Camelot Music, Inc. v. Marx Realty & Imp. Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 25 September 1987 |
Citation | 514 So.2d 987 |
Parties | CAMELOT MUSIC, INC. v. MARX REALTY & IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, INC. 86-206. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Stephen M. Wilson, Huntsville, for appellants.
Daniel F. Aldridge of Brinkley & Ford, Huntsville, for appellee.
Marx Realty & Improvement Co., Inc. ("Marx Realty"), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Madison County against Camelot Music, Inc. ("Camelot"), demanding a judgment against Camelot for $11,067.64, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. In the first count of the complaint, Marx Realty alleged that Camelot had "failed to pay rent installments and other leasing charges as set forth in the lease contract as the same fell due and that the rent installments and other leasing charges were then past due and unpaid." In count two of the complaint, Marx Realty alleged that Camelot "has failed to pay the rent installments and other leasing charges set forth in said lease contract as the same became due, and that there are now past due and unpaid $11,067.64 rent installments ... security charges, merchant dues, common area dues and other expenses." Camelot filed a motion to dismiss but did not file an answer to the complaint.
The trial was set for July 15, 1986. On the date of trial, Marx Realty filed an application for a default judgment for $28,418.03, this sum consisting of accrued rent in the amount of $25,388.88, with the balance constituting costs and attorney fees. In addition, Marx Realty amended its complaint by adding another claim for $47,206.48 due in monthly installments through December 31, 1988.
After Marx Realty filed the application for default judgment and the amendment to the complaint, Camelot filed an answer and in the same pleading demanded a jury trial. The trial court refused to grant a default judgment, allowed the amendment to the complaint, allowed Camelot's answer, and refused the jury demand as untimely. After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment for Marx Realty in the amount of $75,452.01. Camelot then filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Camelot appeals from that judgment.
This case involves the following facts: In August 1978, Marx Realty executed a lease to Camelot Music for a unit in "The Mall" in Huntsville, Alabama. The lease agreement between Marx Realty and Camelot was for a term of ten years, with fixed minimum rent at $17,200 per annum through December 31, 1979, and $18,813 per annum from January 1, 1980, through December 31, 1988. The rent was to be paid in advance in equal monthly installments.
Camelot took possession of the leased unit on August 16, 1978. This particular mall in Huntsville experienced a dramatic decline in business and by the time of the trial of this case, only 50% of the stores in The Mall were occupied. Camelot Music terminated the lease and moved out of The Mall in March 1985. Marx Realty filed its complaint in November 1985.
The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it refused to grant Camelot's demand for a jury trial. Camelot contends on appeal that its demand for a jury trial, filed after Marx Realty's motion for a default judgment and amendment, was a timely demand for a jury trial pursuant to Rule 38(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. Camelot asserts that the amendment filed by Marx Realty adjusting the amount of damages created a "new issue" in this case, entitling it to a jury trial.
Rule 38(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., provides:
This rule establishes a time limitation for making a jury demand, which is dependent upon the date of service of the "last pleading directed to such issue." Dorcal, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 398 So.2d 665 (Ala. 1981). It is well-settled law in this state that when the 30-day period of Rule 38(b) has run, an amendment that does not set forth new issues will not give rise to the right to demand a jury. Hamon Leasing, Inc. v. Continental Cars, Inc., 358 So.2d 442 (Ala. 1978). In Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 932 (Ala. 1983), this Court stated the following regarding a jury demand made following a motion for a default judgment:
After examining this Court's opinion in Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., supra, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err when it denied Camelot's demand for a jury trial. In this case, Marx Realty filed its complaint in November 1985, and the case was set for trial on July 15, 1986. We hold that because Marx Realty had filed a motion for default before the jury demand was filed, the trial court could legally deny Camelot's jury demand.
The second issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it held that the liquidated damages provision of the lease agreement was valid. Camelot contends that it is invalid in that the trial court's ruling had the effect of holding that the lease agreement contained an acceleration clause for unaccrued rent.
We have examined the record in this case, and the only ruling by the trial court, after it heard the evidence itself, because of its denial of the jury demand, was an entry on the docket sheet which read:
"Judgment upon trial of case for plaintiff for $75,452.01."
The trial judge stated no specific reason or basis for his judgment; therefore, we cannot conclude that he, in fact, treated the subject lease as if it contained an acceleration clause for unaccrued rents, as Camelot argues.
We agree with Camelot's contention that there must be an express provision in a lease in order for it to provide for acceleration upon default, see, H.M. Price Hardware Co. v. Meyer, 224 Ala. 35, 138 So. 543 (1931), and after examining the lease between Marx Realty and Camelot, we agree that it does not allow Marx Realty to accelerate the due date of unaccrued rent payments, but, in this case, we are of the opinion that the lease contains a valid liquidated damages clause that will support the award of damages made by the trial judge. Section 10.3 of the lease provides, in pertinent part:
Camelot also contends that the trial court's award of $75,452.01 as liquidated damages was improper. Camelot asserts that this sum should be construed as a penalty rather than as liquidated damages.
It is true in Alabama that, because penalty provisions are void as against public policy, "Courts ... are disposed to lean against any interpretation of a contract which will make the provision one for liquidated damages and, in all cases of doubtful intention, will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty." Cook v. Brown, 408 So.2d 143, 144 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); see also, Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 So. 149 (1888). In Alabama, liquidated damages are a sum to be paid in lieu of performance, Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277, 198 So. 706 (1940), while a penalty is characterized as a security for the performance of the agreement or as a punishment for default. Standard Tilton Milling Co. v. Toole, 223 Ala. 450, 137 So. 13 (1931). The courts generally identify three criteria by which a valid liquidated damages clause may be distinguished from a penalty. First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and, third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-breach of the probable loss. See, C. Gamble and D. Corley, Alabama Law of Damages, § 5-4 (1982). Determining whether a liquidated damages provision is valid is a question of law to be determined by the trial court based on the facts of each...
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