Cameron v. Lang

• Decision Date: 25 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. S00G1287, No. S00G1180.
• Citation: 549 S.E.2d 341,274 Ga. 122
• Parties: CAMERON et al. v. LANG et al. Williams v. Solomon et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

549 S.E.2d 341

274 Ga. 122

CAMERON et al. v. LANG et al.

Williams v. Solomon et al.

Nos. S00G1287, S00G1180.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 25, 2001.

Reconsideration Denied July 26, 2001.

Harold J. Cronk, Savannah, for Williams.

Oliver, Maner & Gray, Patrick T. O'Connor, Weiner Shearouse & Weitz, William W. Shearouse, Jr., Malcolm McKenzie, III, Savannah, for Solomon et al.

Jones, Cork & Miller, Thomas C. Alexander, for Cameron et al.

Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Atty. Gen., Brenda A. Raspberry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Reynolds & McArthur, W. Carl Reynolds, Bradley J. Survant, Robert S. Slocumb, Macon, for Lang et al. FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.

These appeals concern the interplay between the issues of qualified immunity and proximate cause when a law enforcement officer is sued for damages as a result of a high speed chase of a fleeing suspect. In both actions, the trial court granted summary judgment to the officers and their government employers based on the doctrines of official (qualified) immunity and sovereign (governmental) immunity. The Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia affirmed in the City of Savannah case,¹ but reversed in the Peach County case based on OCGA § 40-6-6.²

We granted the writ of certiorari to address whether a trial court must consider the issue of qualified immunity before the issue of causation under OCGA § 40-6-6. Because the rationale for qualified immunity is to protect the independent judgment of public employees without the potential threat of liability, we hold that a court must consider as a threshold issue whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability in a lawsuit for damages. Despite the seemingly inconsistent results in these cases, we nevertheless affirm both decisions of the court of appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Robert Williams sued police officer Ramsey William Solomon and the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah based on injuries he sustained when his car collided with Solomon's at an intersection. Williams alleged that the officer acted in reckless disregard for the public safety by running the stop sign and failing to use his car's siren and emergency lights. In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, the court of appeals concluded that Solomon was entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability and OCGA § 40-6-6 did not apply since it does not create a waiver of any immunity. In granting certiorari, we asked the parties to address whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that OCGA § 40-6-6 did not apply.

In the second case, Sheryl Ann Lang sued deputy sheriff Kenneth Cameron, Peach County Sheriff Johnnie V. Becham, and others for the wrongful death of her husband, Lonnie Raymond Lang. Lang was killed in a head-on collision when Thomas Tiraboschi, a fleeing felon, crossed the centerline of a two-lane road and struck Lang's car while being pursued by Cameron. In its decision, the court of appeals did not address whether the officer was entitled to immunity from personal liability, but instead held that the trial court erred in granting him summary judgment under OCGA § 40-6-6 because the plaintiff presented evidence that Cameron acted in reckless disregard of proper law enforcement procedures in his decision to continue the high speed pursuit of Tiraboschi. We asked whether the court of appeals should have determined if qualified immunity applies as the threshold issue before considering whether the plaintiff created a disputed issue of material fact under OCGA § 40-6-6.

OFFICIAL (QUALIFIED) IMMUNITY

1. The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.³ Qualified immunity "protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption."⁴ Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.⁵ The rationale for this immunity is to preserve the public employee's independence of action without fear of lawsuits and to prevent a review of his or her judgment in hindsight.⁶ This protection is particularly important in the context of a high speed pursuit where police officers must make a split-second decision on whether to initiate the pursuit or continue it and the type of risks to take.

In a different context, the United States Supreme Court has discussed the role of qualified immunity under federal law in protecting government officials from liability.⁷ The Court explained that qualified immunity is provided to permit government officials to act with independence and without the fear of consequences. These consequences "are not limited to liability for money damages; they also include `the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service.'"⁸ As a result, the Court concluded that qualified immunity is an "entitlement not to stand trial" rather than a "mere defense to liability."⁹

Although the Supreme Court in that case was dealing with whether a government official could appeal the district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity as a collateral order, its decision provides persuasive reasons for resolving the issue of a government employee's qualified immunity as early as possible in the legal proceedings. Since state law also affords public officers and employees immunity from personal liability for discretionary acts in part to protect them from the risks of trial, it would not be logical, efficient, or fair to bypass the issue of qualified immunity in favor of the issue of causation. Instead, a law enforcement officer's role in contributing to a collision during a high speed chase, which usually involves questions of fact under OCGA § 40-6-6, should be evaluated only after the court has determined that the officer is not immune from personal liability, which usually is a question of law.¹⁰

Nothing in the language of OCGA § 40-6-6 on emergency vehicles requires a court to address the issue of causation before dealing with the defendants' immunity from liability. OCGA § 40-6-6(d)(3) states explicitly that subsection (d) deals solely with issues of causation and duty and "shall not affect the existence or absence of immunity which shall be determined as otherwise provided by law." Because the better policy and practice is to address immunity before causation, we hold that our state courts must consider the issue of a government employee's qualified immunity from liability as the threshold issue in a suit against the officer in his personal capacity.

2. In Gilbert v. Richardson, we concluded that county law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary acts within the scope of their authority; they may be personally liable if they negligently perform a ministerial act or act with actual malice or an intent to injure.¹¹ Although we based our ruling in Gilbert on the 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution,¹² we noted that the protection provided for negligent discretionary acts was consistent with prior law.¹³ "This interpretation comports with the purpose of providing immunity from personal liability to government employees who work in positions where they make policy or exercise discretion."¹⁴ Since that decision, we have applied the same standard of liability for the discretionary acts of city employees as for the acts of county employees.¹⁵ Both our case law and our reasons for developing the doctrine provide authority for applying qualified immunity in the same manner to both municipal police officers and county law enforcement officers.

We have previously held that a law enforcement officer exercises discretion in responding to an emergency call,¹⁶ entrusting a car to a jail inmate,¹⁷ executing a search warrant, and firing a gun at a suspect.¹⁸ Similarly, both officers in these cases were exercising their discretion when they decided to engage in a high speed pursuit against persons suspected of stealing a car.¹⁹ Allegations in the City of Savannah case that the officer ran the stop sign without turning on his blue lights or his siren do not change his decision to engage in a high speed pursuit into a ministerial act, but merely raise a question of fact concerning whether he drove with due regard for the public's safety.²⁰ There is no evidence that either officer Solomon or deputy Cameron acted with malice or an intent to injure in initiating or continuing the high speed chase of the fleeing suspects.²¹ Therefore, both trial courts properly granted summary judgment to the law enforcement officers based on their official or qualified immunity from personal liability, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed summary judgment in favor of Solomon in the City of Savannah case.

SOVEREIGN (GOVERNMENTAL) IMMUNITY

3. Besides being sued in their personal capacity, the law enforcement officers were also sued in their official capacity. Suits against "public employees in their official capacities are in reality suits against the state and, therefore, involve sovereign immunity."²² The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit.²³ Generally, a court should consider the issue of governmental immunity and its waiver before addressing issues of causation.²⁴

The Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may waive the immunity of counties, municipalities, and school districts by statute.²⁵ OCGA § 36-33-1 states...