Camden & A.R.R. Co. v. Baldauf

Decision Date16 May 1851
Citation16 Pa. 67
PartiesCamden and Amboy Railroad Co. v. Baldauf.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

March Term 1851

1. Though in Pennsylvania a common carrier may limit his responsibility by a general notice, yet the terms of the notice must be clear and explicit, and the person with whom the carrier deals must be fully informed of the terms and effect of the notice: the limitation is to be confined to cases of special contract, express or implied; and where the notice is in the English language and the passenger a German who did not understand the English language, it is incumbent on the carrier to prove the knowledge by the passenger of the limitation in the notice.

2. If tickets, without more, are evidence of a special contract yet they must be printed in a language which the passenger understands, or their terms must be explained to him.

3. Where a trunk was lost, and no proof given as to when or how it was lost, the legal inference is that it was lost or mislaid in consequence of the negligence or fraud of the carrier or his agent.

4. Where a trunk of a passenger contains specie, it is not incumbent on him to inform the carrier of its contents unless inquired of, notwithstanding the advertisement of the carrier that passengers are " prohibited from taking any thing as baggage but their wearing-apparel, which will be at the risk of the owner; " and where the extra weight of the passenger's baggage, including the trunk, was paid for, and the agents of the carrier took charge of it,-- Held, that it was immaterial whether the trunk was to be viewed as baggage or freight, and that the carrier was responsible for its loss through the negligence or fraud of its agents.

5. Carriers cannot, even by a special agreement with the owner discharge themselves from the ordinary care incumbent on a bailee for hire. Per ROGERS, J.

ERROR to the District Court, Philadelphia.

This was an action brought by Henry Baldauf against the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, as carriers of passengers and their baggage from New York to Philadelphia. The declaration contained three counts, charging the defendants below, 1. As carriers of passengers and their baggage. 2. As carriers of passengers and their luggage. 3. As bailees. The general issue was pleaded. The material facts appear in the special verdict.

February 16, 1849, jury called, and found a special verdict as follows:

That the defendants are carriers of passengers and their baggage and not carriers of merchandise, from New York to Philadelphia. That the defendants had published in the public daily newspapers of New York and Philadelphia, from May to September 1846, an advertisement as follows, (prout copy of the same annexed, marked A.,) and delivered to the plaintiff, who is a German, and did not then understand the English language, as well as the other passengers, on the 22d August, 1846, a card or ticket as follows, (prout copy of the same annexed, marked B.) The plaintiff took passage in defendants' line upon the said 22d August 1846, and put on board the steamboat Independence, belonging to defendants, and forming part of defendants' means of conveyance, among other baggage, a trunk containing twenty-one hundred and one silver coins, commonly called French five-franc pieces, and also certain articles of wearing-apparel. The said trunk was delivered to the conductor or other agent of defendants on board of said boat. The extra weight of plaintiff's baggage, including the said trunk, was paid for, and the said agents did take charge thereof. The plaintiff did not notify the defendants or their agent that the said trunk contained coins or money, and no special agreement was made by them to accept or carry the same. The said trunk was lost, and not delivered to the plaintiff upon his arrival at Philadelphia, or at any time thereafter.

If the court shall be of opinion that the defendants are responsible for the injury arising from the loss of the money or silver coins aforesaid, then the jury find for the plaintiff, and assess the damage at twenty-two hundred and forty-five dollars ninety-five cents, ($2245.95.) If the court shall be of opinion that the defendants are not liable for the injury arising from the loss of the money or silver coins aforesaid, then the jury find for the plaintiff, and assess the damages at ten dollars. The $10 was for the wearing-apparel.

Advertisement (A).--The Camden and Amboy Railroad Line for Philadelphia and intermediate places, will leave Pier No. 2, North River, foot of Battery Place by steamboat, to South Amboy, every day, (Sundays excepted,) & c.

Fifty pounds of baggage will be allowed to each passenger in this line, and passengers are expressly prohibited from taking any thing as baggage but their wearing-apparel, which will be at the risk of the owner.

