled from their statistics of selected lives, but there seems to be no successor to this general table of mortality. Every lawyer knows that it forms the basis of the table adopted by our own court of chancery as a guide for calculating the value of a life estate (Chancery Rule 184); and it every where-has gained judicial recognition, as will appear upon consulting the decisions noted in the works above cited on the general subject. It is proper, therefore, to admit this standard table in evidence without proof of its repute. That may be assumed. Of course, the authenticity of the paper produced as the table should be established by proof satisfactory to the court, as by the testimony of a witness familiar with it and with its use. There was no such proof in the case in hand, but both the exception and the assignment of error admit authenticity, and there is no complaint now on that score. The complaint is that the judge did not explain and limit the evidential force of the table, and particularly caution the jury that it could not be considered at all unless the deceased was proved to have been in good health at the time of the injury. This complaint does not support the exception. That was directed against the mere admission of the table in evidence. It was legal evidence, irrespective of the condition of health of the deceased for it is not a table compiled from statistics of selected lives only; but, of course, such condition had to be taken into account, and testimony on that subject was in fact taken by both parties. The table was not admitted as controlling. The judge said, "We are not bound by it;" and in his charge to the jury he very clearly and correctly stated the rules governing the estimate of probable duration of life to be made by a jury in awarding damages in case of injury resulting in death. We think that when, in a jury trial, resort is had to a mortuary table, its office and use should be explained by a competent witness, but omission to call such a witness does not make the previous admission of the table legal error. Like any other evidence available only when supplemented, it stands unless motion be made to suppress it. Its effect is another matter. That the judge, in his charge, failed to refer to and explain the legitimate use of the table, affords no ground of complaint, in the absence of any request for cautionary instruction, and of any...