Cameron v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees

• Decision Date: 24 January 1935
• Docket Number: No. 9.,9.
• Parties: CAMERON et al. v. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING PICTURE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL UNION NO. 384, OF HUDSON COUNTY, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

176 A. 692

CAMERON et al.

v. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING PICTURE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL UNION NO. 384, OF HUDSON COUNTY, et al.

No. 9.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 24, 1935.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by William Cameron and others against the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 384, of Hudson County, and others. From a decree of dismissal, complainants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

See, also, 114 N. J. Eq. 493, 169 A. 116.

Wallace P. Berkowitz, of Jersey City, and Norbury C. Murray, of Newark, for appellants.

Saul Nemser, John Milton, and Samuel S. Stern, all of Jersey City, for respondents.

HEHER, Justice.

The primary object of the dismissed bill of complaint was the annulment of the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the defendant trade union, a voluntary association, and a so-called contract classifying the members thereof as "seniors" and "juniors." Auxiliary injunctive relief was prayed.

The complainants, seven in number, each hold a junior membership. Their insistence is that, in the special circumstances here presented, the contract in question constitutes an "abuse of power," and therefore contravenes sound public policy, and is void. These are the asserted special circumstances: (1) The local union has "substantially an 80% monopoly of employment of that trade In" its territorial jurisdiction (the county of Hudson), and are seeking "a complete monopoly"; (2) the senior members alone fix the scale of wages and conditions of employment binding upon all its members; (3) the seniors control the allotment of employment among its members; (4) the seniors select representatives for all its members, empowered to bargain collectively with employers under the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195); (5) the juniors are excluded from voice and vote and participation in the local's management, yet their per capita assessment is substantially greater; the juniors are required to pay $454 per annum, as compared with $80 for the seniors; and (6) while classified as "juniors," they are no less competent than the seniors, and, in fact, are not learners, but skilled operators, who receive the same rate of compensation as the seniors. Specifically, complainants maintain that, in the main, these provisions of the constitution, laws and the claimed contract, particularly that granting a preference in jobs to the seniors, bargain away the juniors'" constitutional and inalienable right to earn a living."

These are the circumstances asserted in justification or excuse: The local came into being on March 15, 1915, under a charter granted by the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada. It is composed of men pursuing the trade of motion picture machine operators. It is governed by the constitution and bylaws of the international body, so far as applicable, and by a constitution and by-laws of its own adoption. Complainants and thirty-five others were granted a "junior" membership on March 4, 1930. It is said that the following are the considerations justifying this classification: In 1928 the synchronization of pictorial action and voice and sound became a reality, and this wrought radical changes in that industry. At least two operators were required for the operation of the sound or "talking" picture projector—one sufficed for the silent picture machine. These men were required to master a new operating technique. The advent of the sound picture, so it is claimed, produced a shortage of skilled projecting machine operators. The local could not supply the demand for adequately trained operators, made by the exhibitors with whom it had "closed-shop" contracts. It then had eighty members skilled only in the operation of the silent picture projector. It became necessary to impart the requisite technical knowledge to them, and to instruct a like number who were wholly unfamiliar with the mechanics of the trade. These latter were given a "permit" to work in the theaters with which the union had a contract, until such time, so the union insists, "as the examining board of the local was convinced that these men were qualified and sufficiently experienced in their trade." These permit holders acquired practical experience under the tutelage and guidance of the union operators, and, in consideration thereof, paid to the local union 10 per cent of their earnings. On March 4, 1930, they numbered thirty-five. They worked under the supervision of the union, who was responsible, under its contract with the exhibitor, for damage done to the latter's equipment and machinery. The permit holders were in no sense members of the union, and consequently had no standing with the parent international body. The result was that, when itinerant members of the latter body entered the local's territory, they had a status that entitled them to the jobs held by the permit holders. This resulted in considerable loss to the latter, and was likewise a source of irritation and annoyance to the exhibitors. So it was concluded that, for the mutual benefit and advantage of all concerned, the permit holders would be given a union status; hence the contract in question. The union terms the relationship thus acquired a "limited standing as apprentice," and insists that the primary purpose was to confer upon the permit holders a status recognized by the international body, which would secure their jobs against the demands of outside members of the latter body. It is vigorously maintained that, in the circumstances, it was only fair and equitable that the union members should reserve a preference in employment, and to effect this purpose, mainly, the challenged contract came into being. It is said, and with an apparent basis in fact, that the sound pictures were inaugurated with deep misgivings, and, that, at the time, it was freely prophesied by men of long experience in the industry that the principle would eventually prove impractical and infeasible as a commercial proposition. It is urged that the sole design of the scheme in question was to safeguard their established position against the consequence of failure of the sound pictures, especially the radical reduction in the number of available places in the event of an enforced return to the silent picture.

To effectuate this design, it was formally resolved by the local union, on January 14, 1930, "that a Junior Local 384 be created within the jurisdiction of Local 384, I. A. T. S. E. and M. P. M. O.; said Local to be governored (sic) by the Senior Local, at all times." On March 4, 1930, the permit holders subscribed to the membership contract presented by the union. The membership fee was fixed at $500. A prerequisite to membership was a demonstration of the applicant's capacity. The "senior members," some eighty in number, were listed, and they were expressly "given seniority rights over all other members with reference to employment." There was a specific provision (section 9) that "junior members will at all times be subject to removal from jobs when such jobs are desired by senior members." These were made the prerequisites to admission to senior membership: (1) Junior membership; (2) the application must be made "with the consent of the executive board and be vouched for by five senior members," and be accompanied by the "balance on (sic) application fee that is in force at the time of his making application into (sic) senior body"; (3) the applicant shall be "voted on, by secret ballot, at a regular meeting and receive a two-thirds vote of all senior members present at such meeting"; and (4) compliance with all "constitutional requirements." Prior to December 10, 1929, the union membership fee was increased from $200 to $1,000. On that day it was increased to $3,000. Complainants insist that this was not made known to the junior members prior to their admission to the "junior local." As to some of the junior members, there is evidence to the contrary. Provision was also made therein for stated monthly meetings of the "junior members," to be "conducted by the executive board of the senior body." Junior members were thereby required to pay a "per capita tax, insurance and all assessments," and dues to the local union of "10% of salaries earned." Section 11 obligated all members to "abide by the rules of this union, without resort to a court of law, and in the event of expulsion agree to forfeit all property rights in the union."

The contract, as thus outlined, was not induced by fraud, material misrepresentation, mistake, duress, or undue influence. There was indisputably such a manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to the terms embodied in the memorandum referred to as to give rise to a contract. The reality of consent of the parties, as it has been termed by a distinguished text-writer (Anson on Contracts [14th Eng. Ed.] §§ 10, 176) is not at issue.

But defendants maintain that the provisions of a subsequent revision of the constitution and laws of the local union, adopted in May, 1931, are equally binding upon the junior members. Complainants concede that the revision incorporated into the constitution and by-laws of the local union "the substance of the 'contract,'" but maintain that it "changed and added to it in important particulars." The general insistence is that the revision is void because the "juniors" were not afforded "an opportunity to vote on this revision," or "to be heard thereon," as provided by the 1923 constitution and by-laws. And the following specific provisions are further challenged as an unwarranted insertion of new terms and conditions into the contract evidenced by the constitution and laws in effect when they were admitted to...