Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 85-CV-71537-DT.

Decision Date27 December 1985
Docket NumberNo. 85-CV-71537-DT.,85-CV-71537-DT.
Citation623 F. Supp. 1238
PartiesBetty CAMERON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Cameron, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PONTIAC, a Municipal corporation, Officers Michael McBride and Vernon Roberts, individually and in their capacities, jointly and severally, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Michael D. Burwell, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for plaintiff.

Gene A. Farber, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LA PLATA, District Judge.

I. Introduction

In the recent case of Tennessee v. Garner,1 the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer is constitutionally prohibited from using deadly force when pursuing a felon who is neither armed nor dangerous. In the instant matter, this Court is called upon to determine whether a police officer violated a fleeing felon's constitutional rights when he unsuccessfully used deadly force in his pursuit of the felon, but where the suspect suffered fatal injuries attributable to an intervening agent while he was attempting to escape.

II. Facts

On the morning of April 7, 1983, two uniformed City of Pontiac police officers, Michael McBride and Vernon Roberts, while on patrol duty, received a radio call directing them to investigate a burglary at a home located on 57 S. Eastway in the City of Pontiac. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers were greeted by a woman, who stated that two young black males had forcibly entered the house. Noticing two males running away from the back portion of the house, the officers, after identifying themselves and ordering the suspects to stop, each fired their weapons twice. One of the men, Christopher Cameron, continued to flee from the scene, with Officer Roberts in pursuit. During the chase, Roberts thrice fired his revolver unsuccessfully at Cameron. Soon thereafter, Cameron climbed a fence and ran toward a well-traveled highway, where he suffered fatal injuries when struck by a motor vehicle.

III. Plaintiff's Complaint

On April 8, 1985, Betty Cameron, the personal representative of her deceased son's estate, filed a civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the two police officers and the City of Pontiac. Plaintiff essentially alleged that the police officers used excessive force and committed an unlawful seizure by using deadly force while pursuing the decedent.

Conceding that the decedent was unarmed and not a danger to the community, for purposes of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Defendants assert that a fleeing felon cannot collect damages, even when the pursuing officers attempted to use deadly force to apprehend him, where he was injured or killed by an intervening danger encountered along his escape attempt.

IV. Discussion of Tennessee v. Garner

In Tennessee v. Garner, supra, a Memphis, Tennessee, police officer fatally shot an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect. The decedent's estate instituted a civil rights action in the federal court. In applying deadly force, the police officer complied with a state statute which prescribed that an officer may use any necessary measures to effectuate the arrest of a criminal suspect, as long as the officer gave notice of his intent to arrest the suspect. Writing for the majority, Justice White, in affirming the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 held that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes the use of deadly force by a police officer against an apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect.3 The Court enunciated the proposition that deadly force may be used only when the officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspect presents a threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or third parties.4

In a blistering dissent, Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, stated that the opinion of the majority was circumscribed to instances where an officer was successful in his use of lethal force to apprehend a suspect:

Although it is unclear from the language of the opinion, I assume that the majority intends the word "use" to include only those circumstances in which the suspect is actually apprehended. Absent apprehension of the suspect, there is no "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. I doubt that the Court intends to allow criminal suspects who successfully escape to return later with § 1983 claims against officers who used, albeit unsuccessfully, deadly force in their futile attempts to capture the fleeing suspect. The Court's opinion, despite its broad language, actually decides only that the shooting of a fleeing burglary suspect who was in fact neither armed nor dangerous can support a § 1983 action.5
V. Analysis

In analyzing the instant Motion, this Court, viewing the factual setting in a light favorable to Plaintiff, assumes that the decedent was unarmed and undangerous at the time the officers attempted to apprehend him. Plaintiff does not contest that the two officers had probable cause to believe that the decedent was involved in the breaking and entering of the occupied dwelling.

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2 cases
  • Joseph v. City of Kent
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
    • 4 février 2021
    ...albeit unsuccessfully, deadly force in their futile attempt to capture the fleeing suspect."); see also, Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 623 F. Supp. 1238, 1240 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect did not amount to a constitutional violation when the suspect was not......
  • Cameron v. City of Pontiac, Mich., 86-1067
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 13 mars 1987
    ...RYAN, Circuit Judges. KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Betty Cameron (appellant) appealed from the district court's order, 623 F.Supp. 1238, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action pursuant to the precedent enunciated by the......

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