I. BLISS, Agent.

Ticket (B).--Camden and Amboy Railroad Line. Received payment in full for passage to Philadelphia, from forward-deck passenger, No. -- All baggage at the risk of the owner thereof. The proprietors binding themselves to no charge or care of the same whatever, either express or implied.

IRA BLISS, Agent.

Keep this receipt until called for.

February 20th, 1849, motion for rule for new trial, and to show cause why judgment shall not be entered for defendant on the special verdict, on reasons filed and points reserved.

June 30th, 1849, judgment for plaintiff for $2245.95.

The defendants then sued out their writ of error.

It was assigned for error:

The court erred in entering judgment for Henry Baldauf, the plaintiff below and the defendant in error, for the sum of two thousand two hundred and forty-five dollars and ninety-five cents.

The case was argued by Read and Mallory, for the Company.--Upon the special verdict in this case, two questions arise:

The first is, as to the special agreement imbodied in the passenger-ticket or receipt, by which " all baggage" is " at the risk of the owner thereof. The proprietors binding themselves to no charge or care of the same whatever, either express or implied."

The courts of this State have uniformly held that such an agreement is valid and discharged the carrier from all liability whatsoever, except in case of gross negligence or fraud.

This principle is distinctly recognised in Beekman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle 189, (1835,) in Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. & Ser. 500, (1843,) and in Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr 484, (1848,) where it is said, " Since then, it has been expressly decided in Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. & Ser. 495, that a common carrier may limit his liability by notice to passengers, such as was given in this case, that the baggage is at their own risk. This must now be taken as the law of this State, and the court below asserted nothing beyond it."

The second question is whether, under the known course of the business of this company, in carrying passengers and their baggage, these defendants are liable for the loss of the very large amount of French silver coins placed in the trunk of the plaintiff without any information or notice whatever to the defendants or their agents, and contrary to their express prohibition.

The line was only a passenger line, and not in any manner a freight line, and the carrying of baggage was simply a consequence of the carrying of passengers. The question therefore is, what is meant by the term baggage of passengers; and this has been clearly and definitely settled in New York, not to include merchandise at all, nor bank-bills, nor gold or silver coins or money, particularly if the sums are large. Silver, which is carried in boxes of $1000 each, or in kegs of larger dimensions, is particularly a subject of freight, and liable not only to the ordinary charges for valuable articles, but is also often the subject of insurance by the carrier himself, and is very generally carried by the express lines, which are entirely unconnected with the steamboat and railroad companies.

As in Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell 85, (1832,) a large sum of money in bank-bills, in an ordinary travelling-trunk, was not considered as included under the term baggage so as to render the carrier responsible for it. So in Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wendell 459, (1841,) NELSON, C. J., confirming his decision in 9 Wendell, extended the principle of non-liability to valuable merchandise placed in a trunk and carried as baggage; and in Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill 586, (1844,) the present chief justice of New York said, p. 589, 590, speaking of baggage, " It neither includes money nor merchandise. ( Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell 85; Pardee v. Drew, 25 id. 459.) It was suggested in the first case, that money to pay travelling expenses might perhaps be included. But that may, I think, be doubted. Men usually carry money to pay travelling expenses about their persons, and not in their trunks or boxes."

" It is undoubtedly difficult to define with accuracy what shall be deemed baggage within the rule of the carrier's liability. I do not intend to say, that the articles must be such as every man deems essential to his comfort; for some men carry nothing or very little with them when they travel while others consult their convenience by carrying many things Nor do I intend to say, that the rule is confined to wearing-apparel, brushes, razors, writing apparatus, and the like, which most persons deem indispensable. If one has books for his instruction or amusement by the way, or carries his gun or fishing-tackle, they would undoubtedly fall within the term baggage, because they are usually carried as such. This is, I think, a good test for determining what things fall within the rule."

The same principle is stated by WILLARD, J., in Blanchard v Isaacs, 3 Barbour's S.C. 389, (July 3, 1848,) "...

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