Cameron v. Colvin, CIVIL NO. 2:15-cv-02051-MEF
| Decision Date | 04 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 2:15-cv-02051-MEF |
| Parties | SAMANTHA CAMERON PLAINTIFF v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Plaintiff, Samantha Cameron, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on November 30, 2011, alleging disability since May 15, 2011 due to a herniated disc in her lower back. (T. 264-269, 270-273, 391) Her applications were denied initially on May 16, 2012, and upon reconsideration on June 21, 2012. (T. 125-127, 128-130, 132-133, 134-135) On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing (T. 136-137), and the hearing was held on October 18, 2012, before the Hon. Harold D. Davis, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (T. 32-50) Plaintiff appeared in person and was not represented. (T. 34) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on December 3, 2012, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (T. 91-107) On December 12, 2013, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for further administrative proceedings, to include further consideration of the severity of Plaintiff's mental impairment and her mental residual functioning capacity ("RFC"). (T. 108-111)
On remand, a supplemental administrative hearing was held on October 16, 2014. (T. 51-84) Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by an attorney, Michael Hamby. (T. 51, 53) Plaintiff and Montie Lumpkin, a vocational expert ("VE"), testified at the hearing. (T. 53-84)
Plaintiff, born in 1971, was 40 years old at the time of her applications for DIB and SSI, and she was 41 years old on the date her DIB insured status expired on September 30, 2012. (T. 24) She finished tenth grade in 1987. (T. 391) She had past relevant work ("PRW") experience as a lumber yard worker, industrial cleaner, and stock clerk. (T. 24, 74, 392) Plaintiff alleges she stopped working on May 15, 2011 because of her condition(s). (T. 391)
By a written Decision dated November 20, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: scoliosis of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of L3-4 and L4-5, mild facet stenosis at L4-5, borderline intellectual functioning, and depression. (T. 15-16) After reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's severe impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. (T. 16-18) The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work, except that she is limited to work with simple tasks and simple instructions, and she can have only incidental contact with the public. (T. 18-24)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any PRW. (T. 24) With the help of avocational expert ("VE"), and considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T. 25) Specifically, the VE testified that Plaintiff could perform the duties of representative occupations such as hand packer (DOT 920.587-018; medium, unskilled, svp 2; 41,353 nationally/319 Arkansas), kitchen helper (DOT 318.687-010; medium, unskilled, svp 2; 273,590 nationally/1,785 Arkansas), and industrial cleaner (DOT 381.687-018; medium, unskilled, svp 2; 12,392 nationally/101 Arkansas). (T. 74, 77-78) The ALJ then found Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act during the relevant time period. (T. 26)
Plaintiff requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council (T. 5-8), which request was denied on January 29, 2015 (T. 1-4). Plaintiff then filed this action on March 19, 2015. (Doc. 1) This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 9) Both parties have filed appeal briefs (Docs. 11, 12), and the case is ready for decision.
This Court's role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). The Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In otherwords, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the Court must affirm the ALJ's decision. Id. Thus, the Court's review is limited and deferential to the Commissioner. See Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014).
A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines "physical or mental impairment" as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). A plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his or her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given his or her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Only if he reaches the final stage does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
While not specifically articulated, Plaintiff appears to argue two issues on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred in his credibility evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints, and (2) that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's mental RFC assessment. (Doc. 11, pp. 4-6) The Commissioner's response is that the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's history of medical treatment, the reported objective medical findings of record, the type and effectiveness of treatment, the medical assessments of record, Plaintiff's reported activities of daily living, and Plaintiff's subjective complaints in assessing her credibility and in determining RFC, and that the ALJ's credibility and RFC assessments are supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 12, pp. 5-12)
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are presented in the parties' briefs and the ALJ's opinion, and they are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
The ALJ commented that he considered "but granted little probative weight" to the Plaintiff's testimony, and that "the paucity of evidence does not support the [Plaintiff's] ultimate allegation of disability." (T. 24) The ALJ gave as reasons for his credibility determination the Plaintiff's ability "to maintain her household, do laundry, cook, drive, shop, and tend to her personal hygiene in conjunction with the medical evidence demonstrating minimal abnormalities," finding that such evidence reflected "a significant functional capacity and not an individual unable to sustain regular and continuing work due to medically determinable impairments." (T. 24)
Plaintiff's only argument on this issue seems to be that the ALJ should not have discountedPlaintiff's testimony because of the lack of medical treatment as Plaintiff had no insurance or financial ability to pay for treatment. (Doc. 11, p. 5) Although Plaintiff claimed an inability to afford treatment, the ALJ noted "there is no indication that the [Plaintiff] availed herself of and exhausted all possible resources available," suggesting to the ALJ that Plaintiff's impairments and the resulting limitations were not as debilitating as alleged. (T. 20)
A lack of funds may justify a failure to receive medical care, see Osborne v. Barnhart, 316 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2003); however, a lack of funds alone will not excuse a claimant's failure to obtain treatment or follow medical...
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