Cameron v. Mullen

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
• Writing for the Court: BAZELON, , EDGERTON, Senior Circuit , and WRIGHT, Circuit
• Citation: Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 128 U.S. App. D.C. 235 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
• Decision Date: 02 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 20308.,20308.
• Parties: Dale C. CAMERON, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Appellant, v. Carolyn MULLEN, a/k/a Rita Raymond, Appellee.

387 F.2d 193 (1967)

Dale C. CAMERON, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Appellant, v. Carolyn MULLEN, a/k/a Rita Raymond, Appellee.

No. 20308.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued October 21, 1966.

Decided March 2, 1967.

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Mr. Thomas Lumbard, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. David C. Niblack, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), with whom Mr. Arthur J. Whalen, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, EDGERTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

During Mrs. Mullen's trial without jury in the Court of General Sessions on a misdemeanor charge of simple assault,¹ the court sua sponte adjourned the proceedings and committed her to Saint Elizabeths Hospital under D.C. Code § 24-301(a) (1961) hereinafter Subsection (a) for a determination of her competency to stand trial.² The hospital reported her competent. But it also reported that she suffered from a "personality pattern disturbance, paranoid personality," both at the time of the examination and at the time of the offense. The court thereupon found her competent to stand trial, and, after hearing further testimony, found her not guilty by reason of insanity, although she did not raise that defense and objected to the court's considering it. On the Government's motion, the court held a hearing and committed her to Saint Elizabeths expressly pursuant to Subsection (a) which provides that "prior to the imposition of sentence" a person may be committed if found of "unsound mind," or "mentally incompetent to stand trial." The subsection specifies no standard for release, but the order provided for confinement until she could meet the standards for release applied to the civilly committed.

Appellee then petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming inter alia that the Court of General Sessions had no jurisdiction to commit her under Subsection (a).³ The District Court issued the writ and ordered her released, on the ground that Subsection (a) did not empower the court to act after it entered the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Government appeals.⁴ We affirm.

I

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Overholser,⁵ Subsection (a) has been used not only for commitment for examination of competency to stand trial but also for the commitment after trial of those found not guilty by reason of insanity over their objection.⁶ Lynch was found not guilty by reason of insanity, although he sought to plead guilty, and was committed under D.C.Code § 24-301(d) (1961) hereinafter Subsection (d), which requires automatic commitment upon an acquittal based "solely on the ground that * * * the defendant was insane" at the time of the crime. The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to allow automatic commitment without a hearing on the issue of present insanity when the defense of insanity is thrust upon a defendant who objects.

The Court concluded: "We decide in this case only that if * * * the defendant, despite his own assertions of sanity, is found not guilty by reason of insanity, § 24-301(d) does not apply." (Emphasis supplied.) It added that: "If commitment is then considered warranted, it must be accomplished either by resorting to § 24-301(a) or by recourse to the civil commitment provisions * * *."⁷ In Cameron v. Fisher, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 320 F.2d 731 (1963), we considered the Supreme Court's reference to Subsection (a) as an alternative commitment procedure. We said that the "actual holding of the Court in Lynch * * * was not with respect to Section 301(a). * * * The holding was that the mandatory commitment requirement of Section 301(d) does not apply to a person acquitted on the ground of insanity when he * * * sought to plead guilty." Id. at 12, 320 F.2d at 734.

Although the availability of Subsection (a) was not urged in Lynch, or in any other case in any court as far as we are aware, and although its availability was unnecessary to the disposition of the question whether Subsection (d) applies to one who refuses to raise the insanity defense, the Court said, "it appears"⁸ that Subsection (a) is available for commitment of those acquitted by reason of insanity over their objection. But it also said that the legislative history of Subsection (d) showed that Congress was concerned only with commitment of those who had "pleaded insanity as a defense";⁹ that mandatory commitment for those who refused to plead the insanity defense would be "out of harmony with the awareness that Congress has * * * shown for safeguarding those suspected of mental incapacity against improvident confinement"¹⁰ in the civil commitment provisions; and finally that alternative commitment procedures, including civil commitment, would effectuate the legislative goal of protecting the public against the dangerously insane and yet aviod "improvident confinement."¹¹ Based upon these considerations, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend Subsection (d) to be applicable to persons who refuse to raise the insanity defense. The Court's comment — that "it appears Subsection (a) is * * * available" — must be viewed as "going beyond" the point "presented for decision" in Lynch. Hence, that comment is not controlling here, where "the very point is presented for decision." See Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 U.S. 6 Wheat. 264, 398, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

In Cameron v. Fisher, we also said that:

The Supreme Court\'s * * * reference to Section 301(a), along with civil commitment, as means for securing adjudication of unsoundness of mind, when a commitment under the mandatory provisions of Section 301 (d) is not proper * * * was not a holding that Section 301(a) was available after the criminal charge which brought the person into court had been entirely disposed of. The Court referred to Section 301(a) in connection with the "pretrial commitment" of an accused antedating a finding of guilt. It is in this light that we read the Court\'s further statement that since the inquiry under Section 301(a) "may be undertaken at any time `prior to the imposition of sentence,\' it appears to be as available after the jury returns a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as before trial." * * * But surely the time available after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, within which it was thus thought a commitment under Section 301 (a) for unsoundness of mind might be made, was not intended by the Court to be extended beyond the time the criminal charge is decided and the question of custody incident to the disposition of the charge is determined. 116 U.S.App.D.C. at 12, 320 F.2d at 734 (emphasis supplied).

Accordingly, we held in Fisher that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's dictum in Lynch, "the trial court * * * at the time of its order committing appellee to St. Elizabeths pursuant to a hearing under Section 301(a), was without jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of such commitment." Ibid.

The Government argues that Fisher is not controlling, because there a full year had elapsed between the time the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and the time the Government invoked Subsection (a). Here, it says, proceedings were instituted minutes after the judge's verdict. We think Fisher does not turn on length of time. When a person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, "the criminal charge is decided,"¹² and there is no "question of custody incident to the disposition of the charge" unless some statute requires further disposition. The language of Subsection (a) does not expressly provide for further disposition, and indeed seems to exclude it. We read the subsection as authorizing commitment only "prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of any period of probation." But there can be no sentence or probation period upon a verdict of not guilty, by reason of insanity or otherwise.¹³

Our conclusion that Subsection (a) does not authorize commitment after a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is buttressed by comparing Subsection (a) with Subsection (d), enacted at the same time. In Subsection (d) Congress expressly requires disposition by commitment.¹⁴ The absence of any comparable explicit direction or authorization in Subsection (a) makes clear that the subsection was not intended for post-verdict commitment.

There is another reason why Subsection (a) should not be read as authorizing the post-verdict commitment of respondent. When "it shall appear to the court from its own observations, or from prima facie evidence submitted to the court, that the accused is of unsound mind or * * * mentally incompetent so as to be unable" to stand trial, this subsection authorizes the court to confine him for the "reasonable" time required for "examination and observation and for care and treatment if * * * necessary." But the subsection further provides that if the hospital reports that the person is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent, the court may commit him to a mental hospital unless he or the Government objects, in which event the court must hold a hearing to determine "the competency of the accused to stand trial." Thus, although the section speaks of both unsoundness of mind and incompetency to stand trial, it empowers the court to hold a hearing only to determine competency.¹⁵

II

We think, moreover, that under the logic of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), serious constitutional doubts would attend any construction of Subsection (a) which authorized post-verdict indefinite confinement.

Baxstrom involved a New York statute¹⁶ which provided that when a prisoner, placed in a mental hospital while serving his time, was reaching the...