Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-11546.,03-11546.
• Citation: 347 F.3d 1240
• Parties: Maxine CAMERON-GRANT, Feleshia Tissiera, Velda A. Frederick, Plaintiffs, Ross Basil, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a Foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

347 F.3d 1240

Maxine CAMERON-GRANT, Feleshia Tissiera, Velda A. Frederick, Plaintiffs Ross Basil, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a Foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-11546.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

October 20, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph Bilotta, Lake Worth, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey P. Watson, Patrick D. Coleman, Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HULL, MARCUS and STAHL^* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-appellant Ross Basil was one of four plaintiffs who brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., on behalf of themselves as well as "similarly situated" employees. This appeal raises the question whether Basil, whose personal claims are settled and now moot, may appeal the district court's order denying his motion to notify other potential plaintiffs of this FLSA action. After review and oral argument, we determine that this action is moot.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2002, plaintiff-appellant Ross Basil, and plaintiffs Maxine Cameron-Grant, Feleshia Tissiera, and Velda A. Frederick, brought this action against defendant-appellee Maxim Healthcare, Inc. ("Maxim") under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The plaintiffs filed this action "on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees," seeking to recover unpaid back wages, unpaid overtime compensation, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

According to the complaint, Defendant Maxim provides healthcare services to adults. At various times, Maxim employed the four named plaintiffs, who are nurses that rendered nursing services on Maxim's behalf. The complaint alleges that the four named plaintiffs sometimes worked longer than forty hours per week and that Maxim failed to compensate them for their work in excess of forty hours per week at a rate of at least one and one-half (1-½) times the regulated rate at which they were employed, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207. The complaint also alleges that Maxim failed to pay the plaintiffs the applicable minimum hourly rate, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 215(a)(2), and that Maxim retaliated against the plaintiffs after they complained about not receiving back pay or overtime compensation.

On September 27, 2002, the four named plaintiffs filed a motion for an order permitting court supervised notice to employees of their opt-in rights. The plaintiffs sought permission from the district court to proceed as a "collective action" under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),¹ asserting that they "know that their claims are typical of the claims of other employees of the defendant and are typical of the claims of all members of the representative class."² See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

On January 9, 2003, three of the four named plaintiffs, Maxine Cameron-Grant, Feleshia Tissiera, and Velda Frederick, filed a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice of "all of their ... claims and causes of action in the above-styled case, in their entirety." The district court accepted the dismissal of their claims.

On January 22, 2003, Maxim stipulated to paying the fourth plaintiff's, appellant Basil's, claims for unpaid wages and overtime pay. Basil had other claims pending.

On February 6, 2003, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to allow notification to potential opt-in plaintiffs. In analyzing the plaintiffs' motion, the district court applied the two-part test set forth in Dybach v. State of Florida Department of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1991). In Dybach, this Court stated that the district court, before exercising its power to give notice to other potential members of the plaintiff class to "opt-in" to the lawsuit, "should satisfy itself that there are other employees of the department-employer who desire to `opt-in' and who are `similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions." Id. at 1567-68. The district court concluded that "the affidavits and deposition transcripts provided by Plaintiffs are sufficient to satisfy this Court that there are other employees of Defendant who are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and with regard to pay provisions." However, the district court also found that the plaintiffs failed to set forth evidence that any employees desired to opt-in to the lawsuit.

After the denial of this motion, plaintiff Basil and defendant Maxim agreed to the dismissal of Basil's remaining claims — leaving no claims pending against Maxim. Thus, on March 5, 2003, the district court issued an order entering final judgment on Maxim's stipulation that it would pay some of Basil's claims and that his other claims would be dismissed. According to the order and stipulated final judgment, Maxim specifically "agreed to pay, and now has fully paid [Basil] all claimed unpaid wages and overtime pay, liquidated damages equal to that amount, and [Basil]'s costs and attorneys' fees." The order also stated that "[a]ll other claims in this case have been dismissed with prejudice."

Plaintiff Basil now appeals the district court's order denying the motion to allow notification to potential opt-in plaintiffs. Because Basil has settled some of his claims with Maxim, agreed to dismissal of the remainder of his claims, and even recovered his costs and attorneys' fees, we first must consider whether this action is moot.

II. DISCUSSION

This appeal raises an issue of first impression: whether a district court's denial of a motion to notify potential opt-in plaintiffs under § 216(b) of the FLSA may be reviewed on appeal after the named plaintiff's personal claims have become "moot."

The general rule is that settlement of a plaintiff's claims moots an action. See Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120, 106 S.Ct. 553, 554, 88 L.Ed.2d 418 (1985); Hammond Clock Co. v. Schiff, 293 U.S. 529, 530, 55 S.Ct. 146, 79 L.Ed. 639 (1934). In the Rule 23 class action context, however, unique mootness principles may apply — when the named plaintiff seeks to have a class certified, the class certification is denied, and his personal claims subsequently become moot — to permit the named plaintiff to appeal the denial of class certification. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1984). In this case, we consider whether the mootness principles in the Rule 23 class action context apply to collective actions brought under § 216(b) of the FLSA.

A. Mootness/Personal Stake and Rule 23 Class Actions

As required by Article III of the Constitution the exercise of judicial power by federal courts "depends upon the existence of a case or controversy." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted); 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir.2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Sep. 2, 2003) (No. 03-351). "A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1263 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More specifically, a case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1263.

The "legally cognizable interest" or "personal stake" requirement derives from Article III's case or controversy limitation, which restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts "to disputes capable of judicial resolution." Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 396, 100 S.Ct. at 1208. "The `personal stake' aspect of mootness doctrine [] serves primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are presented with disputes they are capable of resolving." Id. at 397, 100 S.Ct. at 1209.

In two cases decided on the same day, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), and Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), the United States Supreme Court discussed whether the named plaintiff, whose personal claims became moot after the denial of class certification under Rule 23, had a personal stake in appealing that denial. In Geraghty, the plaintiff prisoner challenged the parole release guidelines, but his substantive claims became moot because he was released from prison.³ In Roper, the plaintiffs challenged the usurious interest rates of the defendant bank, which tendered to plaintiffs the maximum amounts, including interest and costs, that could be recovered. Although the Roper plaintiffs refused the tender, the district court entered judgment for the defendant bank over plaintiffs' objection, which mooted their substantive claims.

In Geraghty, the Supreme Court concluded that the named plaintiff in a Rule 23 class action may have a "personal stake" in the class certification claim in one of two ways. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402, 100 S.Ct. at 1212. First, the named plaintiff may retain, in some cases, a "legally cognizable interest" in the "traditional sense." See id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)). For example, the named plaintiff who retains an "economic interest" in the class certification question continues to have a personal stake in the action. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 336-37, 100 S.Ct. at 1173. In Roper, the Supreme Court recognized that an economic interest could include the named plaintiff's...